Outside In - Targeting Aid Within Communities by Strauss-Kahn, Camille
Outside In
Targeting Aid Within Communities
Camille Strauss-Kahn
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Arts and Science
Columbia University
2019
c©2019
Camille Strauss-Kahn
All rights reserved
Abstract
Outside In - Targeting Aid Within Communities
Camille Strauss-Kahn
In this volume, I present a collection of three articles that are representative of
my research on the targeting of humanitarian & development aid. These papers focus
on highlighting the role of non-targeted, non-elite community members in fostering
or hindering the process of aid distribution to vulnerable community members.
In the first paper, “Allocating Resources To The Poor: The Effects of Targeting
Instructions, Community Involvement and Monitoring”, I use a lab-in-the-field ex-
periment to examine resource allocation at the micro-level. More specifically, I study
how small groups within rural communities in eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo — each composed of elites, poor, and non-poor village members — decide to
share money among themselves. In a dictator-game like setting, I vary whether the
groups are provided with instructions to target the poor, whether the decision-making
process is private or public, and whether it is monitored by a third-party or not. I find
that (1) by themselves, instructions to target the poor seem to actually benefit both
the poor and the non-poor, but that (2) the effectiveness of targeting instructions
in reaching poor group members is largely moderated by the presence of community
members during the decision-making process, while (3) by contrast, monitoring does
not contribute much to the effective allocation of resources to the poor.
In the second paper, “Inside & Out: The Role of the Non-Poor in Targeting
Resources to the Poor”, I use a similar experimental set-up to study further the
nature of the community dynamics that affect the allocation of resources to the poor.
More specifically, I look at the role of non-poor, non-elite community members in
influencing how elites choose to allocate resources to the poor. I find evidence that (1)
community effects have to do with bargaining dynamics more than peer-pressure; (2)
non-elite, non-poor members of the community have an significant role in fostering the
allocation of resources to the poor, and that (3) their influence on resource allocation
depends crucially on existing alliances or rivalries between various group members.
Finally, in the third paper, “Is Bigger Always Better? How Targeting Bigger Aid
Windfalls Affects Capture and Social Cohesion”, co-authored with Laura Paler &
Kohran Koc¸ak, I model the provision of targeting instructions as enforcing a bargain-
ing environment in which three groups - the target group, the elites, and the excluded
group - compete over the aid windfall. I predict that success in aid targeting depends
primarily the size of the windfall, the relative influence and the historical relationships
between these three groups. Poor, vulnerable groups are more efficiently targeted in
environments in which the elites and the excluded group are rivals, as they will then
both prefer for the windfall to be allocated to the target group rather than for it to be
captured by one another. I provide support for these predictions using a regression
discontinuity design and original survey data from an aid program implemented in
Aceh, Indonesia.
With these three articles, I aim at providing a substantive theoretical and empir-
ical contribution to the growing literature on aid targeting effectiveness by bringing
light to the role in the targeting process of a part of recipient communities that is
otherwise largely overlooked, namely all those community members that are both in
the community, yet left out of targeted aid programs.
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Preface
Targeting is simply the task of ensuring that assistance reaches people
who need it, when and where they need it, in an appropriate form, in
appropriate quantities, and through effective modalities. Conversely, it
also aims to ensure that aid does not flow to people who do not need it.
Barrett, Food Aid After Fifty Years (2006)
All foreign aid to developing countries targets a particular recipient. At the
country-level, donors select which government receives official development assistance
(ODA) or not. For example, in 2015 the United States chooses to promote its foreign
policy interest by funding Nigeria over Mali in its fight against Boko Haram (US
Department of State, 2015). In the same time, the World Food Programme (WFP)
has decided to direct its food assistance within Nigeria to highly food insecure young
children in the North-Eastern part of the country (Brown, 2016). At the sub-national
level, aid agencies and NGOs target regions within countries, communities within re-
gions, households or even individuals within communities. Foreign aid cannot – and
is not intended to – reach everyone: a selection must occur as to who receives it.
Over the past 25 years, donors have increasingly chosen to target local aid distri-
butions to specific groups that are considered most in need or vulnerable within recipi-
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ent communities. Targeting the poorest, most vulnerable individuals or households is
now the norm for humanitarian and development aid and the international standard
when selecting beneficiaries of foreign aid. According to conservative calculations, the
World Bank’s commitments for such community-level development projects targeted
at the vulnerable has gone up from $325 million in 1996, to $2 billion in 2003, to $7
billion in 2008, to nearly $15 billion in 2014.1
While there is general consensus that targeting those most in need is necessary to
allocate scarce resources, empirical evidence from evaluations of targeted aid projects
suggests that the outcomes of these programs are mixed at best. They vary signifi-
cantly both in terms of whom ends up benefitting from the aid windfall, and how this
distribution affects social cohesion in the recipient community. Results range from
cases where aid reaches the designated beneficiaries effectively and exclusively to cases
where it is entirely diverted by some other group. Likewise, there are communities
that are satisfied with the outcome of the targeting program, and others where the
process of distributing to some and not others generates tensions and competition up
to the point of creating violent conflict (Young & Maxwell, 2009, de Sardan et al.,
2014, de Sardan, 2014).
It is not surprising per se that giving goods to some and not others within the same
community has the potential to yield adverse outcomes that are either conflicting with
the objectives of aid targeting in terms of efficiency (by diverting aid away from the
target group) or with the objectives of humanitarian and development programs in
terms of protection (by creating tensions in the recipient community between those
who get something and those who do not). Yet, as with foreign aid programs in
1These estimations have been calculated using World Bank project data reported by AidData.org.
I have included only spending earmarked as development projects and exclusively in sectors that
can be identified as community-level assistance. Notably, I have excluded budget-support as well as
public construction projects.
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general, targeted aid projects were launched long before there was compelling theory,
or compelling evidence, that proved they could work. The concern that aid be utilized
by those who most need it is a legitimate one. But it is yet to be established how aid
agencies can design programs to ensure this.
In my research, I have studied this variation in the outcomes of targeted human-
itarian and development assistance projects in which aid is distributed at the local
level in the form of divisible goods such as food, cash or objects. In articles not pre-
sented in this volume, I show that while targeting practices are myriad (depending
on the context in which they are implemented and the choices that were made in the
design of the aid program), targeting outcomes have patterns. Yet, I also show that
these patterns in the levels and types of aid diversion yielded by targeted distribu-
tions and in their broader social, political and economic consequences do not depend
neither on the design nor on the context of intervention. In the collection of three
papers presented in this volume, I argue to the contrary that the observed variation
is primarily explained by within-community dynamics, and more specifically by the
competition between various groups. In doing so, I offer a much needed theory of tar-
geting in which my main original contention is that it is specifically the role of those
who are not targeted to receive assistance that is paramount in explaining targeting
outcomes.
Targeting is “a double-edged sword” (Barrett, 2006). By selecting some and not
others as intended beneficiaries, targeting a windfall necessarily creates an outgroup.
The role of this outgroup in fostering or hindering the efficiency of targeted distribu-
tions has been largely ignored. Yet, it is a part of the recipient community that is
both inside (the community) and out (of the aid program) and typically has influ-
ence on resource allocation. By definition the outgroup is the non-targeted: it is the
rich to the poor, the strong and powerful to the weak and vulnerable. In practice,
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outgroups of aid targeting have many faces: traditional leaders, armed groups, host
communities, those not or less affected by conflict, droughts, floods,... And among
them, some are involved in aid distribution processes (typically local elites) while the
rest is not, henceforth referred to as the excluded group. I contend that depending on
their historical relationships, their respective influence and the stakes of the distribu-
tion, competition between these elites and the excluded can result in aid capture by
one or the other if one is significantly stronger than the other, or by both if they get
along well enough to collude, or in the actual distribution of the aid windfall to the
target group if they are both strong but don’t get along with one another.
Literature Review
My research builds on a substantive theoretical and operational literature on aid ef-
fectiveness and targeting. In the early 2000, Burnside & Dollar (2000) have presented
evidence that at the macro-level foreign aid has little benefits to recipient popula-
tions of developing countries that had poor policies. This vastly influential paper
has durably instilled doubt among economists, political scientists and practitioners
on the effectiveness of foreign aid. The potential of aid interventions for adverse ef-
fects has since been the object of growing attention (Easterly et al., 2004). At the
country-level, studies have shown that like for other valuable resources there is a po-
tential for capture of foreign aid (Collier, 2006, Morrison, 2012), that foreign aid can
reinforce bad governance and the lack of accountability of authorities toward their
population (Brautigam & Knack, 2004, Moss et al., 2006, Wright, 2009), that it can
induce rent-seeking behaviors and corruption (Svensson, 2000a, Djankov et al., 2008,
Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009, Grossman, 1992), that aid shocks can induce vio-
lence (Nielsen et al., 2011), and that assistance can also create a form of dependency
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among the recipients (Brautigam, 2000, Knack, 2001).
Practitioners have long assumed that it was the design of a targeted intervention
that mattered most in terms of fostering good outcomes (Sharp, 2001). Throughout
the 1990s, aid workers have experimented with varying some elements of interventions’
design looking for best practices and “the right way” to do aid (Taylor & Seaman,
2004).2 This belief in the existence of an ideal, “one-size-fits-all” targeting design is
still very much alive today (Slater et al., 2009). Many models of aid provision focus
their conceptual understanding of aid dynamics on the principal-agent relationship
between a donor - the aid agency - and a recipient - the community, envisioned as
a unitary actor (Paul, 2006a). And as a result, experts often tend to recommend
relying on monitoring to solve targeting errors, which are considered as nothing more
than residual outcomes (Killick, 2004).
However, there is growing evidence since the 2000s that aid interventions targeted
at the local level are in fact fraught with all the same problems than foreign aid in
general, and that adverse outcomes in targeted aid programs are a pervasive problem.
Various regional or program-level studies, in particular by the Feinstein Institute
Center (FIC) in recent years, provide suggestive evidence that aid project evaluations
tend to under-report targeting errors, and that adverse outcomes in aid programs may
actually stem from complex social dynamics within recipient communities.3 A new
trend has thus started to develop among practitioners and eventually in the literature
(Jaspars & Maxwell, 2008).
2Most notably, many have argued that conditional aid would work better than non-conditional aid,
that women recipient were less likely to capture aid windfalls for themselves, that transparency would
increase the accountability of the community, that community-based targeting would be empowering.
However, there is still limited to no compelling evidence that any of these specific schemes yields
better outcomes. See for example Mansuri & Rao (2003).
3See primarily the series on Targeting in Complex Emergencies in Columbia by Frize (2008), in
Ethiopia by Jaspars & Maxwell (2008), in Darfur by Maxwell & Burns (2008), and in South Sudan
Young & Maxwell (2009). See bibliography for additional work by FIC.
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In their efforts to improve targeted aid interventions, experts have started to take
into account characteristics of recipient communities rather than focusing solely on
the role of the aid agency and the nature of the intervention (Alatas et al., 2012a,
Banerjee et al., 2015). This new trend in targeting literature and practices has ar-
guably developed in two stages. First, the aid community has started to increasingly
think about how to properly define the target group. More specifically, aid agencies
have started considering the difference between objective and subjective notions of
poverty, and taking into account their economic, social, and political correlates. This
has led to the use of more refined targeting criteria with a historical shift from using
the concept of poverty to using the concept of vulnerability as a basis for entitlement
to assistance (Jaspars & Shoham, 1999a, Pritchett et al., 2000, Narbeth, 2001).4
More recently, scholars and practitioners have also started to take more into ac-
count the role of another important part of recipient communities, the elites (Platteau,
2004a, Fritzen, 2007, Dutta, 2009, Alatas et al., 2013a, Platteau et al., 2014). My
work, and in particular the three papers presented in this volume, follows in the
path such studies while building on my own experience in the field as a humanitarian
worker and as a researcher. In addition to the target group and the elites, I bring
light to the role of yet another part of recipient communities, namely all the other
members of the community at large. These are the people who live with or around
the elite and the target group, yet are both inside the community and formally out
of the aid program. I believe that one needs to understand their role and how they
4Semantically, the difference between these two notions in lay language may seem thin. But it has
several important practical consequences. The idea behind the notion of vulnerability —as opposed
to poverty— is that what puts people at risk of not being able to take care of themselves, and hence
what justifies external assistance, are not just economic factors. It can also be political, social, or
physiological factors (Morduch, 1994). In practice, the shift from poverty to vulnerability has led for
example to a broadening of targeting criteria to include not just the economic poor but also other
segments of the population such as young children, displaced persons, women head-of-household,
etc.
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interact with aid programs and their recipients in order to fully explain the outcomes
of a targeted program within a given community.
Contribution
The three standalone papers on aid targeting presented in this volume are part of
a broader research agenda. Overall, my research on the topic of targeting can be
broken down into three parts. First, I have provided the first macro-level large-N
empirical analysis of adverse outcomes in targeted aid programs and I have offered
a new typology to conceptualize them. Second, I have provided the first empirical
analysis of the causal effects of targeting instructions on resource allocation. Third,
I have built on these insights to offer a new theory of aid targeting that I have
tested empirically, and from which I have eventually derived policy implications. The
collection of empirical pieces presented hereafter correspond to the second and to the
beginning of the third part of this research agenda.
In “Allocating Resources to the Poor”, henceforth Paper 1, I look at the causal
effect of instructions to target the poor, community involvement and monitoring on
resource allocation at the micro-level. Using behavioral experiments within rural
communities in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), I examine how
small groups of villagers composed of elites, poor, and non-poor village members
decide to share money among themselves under various treatment conditions. I show
(1) that the effectiveness of targeting instructions is largely moderated by community-
level dynamics, but that (2) by contrast monitoring does not contribute much to the
effective targeting of the poor.
In “Inside & Out”, henceforth Paper 2, using a similar design, I look further into
the community dynamics that affect the allocation of resources to the poor. I show
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that (1) these community effects have to do with bargaining dynamics rather than
peer-pressure; (2) there is suggestive evidence that the non-elite, non-poor members
of the community have an important role in fostering the allocation of resources to the
poor, and that (3) the influence of these non-elite, non-poor community members on
resource allocation depends crucially on existing alliances or rivalries between various
group members.
Finally, in “Is Bigger Always Better?”, henceforth Paper 3, I use formal modeling
to offer a theory of targeting. More specifically, along with my two co-authors, Laura
Paler and Koran Koc¸ak, I argue that targeting instructions enforce a bargaining envi-
ronment in which three groups - the target group, the elites, and the excluded group
- compete over the aid windfall. I predict that targeting can result in capture by the
elites, capture by the excluded group or effective distribution to the poor depending
on the size of the windfall, the relative influence and the historical relationships be-
tween these three groups. The main intuition behind this new theory of targeting is
that poor, vulnerable groups are more efficiently targeted in environments in which
the elites and the excluded group are rivals, insofar as they will then both prefer for
the windfall to be allocated to the target group rather than for it to be captured by
one another. Using a regression discontinuity, I test these predictions in the context
of an aid program targeted to conflict victims in villages in Aceh, Indonesia.
When appropriate, I also mention in this volume my other research papers on aid
targeting for which drafts are available upon request. Together, all these pieces are
a substantive theoretical and empirical contribution to the growing literature on aid
targeting effectiveness. For reference, I will now briefly describe the contents of the
papers that are not included in this volume.
While there is a large number of impact evaluations for targeted aid programs
available individually, there is no systematic comparison of the social, political and
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economic outcomes of these programs, let alone of their adverse outcomes.5 This is in
part due to the long-held belief among aid practitioners that adverse targeting out-
comes, also called targeting “errors”, are merely residuals. In “Missing The Target”,
I look at targeting errors at the macro-level. Using unique cross-country data on tar-
geted aid projects in humanitarian and development programs around the world since
1990 that I have collected and coded, I show that (1) diversion of aid and conflict
are actually pervasive outcomes of targeted aid programs; (2) there is large variation
in the magnitude of these outcomes across aid programs, and that they vary inde-
pendently from one another; and (3) the variation in these outcomes is not explained
by macro-level data (such as country- or region-specific variables or context-related
variables) nor by program-level data (such as design choices for the intervention). In
“Just An Error?”, I further analyze patterns of missingness in the same dataset and
discuss incentives for aid agencies to under-report adverse outcomes in targeted aid
programs.
In “Hidden Figures”, I build further on my conclusions that inclusion errors and
exclusion errors are neither independent nor homogeneous categories. More specifi-
cally, I offer a new, more refined typology for the study of the adverse outcomes of
aid targeting that helps differentiate between phenomena that tend otherwise to be
lumped together, such as the capture and the sharing of aid for example. I use this
typology in a comparative case study of food aid distributions in South Sudan and
in Darfur between 2000 and 2015 in which I disaggregate aid programs outcomes as
well as conflict dynamics and population movements both spatially and temporally. I
show that: (1) despite the fact that these two cases are most similar at the aggregate
5The most notable attempts at providing a general overview of aid program outcomes are Barrett
(2006) on food aid and (Peppiatt et al., 2001) on cash transfers. However, both studies are limited
in their geographic range, their time span and the type of intervention they consider. And within
their own scope, neither is comprehensive either.
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level, there is more variation within these aid programs than across them; (1) there
are patterns in the outcomes of targeted distributions in terms of capture, sharing,
taxation, theft, exclusion, and conflict; and (3) that there are reasons to think that
community-level dynamics might account for these dynamics.
In “I’d Rather Lose Than Let You Win”, I generalize the model presented in
Paper 3 and offer an extension that examines the role of aid agencies and program
design in fostering good outcomes for targeted aid programs. More specifically, I look
at (1) how aid agencies can optimize the choice of targeting instructions under time
and information constraints, and (2) how the theoretical implications of aid targeting
vary with the primary objectives of aid organizations and the context of intervention.
Finally, in “Bringing the Outside In”, I use all the evidence I have accumulated to
derive policy implications as well as practical tools and frameworks that can be used
to better take into account the role of excluded groups in the design of aid programs.6
Scope and External Validity
The scope of the discussion in this volume is limited to the targeting of foreign
assistance distributed in the form of divisible goods to local, mostly rural communities.
Each of these three elements - foreign aid, divisible goods and communities - have
implications for the external validity of the results that are presented.
6In addition to these research papers, I also reference “Varying An Invariant”, a think piece that
offers a brief description of targeting practices and aims at constituting aid targeting as a proper
object of study for political science. In this piece, I show that despite the many possible choices in
theory for the design of targeted aid programs, time, cost and information constraints are such that
there is limited variation in the ways in which these programs are implemented in practice. I also
argue that the few choices that are left effectively carry such agenda-setting power that the process
of targeting, and who controls it, has become a highly political matter.
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Foreign Aid
I have restricted my research on targeting to the targeting of foreign aid that is
intended to be directly distributed and used by beneficiaries (as opposed to budget
supports or institution building, etc). There are many other types of situations in
which economic transfers are targeted to households or individuals: governments
target social policies toward some specific segments of their population, firms target
bonuses to their most productive workers, etc.7 But precisely because it is aid, and
because it is foreign, one can expect that, compared to government transfers and
productivity pay, aid targeting is going to display singular dynamics both in terms of
ownership of the windfall by the recipient and accountability between the recipient
and the donor.
One specificity of foreign aid compared to other transfers is that the donor is not
an agent to whom the recipient would act as a principal as is the case for an elected
government. Actually, the donor and the recipient do not have any form of contractual
relationship that binds them together outside of the allocation of the aid windfall. As
a result, there is no accountability mechanism that exists naturally, neither from the
donor to the recipient, nor the other way around. Another important characteristic of
foreign aid provision is that it is a situation in which a windfall is gifted rather than
earned by its recipient. Sociology studies have shown such situations raise complex
considerations about the legitimacy of the transfer both on the part of the donor and
on the part of the recipient. This is especially true when there is no possibility, as
is the case with foreign aid, for the recipient to give something back to the donor in
exchange, let alone something of similar value.8 The various aspects and effects of
7Parts of the theoretical contribution in this volume can apply more broadly to various contexts of
targeted policy interventions. I will discuss in more details such concerns about the external validity
of my research as appropriate.
8See first and foremost Mauss & Cunnison (1954) on the forms and functions of gifts in archaic
xxi
PREFACE
these lacks in ownership and in accountability inherent to foreign aid provision have
been discussed at length in the literature on aid effectiveness,9 and I will refer to these
discussions in the rest of this volume as appropriate.
Divisible Goods
The focus of my research is also restricted, within foreign aid, to the distribution of
divisible goods at the local level. There are three main types of such aid provision to
communities: food aid, cash transfers, and objects, also called non-food items. Non-
food items (NFIs) can typically be tents, blankets, pots and pans, kitchen ustensils,
soap and other hygiene items, jugs, clothes, etc. All three types of aid are highly
targeted.10 While restrictive, this still covers the vast majority of aid projects at the
local level. Targeted cash transfers within communities now represent more than $7
billion in the budget of the World Bank. As for food aid, out of nearly six million
metric tons of food aid provided worldwide in 2000 by WFP, about 83% was for
targeted distributions.
Because the goods distributed are divisible, they are rival in the economic sense.
And since they are targeted, they are also excludable by definition. As opposed to
health services, water and sanitation infrastructures, or education which are types
of foreign aid provision to communities that mostly function either as public or club
goods, targeted distributions are essentially private goods that can be coveted, com-
peted for, and even stolen by those who have not received them. As with many
societies.
9About accountability problems in aid distribution, see Brautigam (2000), Paul (2006a). About
ownership problems in aid distributions, see citetmaxwell2008c, maxwell2011.
10See (Strauss-Kahn, 2018h) for a discussion on the choice of aid type in the design of a targeted
program, and (Strauss-Kahn, 2018g) for more details on the breakdown of aid projects by type
of transfers. While aid can also be provided at the local level in the form of water and sanitation
infrastructures and education or health services, these are public or club goods that are not typically
targeted and hence not relevant for this study.
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easily extractible and valuable resources, the main question about targeted goods
then becomes to determine how much will actually be diverted from their intended
beneficiaries, and in which ways aid targeting and aid diversion will affect the social,
political and economic relationships between aid recipients and non-recipients within
a given community.
Community Distributions
The third scope restriction of my research is that I focus exclusively on distributions
within communities, although I have a rather loose understanding of what constitutes
a community. As noted by Maxwell & Burns (2008), the definition of a community
in an aid context is often problematic, and this is an idea that I will develop through-
out the volume. Aid distribution systems are often based on an idealistic notion of
community and little attention is paid to existing social and cultural realities.
By community, I mean an ecosystem or a set of people who live together within
a given geographical area, compete over the same basic resources, and interact with
each other on a regular basis. Because I use a geographical criteria rather than a po-
litical one, communities are not necessarily composed of populations that have strong
historical ties with one another. It encompasses for example displaced populations
that arrive at a given site from multiple locations. The competition criteria serves to
define a minimum level of co-dependency between community members. For exam-
ple, it generally excludes most aid projects in urban settings, but it comprehends in
a given area both displaced populations and their host communities. Finally, the in-
teraction criteria serves to include non-traditional relationships between populations
that live within a given area and share resources, such as for example the relationship
of members of armed groups to the villages in which their families live.
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Communities are thus defined both in terms of primary groups (indigenous in-
stitutions that are ascriptive, including kinship ties, traditional political institutions,
authority structures, and territorial networks, ...) and in terms of secondary groups
that include social and economic organizations (Chazan, 1992). In a way, it opens
the possibility of a “moral economy” without presupposing it and combines it with
self-preserving individualistic tendencies that could include elite capture of goods and
services (Scott, 1976, Sardan, 1999).
A lot of aid diversion and corruption can also happen before aid reaches recipient
communities.11 Transparency International (2014) even dedicates an entire section
of their report on corruption to institutional and agency-level risks. While these
phenomena are definitely important in getting the fuller picture about aid diversion,
I am not going to address them in this volume. I focus on what happens to the aid that
actually reaches local communities. Given the loose definition of communities that I
have just given, this still includes to some extent for example cases of trucks that are
stopped by roadblocks on their way to recipient communities, but such occurrence
will not be central to the discussion.
Methods
The topic of aid targeting lends itself to particular methodological pitfalls. Each of
them is discussed in more details as they are encountered in the rest of this volume.
In this introduction, I provide an overview of the major challenges posed by the study
of targeting and discuss the ways I have found to resolve them. In general, I have
tried to approach my object of study in as many different ways as I could think of.
11For example, in February 2007, WFP received an anonymous tip that lower level local employees
in key positions of implementing agencies were diverting food deliveries, building supplies for per-
sonal gain, in their programs in India. Similar examples are available in several other countries
(Transparency International, 2014).
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I have used various levels-of-analysis, various empirical and theoretical methods and
various qualitative and quantitative data collection technique, including large-N cross-
country data analysis, lab-in-the-field experiments, regression discontinuities, case
studies, game theory, data mining, surveys, interviews, participatory observation,...
I strongly believe that it is the combination of all these approaches that ensures the
consistency and validity of the results that I present.
Causality
The study of targeting raises many of the same challenges that are encountered by aid
effectiveness studies, and in general by social science studies that aim at determining
the effect of a phenomenon for which there is no observable counterfactuals. How do
I determine the causal effect of targeting when I cannot know how the allocation of
an aid windfall would differ if it was not targeted? How can I compare it to what
the allocation of a non-aid windfall would have been? How can I estimate what the
situation would have been if there had not been any aid distributed at all? While
there is no general answer to such questions, I have attempted to the best of my
ability to answer them in various ways.
In Paper 1 & 2, I look at the causal effect of targeting instructions on the alloca-
tion of a non-aid windfall at the micro-level using an field experiment, and I discuss
the limitations of such experimental designs as abstract constructs used to represent
complex realities. In Paper 3, I consider the limitations of quasi-experimental designs
in terms of external validity, and I briefly discuss the difference between assumptions
and hypotheses in theory-building when using a game-theory model. In other work,
I discuss the importance of identification strategies when considering correlations in
macro-level quantitative observational data Strauss-Kahn (2018g).
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Data
Another methodological difficulty arises from the fact that aid targeting is a relatively
new topic of study for political science: there is no existing, consistent, reliable data
on the outcomes of targeted aid programs. For the purpose of my research, I have
collected and / or compiled a lot of new data at various levels-of-analysis. In doing so,
I have had to give a lot of thought to the proper variables that I could and / or needed
to consider and control for. In Paper 1 & 2, I discuss the attention given to building
culturally sensitive survey questionnaires as well as some additional considerations
about ethical data collection in the field. In Paper 3, l discuss concerns with the
lack of variance in survey questions that had not been tested ahead of time. In
other work, I discuss in more details the difficulties of inference-making on data from
secondary sources as well as the challenges of implementing large-scale data mining
in a comprehensive, systematic manner so as to get a sample with no selection bias
Strauss-Kahn (2018g,c).
Measurement
Finally, the study of aid targeting also shares some of the methodological problems
of studies related to corruption and / or violence: the topic is hard to study because
outcomes tend to be both inconsistently reported and under-reported. In Paper 1
& 2, I discuss some of the challenges of measuring behaviors and attitudes at the
micro-level that respondents might have an incentive to lie about, as well as the
importance of multiple measurements in surveys for questions on which respondents
are susceptible of answering strategically. In Paper 3, I discuss the difficulties of
measuring theoretical variables with empirical indicators that are imperfect proxies
as well as the proper use of suggestive anecdotal evidence gathered during field work.
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In other work, I discuss issues of censoring and missingness (Strauss-Kahn, 2018f), as
well as issues of reliability with qualitative measurements and recall data (Strauss-
Kahn, 2018c).
Overall, I have used all the methods at my disposal to study the multi-faceted
phenomenon that is aid targeting. Each of them individually presents challenges and
can only uncover a little part of the story. Yet taken together and used properly, I
believe that these various pieces of the puzzle effectively help getting at the bigger
picture. What remains are difficulties specific to research topics that are both of
academic interest and have important policy implications. How can I make useful
recommandations and develop practical tools from theoretical inferences? How do I
take into account the constraints in time and information that decision-makers are
actually facing? These are issues that are largely discussed in Strauss-Kahn (2018b).
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Allocating Resources to the Poor
The Effects of Targeting Instructions,
Community Involvement and Monitoring
Camille Strauss-Kahn∗
Abstract
Efficiently allocating resources to the poor is a major concern for all sorts
of social transfers, and in particular in the distribution of foreign aid. In
this paper, I estimate the causal effect of three highly prevalent factors
in the process of distributing foreign aid at the local level — targeting
the poor, community involvement and monitoring. More specifically, I
use dictator-game-like distributions among small groups of people from
rural communities in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to deter-
mine whether the decision to allocate resources to poor group members,
non-poor group members and elites is affected by the provision of in-
structions to target the poor, the presence of community members during
decision-making and the monitoring of the decision by a third-party. I find
that what primarily increases the share of the windfall that poor group
members receive is the presence of other community members during the
decision-making process. By contrast, I find little to no evidence that
monitoring increases the allocation of resources to the poor at all. As for
instructions to target the poor, by themselves they are in fact less effective
than community involvement in ensuring that the poor benefits from the
windfall. Their effect is also complex: they actually benefit both the poor
and the non-poor and seem to be essentially understood as a signal that
the windfall is not intended to benefit elites.
∗Ph.D. candidate, Columbia University (Email: cs2899@columbia.edu). The author would like to
thank Macartan Humphreys, Chris Blattman, Grant Gordon, and the participants of the advising
group at Columbia University as well as all the group from WZB. The author would also like to
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Allocating resources to the poor in the most efficient manner is a major concern
for all sorts of social transfers, and it is most of all paramount in the distribution of
foreign aid. Targeting the poorest, most vulnerable individuals has become the norm
for the distribution of humanitarian and development resources at the local level.
Rather than distributing money, food, and non-food items to entire villages, non-
governmental organizations usually identify a restricted pool of beneficiaries within
recipient communities and attempt to deliver assistance only to them. More than 85
percent of the aid intended for individuals now takes the form of targeted distribu-
tions of such divisible goods (Wahlberg, 2008, Barrett, 2006). Yet, as with foreign
aid programs in general, targeted aid projects were launched long before there was
compelling theory, or compelling evidence, that proved they could work (Maxwell &
Burns, 2008).
The results of targeted distributions are often not what aid agencies originally
expected nor intended (Strauss-Kahn, 2018g). The outcomes of targeted aid programs
vary significantly in terms of whom in recipient communities ends up benefiting from
the aid windfall as well as in terms of whether beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are
satisfied with the aid program or not (Jaspars & Shoham, 1999a). Results range from
situations where aid reaches the designated beneficiaries effectively and exclusively to
cases where it is entirely diverted by one or several other groups which are arguably
not the most vulnerable, such as elites, well-off population groups or even armed
groups (Paler et al., 2018). Likewise, there are communities that are satisfied with
the outcome of targeted distributions, and others where the process of distributing
to some and not others generates dissatisfaction, tensions and competition up to
the point of creating violent conflict between those who have received part of the
aid windfall and those who have not (Young & Maxwell, 2009, de Sardan et al.,
2014, de Sardan, 2014). Getting a better understanding of what makes for successful
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targeting is thus an essential step in the perspective of increasing aid efficiency.
Aid agencies usually face high cost, time and information constraints in the field,
such that there is little variation in the way targeting is implemented at the local
level.12 Most commonly, an NGO will come to a village and inform community mem-
bers that an aid windfall is intended for the most vulnerable among them. It will
then rely to some extent on local leaders to make the actual allocation, and will mon-
itor the distribution of goods to the best of its ability before leaving the village. In
other words, targeting aid is a complex process which can not be simply reduced to
the provision of targeting instructions. Notwithstanding the context of intervention,
there are three elements that are characteristic of targeted distributions: the pro-
vision of some instructions to target poor community members, the involvement of
the recipient community in the process albeit in various ways and to various degrees,
and some level monitoring by the aid agency.13 While it stands to reason that com-
munity involvement and monitoring are two important factors that could possibly
moderate the effect of targeting criteria, aid programs can hardly improve effectively
without better knowledge of the relative impact of each of these elements on windfall
allocation.
Aid agencies usually assume that the effectiveness of their targeting depends either
12In theory, the design of a targeted aid program can vary in terms of which group is targeted within
the recipient community and how targeted community members are identified. While the general
principle is always to reach those community members who are most in need, the actual definition of
targeting criteria and indicators can be either based on status - for example displaced populations,
women, the elderly - or on needs - such as the poor, conflict or disaster-affected populations. The
design of a targeted aid program can also vary in terms of targeting levels and methods (geographical
or household targeting, administrative or community-based targeting, etc). In other work, I discuss
in more details the constraints that prompt aid agencies in practice to pool on a limited number of
designs depending on the context of intervention (Strauss-Kahn, 2018h).
13In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, I use the term “poor” as a generic characteristic of target
groups. In general, the consensus among aid organizations since the 1990s is that aid targeting
should aim at reaching the most “vulnerable” community members. In humanitarian jargon, the
concept of vulnerability is meant to encompass a complex definition of needs that focuses not only on
the economic dimension of poverty but also on social and political factors. In other work, I discuss in
more details the possible nuances in the definition of targeting instructions (Strauss-Kahn, 2018c).
3
PAPER 1 - TARGETING THE POOR
on the fairness and acceptability of the targeting criteria, the degree of transparency
of the process within the recipient community, or the quality of their monitoring
(Transparency International, 2014). But the mere suggestion that targeting does
something at all can seem surprising. The period of time for which an aid organi-
zation actually interacts with the recipient community of an aid program is rather
short.14 Why should the fact that a relative stranger gives instructions about how
to allocate resources matter at all to a community that has long-standing relations,
practices, and traditions? In the absence of a counterfactual, there are actually no
ways to know for sure that targeting really makes community leaders allocate re-
sources differently than they would have otherwise. There is even evidence to the
contrary: elites seem to actually do whatever they want in any case. Even when
WFP aid workers attempt to bypass local power structures and organize direct dis-
tributions to households, local leaders are frequently reported to organize and oversee
a ‘re-distribution’ of the food within the community after the ‘official’ distribution is
finished and the aid organization has left (Duffield, 1996, Narbeth, 2001).
In this paper, I study the causal effect of targeting instructions, community in-
volvement and monitoring on resource allocation. Building on large literature in social
psychology about the determinants of allocation decisions in small groups of people, I
have identified three theoretical pathways through which the aforementioned factors
could affect the allocation of an aid windfall: distributor effects, group effects, and
third-party effects. To test for these effects, I use a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural
villages in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in which I combine three
treatments with a factorial design. More specifically, I measure behaviors and atti-
14The length of time between the first contact with a recipient community and the end-line distribution
of goods can vary from approximately 3 weeks to 2 years depending on whether the aid program
is implemented in an emergency or a development context. During this time, aid workers will only
have sporadic contacts with the recipient community.
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tudes of small groups of five villagers —among which there is one member of the elite,
two poor and two non-poor villagers— when I ask them to allocate money among
themselves in the form of 27 tokens in a dictator-game like setting. In these distribu-
tions, I randomize whether the distributor is provided with instructions to target the
poor or not, whether decision-making is done in the presence of other group members
or not, and whether the enumerator actively monitors the decision-making process or
not.
The Kivus region in eastern DRC, in which I have gathered the empirics for this
study, is currently one of the world’s most complex and long-standing humanitarian
crisis. This allows me to leverage both a relevant context and rich data about real-life
power structures, social roles, and relationships between participants. First, because
rural villages in eastern DRC are used to the presence of humanitarian organizations,
asking villagers to allocate resources among themselves while providing them with
targeting criteria was not considered as a surprising nor an artificial exercise by the
participants. Second, since these villages are rather small, study participants are
likely to interact with one another on a regular basis, such that I can use interesting
variation in how much they know, like or trust each other as control measures.
Overall, I find limited support for an effect of targeting instructions on their own
(distributor effects) and strong support for an effect of the presence of group mem-
bers during decision-making (group effects) in the way targeting is affecting resource
allocation. It is the presence of other group members during decision-making that has
the biggest impact on resource allocation overall. More specifically, I find that both
targeting instructions and public decision-making diminish the share of the windfall
that the elites keep for themselves. But while by themselves instructions to target
the poor actually benefit both poor and non-poor group members to the detriment
of elites, it is when combined together that targeting instructions and community
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involvement are effective in targeting the poor: the share of the windfall allocated to
the poorer recipients is biggest in targeted, public distributions. By contrast, I find
little to no effect of monitoring in general (third-party effects), and I find that in this
experiment monitoring only affects private decision-making. While all these treat-
ment effects are significant and robust across specifications, I also find that baseline
allocation decisions, especially in public distributions, tend to be egalitarian. In other
words, I find that what targeting instructions, monitoring and public distributions
affect is whom in the group receives one or two extra tokens, after the distributor
has seemingly given 5 of the 27 tokens to each of the five group members, including
themselves.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that group effects are most impor-
tant in explaining effective allocation of resources to the poor. By contrast, the results
presented in this paper suggest that monitoring by a third-party is a surprisingly in-
efficient way to target the poor. Thus, this paper suggests that properly harnessing
the community dynamics at play in public distributions may be a more promising
way to improve the efficiency of targeted aid programs than investing in the capacity
of an aid agency to enforce its targeting criteria through monitoring and sanctions
mechanisms. Consistent with observations in aid targeting contexts, this paper also
highlights the existence of strong sharing norms in recipient communities and the
traditional role of elites in conflict management that can both foster and hinder the
effective reaching of the poor. While these findings warrant further work in unpacking
the precise nature of the group effects observed in public settings, they contribute to
a better understanding of what makes the targeting of foreign aid effective or not,
and of some of the dynamics of social transfers in general.
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1 Theory
Aid targeting is a public and monitored process in which an aid agency provides local
elites with a windfall and specific instructions to distribute it to those most poor
in the recipient community. While it is largely assumed that targeted distributions
yield resource allocations that are more beneficial to the poor than non-targeted
distributions, there is no clear predictions about what part of the process of targeting
brings about this result (Maxwell & Burns, 2008).15 Building on a large literature in
social psychology about allocation decision in small groups, I have determined that
the ways in which targeting can affect windfall allocation can typically be classified in
one of three broad categories of explanation: 1/ distributor effects, 2/ group effects,
and 3/ third-party effects.
The nature and degree of involvement of traditional elites in defining targeting
criteria and identifying beneficiaries can vary. Yet elites seem to invariably end up
acting as a distributor once an aid program is implemented in their village, whether
the aid agency in charge actually wants it or not.16 By distributor effects, I mean all
the ways in which the local elites’ own preferences —which can include both their
self-interest and considerations about norms of justice— affect how they decide to
allocate resources.
15What allocation is “more beneficial” to the poor is a complex matter, insofar as the effects of
targeting are multi-dimensional. They include not only economic and distributional aspects, but
also social and political ones. As I have argued in other work, in some contexts, allocations to the
poor that are smaller in size are still more beneficial, for example in terms of diminishing the level
of conflict in the community (Paler et al., 2018). In this paper, however, I only look at allocations
in terms of amount received.
16Arguably, if ones takes out of the equation the aid agency and the rest of the community for a second,
aid distribution at the local level is very similar to a dictator-game in which a distributor, the elites,
have to allocate resources to a receiver, the target group. By construction, this receiver is a weak
group with no bargaining power, insofar as it was designated to receive the windfall precisely because
it is poor, vulnerable and otherwise marginalized from resource allocations. As with dictator games
in general, the preferences of the distributor will matter most in explaining the final allocation.
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Research in social psychology has long shown that, in dictator games, the pre-
dictions that distributors follow purely their self-interest are not verified. Allocation
decisions are actually a mix of economic self-interest - which prompts a distributor
to keep as much of the windfall as she can for herself - and some form of altruistic
considerations (Blanco et al., 2011), which typically have a lot to do with conceptions
of fairness (Messick & Sentis, 1983, Brockner et al., 2001, Van Dijk et al., 2004).
Similarly, the provision of instructions to target the poor to elites in an aid target-
ing context could potentially affect one of two things: the relative importance that
elites gives to altruistic considerations over egoistic ones, and the nature of these
altruistic considerations. The literature shows that different norms of justice - such
as procedural justice or distributive justice for example - can be applied to a single
situation and typically lead to different allocations within a group (Lind & Tyler,
1988, Tyler, 1994), and that framing effects can affect the type of norms applied to a
given situation (Larrick & Blount, 1997, Blount & Larrick, 2000). One could expect
that targeting instructions act as a framing mechanism on the elites and affect the
norms of justice the elites apply to the aid allocation or their perception of the in-
tended recipient (Kravitz & Gunto, 1992). In other words, it could be that targeting
instructions convince the elites that giving to the poor is the appropriate thing to do
when it is not their opinion in the first place.
There is little actual evidence of what traditional elites consider a fair allocation
of resources to begin with, let alone evidence that targeting instructions could change
their mind on the subject. The evaluation literature provides some support for the
idea that different conceptions of fairness are at play in aid targeting and that they
are often conflicting with one another (Maxwell & Burns, 2008, Young & Maxwell,
2009). On the one hand, aid agencies partake in the ideals of distributive justice
that are widely spread in western societies and believe that the fairest allocation of
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resources is to distribute to the poor. On the other hand, recipient communities
are often reported to see targeting as “not fair” and ideals of procedural justice are
typically opposed at least by some to attempts at targeting the poor: “what is fair
is to give to everyone”. But it is less clear whether such “universal” norms of justice
are in fact universally shared within recipient communities, and in particular how
strongly traditional elites partake in them.17
Distributor effects could also be strictly speaking elite effects (Brass & Burkhardt,
1993). Elites’ behavior and their sensitivity to targeting instructions or lack thereof
could be the consequence of their political role and responsibilities within the com-
munity in general rather than the result of their position as a distributor within the
aid allocation system. But it is not clear whether one should expect elites’ prefer-
ences to be prosocial or not. On the one hand, as political representatives and public
servants, elites are typically expected to care more about the public good and to be
more accountable to the poor than other community members. Yet since in most aid-
related contexts elites are not elected representatives, it could also be on the contrary
that traditional leaders cater more to their own interests or to the interests of other
segments of their polity than the poor. As a matter of fact, some aid agencies do
seem to believe so, since they sometimes try to bypass local elites by picking some-
one else in the community as a distributor such as with the creation of food relief
committees by the World Food Programme. Yet there is little evidence to date that
aid targeting affects resource allocation differently depending on how the distributor
is picked within the recipient community.
17The idea that recipient communities are generally not poor-oriented societies is often an assumption
on the part of aid agencies more than an assessment. This assumption is often very strong among
aid workers and it is implicitly self-supported (“if these societies were taking care of their poor,
there would be no need for targeting”). It serves both as a justification for targeting itself and as a
“proof” that that it works (“target groups are vulnerable precisely because outside of the context
of aid targeting they tend to get less than others from resources allocation at the village level”).
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On the other hand, distributors have been shown to be significantly influenced
in their decision-making by other group members (Messick & Sentis, 1983, Robert &
Carnevale, 1997, Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998). In the context of aid targeting, influential
community members could very well influence elites’ decisions through peer-pressure
or bargaining, especially since the elites will have to stand by these decisions toward
the rest of the community even after the aid agency has left. The role that commu-
nities at large play in the targeting process has been subject to growing attention.
Numerous aid programs now directly involve communities in the design of targeting
aid programs in the belief that members of the community are better positioned than
government or aid agencies to identify qualified recipients and get goods to them ef-
ficiently. While it is widely appreciated that involving communities in identification
and distribution raises the prospect that local leaders will influence the allocation
process in a way that benefits them or their supporters (Alatas et al., 2013a), there
is also evidence that involving the community at large can also be accountability and
legitimacy enhancing (Winters, 2012, Alatas et al., 2012a). It is possible that the
public nature of aid programs could also serve to keep elites in check and counter-
balance their natural tendency to over-favor their self-interest in resource allocation.
I call such explanations in which it is the rest of the community that influences the
elites’ decisions groups effects. Group effects, whether in the form of peer-pressure or
bargaining dynamics, are the results of community involvement, insofar as they can
only be at play when decision-making is public to some extent.
In some regards, it may be more credible for group effects to affect allocations
rather than for distributor effects, especially in one-off distributions like most hu-
manitarian emergencies. Distributor effects simply hinge on the fact that instruc-
tions given by a third-party are sufficient to convince elites to change their long-held
preferences over resource allocations. Yet, while long-run, repeated framing effects
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can influence preference formation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1985, Brewer & Kramer,
1986, Slovic, 1995), there is little compelling evidence that isolated framing effects
can have strong effects on preferences, let alone long-lasting ones (Levin et al., 1998,
Druckman, 2004). On the other hand, groups effects are consistent with the fact
that community members have long-standing relationships with one another. Recent
work on dictator games has also shown that altruistic preferences actually tend to
disappear in private, anonymous distributions which further suggests that it may be
the fact that the targeting process is public or monitored that actually fosters its
efficiency (Winking & Mizer, 2013).
The third family of explanations that could account for differences in allocation
between non-targeted and targeted windfalls are third-party effects. One other major
way in which aid targeting is different from other situations in which resources are
allocated within a community is that there is third-party overseeing the process,
namely the aid agency. Third-party effects regroup all the mechanisms that hinge on
the presence of the aid organization during distributions, which range from Hawthorne
effects (it is simply the presence of an external observer that matters)18 to effects that
have more to do with the capacity of the aid agency to enforce sanctions of rewards.19
It is a long-held belief in the aid community that monitoring plays a big role in
making aid targeting effective, and in particular that it can help supersede adverse
community dynamics. Yet, this has not been substantiated with empirical evidence
to date, and there are also good reasons to think that monitoring and sanctions may
not be strong incentives to respect targeting criteria in the context of aid programs.
In practice, most aid agencies have little to no effective monitoring capacities nei-
ther during nor after a program. Simple monitoring of distributions is already very
18Wallace (2015) also calls it the “Heisenberg’s lesson of aid intervention”.
19The community and /or distributor could either expect sanctions if they don’t comply or expect
benefits from repeated interactions with the aid organization if they comply.
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complicated. Most aid agencies often only check that the individuals that come to the
distribution correspond to lists of beneficiaries that have been established. However
that doesn’t guarantee that the beneficiaries’ lists were drafted correctly in the first
place, nor does it prevent the re-allocation of resources once the NGO has left. Sim-
ilarly, the idea that aid agencies as a principal can effectively enforce sanctions and
rewards toward the recipient community a their agent is not very credible.20 Once
funds have been received from donors and work with the community has begun, it is
very unlikely that an aid agency will decide not to proceed with the planned distri-
butions, a reality of which recipient communities are probably aware.21 Sanctions to
individual contraveners are also unlikely. First, the imposition of sanctions supposes
effective complaint mechanisms. While such mechanisms usually formally exist, they
are not much used to report targeting errors or incidents. Second, it supposes that
individual sanctions can actually be enforced. But aid workers are not likely to come
back to the recipient community and get back distributed goods from individuals
that were not supposed to receive them. Overall, there are reasons to think that
monitoring has much less effect on resource allocation than is usually expected.
Finally, there is yet another way in which the provision of targeting instructions
could affect the allocation of aid resources, namely through learning effects. There
20The fact that the decision-making process is monitored by a third-party can either make the dis-
tributor care about norms of fairness or make the community compelled to enforce them. Sev-
eral principal-agent frameworks would adequately describe this situation, in particular three-tiered
models with a principal (the aid agency), a supervisor (the elites) and an agent (the rest of the
community) (Pendergast, 2001). Since aid workers usually do not have not long-standing, sustained
relationship with recipient communities, the capacity of the aid agency, as a principal, to successfully
enforce a contract over the respect of targeting criteria with the community hinges on its monitor-
ing capacities and its credible commitment to enforce sanctions if targeting instructions are not
respected.
21In very rare cases, NGOs have threatened “misbehaving” recipient communities with stoping the
aid program and pulling back when targeting criteria were not respected. This was the case for
example with an OXFAM program in eastern DRC in 2013 that was fraught with corruption and
capture. But, in the end, as in most cases, the incident was often “resolved” somewhat peacefully
by loosening targeting criteria to include a larger pool of beneficiaries.
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is some anecdotal evidence of a long-time framing effect of aid targeting instructions
at the community-level. The increased number of complex emergencies since the
1990s has resulted in multiple, repeated humanitarian and development interventions
targeting the same geographical areas and the same populations. Aid workers now
report that recipient communities that have become “used to” receiving assistance
often display learned behaviors such as being less resistant to the imposition of tar-
geting criteria than “first-timers” and even facilitating the process of targeting by
having lists ready, or even having “the vulnerable” present themselves upfront for
identification.22 According to observers, it is not so much that prolonged exposure
to targeted aid transfers contributes to reshape distributive preferences either on the
part of the recipient community at large or of its elites, nor that these communities
have abandoned their traditional conceptions of fairness (Maxwell & Burns, 2008). It
is rather that they strategically adjust their behaviors or display attitudes that are
believed to yield more benefits (Cason & Mui, 1998, Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000).
2 Empirics
Now let us explore empirically what it is, if anything, about providing targeting
instructions, involving the recipient community, or monitoring by a third party that
actually changes how resources are allocated. To distinguish between various possible
explanations for the effect of targeting on resource allocation, I have gathered data
in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo about how carefully selected groups of
villagers choose to allocate money among themselves in various situations. Each group
in the sample is composed of five people from the same village: one is a member of the
22Arguably, the fact that “being a vulnerable” (rather than “being vulnerable”) has become an identity
marker in places that receive assistance regularly suggests a strategic use of humanitarian linguo
and targeting categories.
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local elites, two are sampled from the poorer half of the village, and the other two are
sampled from the other half of the village (the richer half). In each group, one person
is in charge of allocating a sum of money among themselves and the four other group
members. Using a 2×2×2 factorial design, I vary three things about these allocations:
whether the distributor is asked to target poor group members or not (Treatment 1:
targeted or non-targeted distributions), whether the distributor is alone when making
a decision or whether other group members are present (Treatment 2: private or public
distributions), and whether the enumerator is obviously and actively monitoring the
distributor’s decision or not (Treatment 3: monitored or non-monitored distributions).
I then compare the share of the windfall that is allocated to the two poorer group
members, to the elite and to the two non-poor group members in each of the eight
treatment conditions.
The distributor effects, group effects and third-party effects described in the pre-
vious section can be identified with specific combinations of the three treatments.
Distributor effects are observable as the effect of targeting instructions in private,
non-monitored allocations. Community or group effects can only be at play in public
allocation, whether monitored or not. Conversely, third-party effects can be observed
when comparing monitored allocations, whether public or private, to non-monitored
allocations. The design also allows for the exploration of the various interactions
between the three treatments.
2.1 Context
In order to leverage a relevant context and rich data about real-life power structures,
social roles, and relationships between participants, I have gathered the empirics
for this study in the regions of North-Kivu and South-Kivu in eastern Democratic
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Republic of the Congo (DRC).23 Since 2004, armed conflict, general insecurity and the
lack of economic development in the Kivus region have contributed to create one of
the world’s most complex and long-standing humanitarian crisis. With one out of ten
persons forcefully displaced at least once in the past decade and in need of assistance,
it has become one of the largest humanitarian mission currently in operation.
In 2017, out of the 208 relief organizations operating in the entire country, 162
organizations were regularly assisting internally displaced persons (IDPs) in east-
ern DRC by distributing food, relief items (such as tents, cooking ustensils, hygiene
kits, ...) or cash transfers (OCHA, 2017). While most of these aid projects target
specifically IDPs in their sites of displacement, similar programs that seek to assist
vulnerable individuals more generally both among displaced and host populations are
also quite common. Overall, whether they happen to have directly benefited from as-
sistance or not, rural villages in eastern DRC are used to the presence of humanitarian
organizations.24
Despite the increasing appeal of Goma and Bukavu, the two major local urban
centers, the population of North- and South-Kivu is still largely rural. Most of these
rural communities are agro-pastoralist, with small trade being the second most com-
mon activity and source of income. Small rural villages such as those sampled for
this study usually comprises from 50 to 150 households. With an average of 5 mem-
bers per household, such that one could more or less argue that everybody knows
everybody in these communities.
As in many humanitarian and development contexts, the definition of poverty
23While the same effects of targeting and its moderators could theoretically be observed in the lab,
among participants that do not know each other, I believe I am much more likely to recover effects of
interest in this context, especially since I don’t have to prime group members about their respective
roles.
24In that regard, I would argue that in the study sample, while all villagers were by no means “used” to
assistance, asking them to allocate resources among themselves while providing them with targeting
criteria was not a surprising nor weird exercise for them either.
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in rural eastern DRC is complicated, insofar as sources of vulnerability are not just
economic but also social, ethnic and political. While arguably everybody is poor with
regard to international standards, there are still observable differences between the
poorest and richest individuals in each village. For example, in all of the villages in the
sample, the poorest decile of respondents reported earnings less than $4/month while
the richest respondents declared earning more than $150/month. In most villages,
the population can be broken down into wealth categories using indicators defined
by the community itself: in informal discussions, the groups often self-identify as
‘better-off’, ‘regular’ or ‘very poor’ (Save The Children, 2002).25 Indicators of wealth
differ from one village to the next, but overall the two most important criterion of
wealth are access to land and therefore the size of the plots cultivated, as well as the
number of small livestock a household owns. Typically, “better-off” households own
between 1 to 3 hectares of cultivated land and have a few chickens, goats, sheep, or
cows. Poorer people, on the other hand, work in fields owned by others for around
500 Congolese Francs (CF) per day — about .5$US— and own no livestock if one
chicken.
In those villages, political power is largely concentrated in the hands of the village
chief, who is most of the time male (90%) and whose authority is derived from custom
rather than election. As such, the village chief is not particularly accountable to
poorer segments of the village population. Traditionally, the primary role of the chief
is in fact to allocate land and to settle disputes in the village. In fact, according
to 87% of respondents in my baseline survey, the village chief is expected to treat
everyone in the community equally, and only 4% of respondents consider that taking
25See Household Economic Assessment methodology. According to some focus groups, it would seem
that ‘rich’ households no longer exist in most of the villages in the sample due to their migration to
urban centres during the periods of conflict. For that reason, I prefer henceforth to talk about the
poor and the non-poor in each village.
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care of the poor is one of the roles of the chief. On the other hand, the chief is expected
to benefit to some extent from his position and status. For 32% of respondents in
the sample, when the chief makes a decision he actually mostly takes into account his
own interest rather than the interest of the entire community (54%). In practice, for
example, in occasions were resources are shared among villager, such as food during
a banquet, the chief is usually both the primary decision-maker about allocation as
well as the first- and best-served.
The chief is assisted in his public duties by various elites. These elites are called the
“eyes of the chief”, and they can act as representatives of the chief in various instances.
In rural eastern DRC as in many other humanitarian contexts, these elites are involved
in the process of distributing the aid windfall in aid-recipient villages. Even though
they are not usually intended beneficiaries of aid programs, NGOs usually rely on
these elites for various aspects of the beneficiary identification and / or aid distribution
process. The economic status of elites can vary, although in practice they are mostly
in the better-off or the regular category and rarely among the poor. However, their
social status is distinctly higher than non-elites village members. As the village chief,
while they do not receive official compensation for their work, they are often expected
to somehow profit from their position.
2.2 Methodology
A total of 400 respondents from 10 rural villages in five districts of the Kivus were
surveyed for this study. Out of consideration for external validity and possible het-
erogeneous treatment effects, the villages were block sampled by district, such that
in each district one village that had received aid from an NGO in the past five years
and one that had not would be picked.
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In each village, I have administered a baseline survey to 8 elites and 32 non-elite
members of the village. The members of the elite were randomly sampled from a
comprehensive list provided by the village chief.26 The non-elite respondents were a
gender-balanced, representative sample of the rest of the village.27
Using this baseline survey, I have constructed a poverty index and sorted the 32
non-elite respondents into the 16 poorest (hereafter the ‘poor’ half of the sample) and
the 16 richest (the ‘non-poor’).28 All 40 respondents are then randomly dispatched
into 8 groups of 5 persons that each included 2 poor, 2 non-poor and 1 elite. Each
group is assigned a “room” in which distributions occur.29
For each distribution, one of the five group members is designated by the enumera-
tor as the distributor. The distributor is asked to allocate 13.500CF (13.5$US) among
all group members. The allocation is done by putting 27 tokens, each representing
(and somewhat resembling) a bill of 500CF into five cardboard ballot boxes on top of
which there is a picture of one of the group members. Participants are incentivized to
take these distributions seriously since they are informed that the compensation that
they stand to receive at the end of the day for their participation in the surveying
activities will in fact reflect the results of one of the distribution rounds that they
have participated in during the day.30
26The chief of the village was asked to provide in advance a list of “the eyes of the chief”, local elites
that could act as his representatives in the distributions. The list included all village members that
had official formal duties related to the governing of the village. In short, they were all more or less
village council members.
27The representative sample of the rest of the village specifically excluded the chief and members of
the elite, but it could include their family members. In a different paper, I leverage the fact that
the sample is balanced to provide a gendered analysis of the result of the experiment.
28The poverty index is described in more details in the next section.
29Distribution surveys were administered in specific, private spaces. Often times, actual school rooms
were used since part of the surveying was done over the holidays. Other times it was churches
or other local public buildings depending on availabilities and permission. Occasionally, separate
room-like spaces were set-up ad hoc with poles and pagne cloth.
30In practice, one round to be rewarded is randomly selected among the rounds played, and each par-
ticipants earnings are scaled and added to a fixed compensation of 500FC. On average, participants
have received 2500CF, which is the equivalent of two to three days of work in the fields. See Field
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Each group is randomly assigned one of the 2×2×2 possible treatment conditions.
First, the distributor is either alone in the room and presented with pictures of the
group members (including herself) on ballot boxes or the distributor is in the room
with the other group members and presented with the same ballot boxes. Second,
the distributor is either instructed to target poor group members (“Distribute this
windfall as you want among the members of your group. It is intended for the poorest
people in your group.”) or receives no specific targeting instructions (“Distribute this
windfall as you want among the members of your group.”). Finally, the enumerator
either goes out of the room and informs the distributor that he will not know anything
about his decision or stays in the room, actively observes the allocation process, takes
notes, asks the distributor to explicitly state how many tokens are put in each box, and
informs the distributor that all these observations will impact the payment received
at the end of the day.31
Treatment assignment is decided at the group level. While the targeting and mon-
itoring treatments are factorial, I have decided not to randomize the public/private
treatment due to considerations about the power of the design. In practice, in a given
group, each member has first separately received the same monitoring and targeting
treatments as a distributor in private. Then, a public allocation is organized un-
der the same treatment condition in which the elite is always distributor and with
all other group members present in the room. Each individual in each group thus
participates in BOTH a public and a private distribution.32 From a methodological
Manual for more details on the payment scheme.
31Monitoring treatments are often considered in the literature as some of the most difficult manipula-
tion to credibly enforce in such settings. With this manipulation, I have attempted to make both the
no-monitoring and the monitoring treatment as strong as possible. As a further manipulation check,
in addition to debriefing questions on perceptions about monitoring, the first round of measures with
a given population was systematically done without either the monitoring nor the no-monitoring
treatment. This offers the possibility to assess whether each treatment individually as well as the
difference between treatment is strong enough that one could expect it influences actual behaviors.
32I have also decided not to randomize the order of the public / private distributions under the
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standpoint, assumptions such as sequential ignorability are likely to be satisfied.
Finally, to further increase the size of the sample, after each group has gone
through a round of private and public allocations, the 40 respondents are shuffled
into new, different groups. The permutation of respondents is such that two people
who have been together in a group in one round can not be in the same group again
in subsequent rounds.33 In the end, two or three such rounds of private and public
distributions were played in each village.34 The final dataset comprises a total of 224
public distributions and 1120 private distributions.35
2.3 Estimation Strategy
I look at the causal effect of targeting instructions (X) on resource allocation (Y)
while controlling for two moderating factors, namely group-related effects (M1) and
third-party related effects (M2) (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In equation form, the general
causal model including a treatment indicator for targeting (X with a specific level
represented by x ∈ {0, 1}), two mediators (M1 ∈ {private, Public}, M2 ∈ {non −
monitored,Monitored}) and a dichotomous outcome (Y ), where X may affect Y
directly and/or X may affect any of the Mj, j ∈ {1, 2}, which then affect Y , is:
Y = i+ αX + β1M1 + β2M2 + γ1X ·M1 + γ2X ·M2 + γ3M1 ·M2 + δX ·M1 ·M2 + 
assumption that doing the private distribution first is not likely to influence the public distribution,
while the other way around is probable. This exclusion assumption is not uncommon in social
psychology studies, in which it is generally assumed that individuals reveal their actual preferences
in private distributions.
33This was intended to avoid collusion. Further steps were taken in order to satisfy exclusion restric-
tions and limit the risk of spill-overs of the treatments.
34While, the design of the experiment was originally intended to permit up to five different rounds of
distribution measures in each village, time constraints ended up limiting the surveying activities.
35Due to concerns about the monitoring treatment and to ensure a clear first round of data, the
monitoring treatment only started at round 2. In other round, at round 1, the only treatment
assigned was for the distribution to be targeted or not targeted.
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where α is the direct effect of the targeting instructions on the decision of the dis-
tributor; β1 is the direct effect of the group dynamics; β2 is the direct effect of the
third-party; γ1 is the effect of the interaction of targeting instructions and group dy-
namics ; γ2 is the effect of the interaction of targeting instructions with third-party;
γ3 is the effect of the interaction of group dynamics and third-party; δ is the effect of
the interaction of targeting instructions, group dynamics and third-party.
In terms of potential outcomes, I can identify the effects of targeting instructions
by comparing the outcomes of targeted and non-targeted distributions. To look at the
effect of community involvement, I compare the outcomes of public and private dis-
tributions. Finally, for the effect of monitoring, I compare the outcomes of monitored
and non-monitored distributions.
	 PRIVATE	 	 PUBLIC	
	 NON-
MONITORED	
MONITORED	 	 NON-
MONITORED	
MONITORED	
TARGETED	
	
Y(1,p,m)	 Y(1,p,M)	 	 Y(1,P,m)	 Y(1,P,M)	
NON-
TARGETED	
Y(0,p,m)	 Y(0,p,M)	 	 Y(0,P,m)	 Y(0,P,M)		
Table 1.1: Table of Potential Outcomes
α = E{Y (1, p,m)− Y (0, p,m)}
β1 = E{Y (0, P,m)− Y (0, p,m)}
β2 = E{Y (0, p,M)− Y (0, p,m)}
γ1 = E{Y (0, P,M)− Y (0, p,M)} − E{Y (0, P,m)− Y (0, p,m)}
γ2 = E{Y (1, p,M)− Y (1, p,m)} − E{Y (0, p,M)− Y (0, p,m)}
γ3 = E{Y (1, P,m)− Y (1, p,m)} − E{Y (0, P,m)− Y (0, p,m)}
δ = [E{Y (1, P,M)− Y (0, P,M)}+ E{Y (1, p,m)− Y (0, p,m)}]
−[E{Y (1, p,M)− Y (0, p,M)}+ E{Y (1, P,m)− Y (0, P,m)}]
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3 Data
Each respondent was administered a baseline survey as well as additional surveys
before, during and after each private and public allocation. The survey instruments
include both behavioral and attitudinal measures.36 Additional qualitative, village-
level data was also gathered during focus groups.37
3.1 Outcome measures
The main outcome measured both in private and public distributions is the number
of tokens —among the 27 that are distributed— that each group member receives in
a given allocation.38 Enumerators also record additional information during public
distributions, including which group members participates in the discussion, in what
ways, and whether that seems to influence the elites’ (who is always the distributor
in public allocations) decision.
36For more details about the data collection process see Field Manual, for the wording of the ques-
tionnaires see Appendix A.1.
37In between their participation in the private and public distribution survey in a given round, while
other group members were taking the private distribution survey, respondents were also encouraged
to participate in various focus groups. The point of the focus groups was both to limit direct
interactions between group members before the public distribution and to gather more qualitative
information about several aspects of the village culture that could be relevant in explaining further
the results of the surveys. See Field Manual for more information of the focus groups.
38Social psychology experiments have shown that the divisibility of the windfall affects the way it
is allocated in group distributions, and specifically which coalitions are formed (van Beest et al.,
2004). I have voluntarily chosen a number of tokens that is not divisible by five in order to force
respondents to choose to favor at least one group member in the allocation. In the 1344 distributions
observed, there are 5 instances in which respondents refused to allocate all the tokens and preferred
the equal distribution of 5 tokens to each group members while giving back the 2 extra tokens to
the enumerator.
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3.2 Poverty measures
I use the baseline survey to distinguish richer from poorer respondents, and hence to
block randomize groups for distribution surveys. Getting reliable measures of poverty
in the baseline survey was thus paramount. To that effect, a lot of attention has been
given to developing several appropriate, concurring measures of economic and social
status.39
In the baseline survey, there are several questions related to assets, revenues,
housing and other objective measures of the economic poverty of the respondent. The
baseline survey also includes questions about social relations and connections in order
to provide objective measures of social vulnerability.40 These measures were combined
into a poverty index,41 and the 32 respondents from the general population were
sorted into two groups accordingly. The high correlation across the various measures
of economic poverty and social vulnerability should give reasonable confidence that
the poorer and richer half of the sample were correctly identified (ρ = .65). Since the
50% cut-off is arbitrary, there are no theoretical reasons to expect much difference
between the richest member of poorer half of the population and the poorest member
of richer half. As a control variable in all estimations, I use a measure of within-group
inequality along the poverty index.
Economic poverty and social vulnerability are also assessed subjectively both by
the respondents themselves and by the enumerators in charge of administering the
39See Dilley & Boudreau (2001), Galasso & Ravallion (2005a) for extended discussions on how con-
ceptions of poverty are subjective and Harragin & Chol (1998), Ravallion (2009) on how poverty is
not just economical.
40See Appendix A.1 for the questionnaires.
41The index was developed based on the results of a pilot, and in consultation with the enumerators
team. In the index, I use the measures of objective social and economical poverty that were both
the most meaningful and that had the largest variation in the pilot sample. These included: earning
more than 50$/month (-), or less than 10$ (+), owning a cell phone (-), being unable to send children
to school because of money (+), owning more than one bedframe or one mattress (-), not owning
any blankets (+), owning more than one field (-), owning cows (-), etc.
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surveys. For these subjective measures, the questions ask whether a respondent’s
situation is worse, the same or better than the rest of the village on a given dimension.
The same type of questions were used to test the capacity of respondents to assess
correctly who were the poorer member(s) in their group.
The correlation between being one of the two poorer group members in the ex-
periment and the poverty index is high (ρ = .86), which is expected since the index
was used to block randomize the composition of the groups. The fact that there is
less correlation between the experiment’s poor indicator and other measures of eco-
nomic poverty is not a source of major concerns since it is most likely the reflection of
one of three things.42 First, poverty or vulnerability is multi-dimensional and cannot
be just measured with economic indicators. This has been often emphasized by aid
organizations themselves, and it has prompted the shift since the 1990s from using
economic poverty as a targeting criteria to using the more generic notion of vulner-
ability that encompasses social and political sources of poverty (Dilley & Boudreau,
2001). It is also one of the reasons why I have chosen to use a multi-dimensional
index in this study, the other main reason being that it is harder to “cheat” with a
multi-dimensional index. An alternative explanation for the poor “poor” correlation
could be indeed that villagers that participated in the study are used to being sur-
veyed by aid agencies. This might be create an incentive not to answer truthfully
to questions that are obviously attempting to determine wealth. This explanation is
supported by the fact that the enumerator’s subjective evaluation of the respondent’s
economic situation is more accurate than the respondents own responses.
42The correlation with income is .46, and the correlations with subjective measures of economic poverty
either by the respondent himself (.17) or by the enumerator (.25) are even smaller.
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3.3 Other measures
Attitudes toward group members
In each round, respondents are surveyed on their attitudes toward their group mem-
bers. Survey questions about within-group relationships include estimations of the
level of knowledge, friendship and trust respondents have for each group member.
Pro-poor preferences
In the baseline survey, respondents also answer questions about their conceptions of
fairness in order to assess their preferences for distributive justice (“Which is more
just: (1) giving to all the same; (2) giving more to the poor; etc.”). I use the answer
that it is “More just to give more to the poor” to this fairness question as an indicator
of pro-poor proclivity. I include pro-poor proclivity as a control in all estimations.
Since the same questions are also included in all post-distribution surveys, it is
possible to assess changes in justice norm perceptions pre- and post-treatment within
individual respondents.
Expectations
Both the baseline survey and the post-distribution surveys include questions about
the role of the chief in the village to assess respondents’ expectations about elites’
behaviors. After public distributions, respondents are also debriefed on their percep-
tions of the allocation process and its outcome.
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4 Results
In this section, I present the results of the experiment. I start with a few general
remarks about compliance, treatment checks and some characteristics of the sample
population. Then I look at the main results of interest. For all additional findings,
please refer to Appendix A.2-4.
4.1 Preliminary remarks
Compliance and Treatment Checks
There are no compliance issues in this experiment. In general, the intended main
treatment (target the poor or not) seems to have been correctly understood by par-
ticipants. In post-distribution surveys, participants were asked to recall whether the
distribution in their previous group was intended to benefit to all group members or
only to the poor members of the group. They have reported the correct treatment
95% of the time, and among elites - who were the distributors in the public sessions
- only 1.8% have reported the wrong treatment.
Interestingly, respondents have perceived that the elites decision in their last public
distribution complied with the treatment 70% of the time when the allocation was
not targeted and and 78% of the time when the allocation was intended to benefit
the poor. The elites report a compliance with targeting instructions of 73% and 83%
respectively. The two measures are highly correlated (ρ = .82) which suggests both
that targeting instructions were understood in the same way by the elites and other
group members and that there are some instance of intentional non-compliance with
the targeting instructions.
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Identifying the Poor
An important part of the experiment relies both on the capacity of the survey team
to sort respondents properly into two categories - the poor and the non-poor - so
that the composition of each group can be controlled for, and on the capacity of
group members to correctly identify the poorer members of their group. Participants
were asked to rank subjectively each of their four group members in comparison to
themselves, both in terms of economic wealth and social status. When asked whether
each group member is poorer, the same or richer than themselves, non-poor group
members mis-categorize poor group members (i.e. consider a poor group member to
be richer than themselves) only 1.5% of the time. Conversely, poor group members
mis-categorize non-poor group members (i.e. consider a non-poor group member to
be poorer than themselves) only 3% of the time. It thus seems that participants did
not have any problems in identifying the poorer members within their group in the
same way as the experiment intended.
Interestingly, participants were also asked to rank subjectively each of their four
group members in comparison to the rest of the village. But the variance in the
village ranking is much smaller than the variance of the personal ranking: a lot of
respondents refused the idea that there were differences within the village and gave all
group members systematically the same ranks both on economic and social measures.
In comparison, they had no resistance and no difficulty evaluating the difference in
economic poverty and social status locally between group members and themselves.
This possibly points to another explanation for the low correlation between subjective
measures of poverty and our poverty index. There is widespread conception within
aid recipient communities that community members should not be ranked according
to their poverty, especially by a stranger, and that within villages objective differences
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should be minimized: in other words “everybody is poor”.
4.2 Main Findings
In Table 1.2, I present the causal effect of targeting instructions, public setting and
monitoring on the share of the windfall that the poor receives. I present the same
results on the share of the windfall that the non-poor and the elites receive in Tables
1.3 and 1.4 respectively. The data presented in these tables correspond to public
allocations (n = 221) and private allocations (n = 221) in which the elite was the
distributor.43
By construction, the share of the windfall that does not go to poor group members
or to the member of the elites in the group goes to the non-poor group members. In
other words, in terms of interpretation of the findings, when I find both an increase
in the share that the poor receives and a decrease in the share that the elite keeps to
themselves, it suggests that there is a transfer from the elites toward the poor. When
I find only for the former, it rather suggests that there is transfer from the non-target
group (the non-poor) toward the poor. Finally, when I find support for the latter but
not the former, it could be that broader “sharing” mechanisms are at play, in which
elites are prompted to share the windfall with the community at large, but not with
the poor in particular.
The first, striking observation to take away from these tables is that in all spec-
ifications the value of the constant is around 5 or 6 —a number that represents the
numbers of tokens received on average by players in non-targeted, non-monitored,
private distributions— and the effect size of each treatment is between 0 and 1 in
absolute value. In other words, the story I am telling here about those group alloca-
43Since the monitoring treatment only starts in round 2, models (4) to (7) include only 284 rather
than 442 observations.
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tions is really about how the elites decide to allocate the two extra tokens, after they
have seemingly given 5 of the 27 tokens to each of the five group members, including
themselves. That said, there is a much higher variability in private allocations (in
which it was not rare to observe distributor allocate to themselves more than half
up to the entire windfall while other group members would receive none) than in
public ones (in which the number of tokens received by any group members at any
point ranges from 3 to 8). What targeting instructions and monitoring affect is pre-
cisely whom in the group receives one or two extra tokens. This finding is consistent
with something that came out of the discussions in focus groups: most villagers dis-
played a strong norm when first talking about their village to the facilitators, and
possibly to any observer from outside the village, to first and foremost describe the
village as homogeneous. Yet eventually, as conversations became more specific, large
differences in socio-economic situations and status among villagers appeared to be
well-identified by everyone. It may also speak to the fact that a large majority of
villagers recognized the importance for the chief to treat everyone somewhat equally
to avoid creating conflict within the village.
Effect of Targeting Instructions
Targeting instructions have a significant, yet small positive effect on the share of the
windfall that the poor receives.44 From a baseline of 5.39 tokens (FC2700 / $2.70), an
additional 0.13 token (FC60 / $.07) of the 27 tokens allocated ($13.5) goes to the poor
when the windfall is targeted compared to when it is not, which represents a little over
2.4% increase.45 There is a similar increase in the share that the non-poor receives.
44Here I consider the effect of targeting instructions on their own, hence I look at specification (1) in
tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.
45There are 27 tokens allocated in each distribution, each representing FC500 / $0.5. I present the
result tables with the increase in number of tokens for readability, but in the text, I will present the
findings in terms of their corresponding monetary value.
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Table 1.2: Effects of Targeting Instructions, Public & Monitoring
On the Share of the Poor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Targeted 0.13** 0.13** 0.02 0.09 0.17* 0.09 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12)
Public 0.38*** 0.28*** 0.39*** 0.36***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12)
Monitored 0.09 0.17* 0.09 0.24**
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12)
Targeted × Public 0.21** 0.24
(0.10) (0.17)
Targeted × Monitored -0.16 -0.14
(0.13) (0.17)
Public × Monitored -0.15
(0.17)
Targeted × Public × Monitored -0.05
(0.24)
Constant 5.39*** 5.20*** 5.25*** 5.35*** 5.33*** 5.15*** 5.14***
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21)
Observations 442 442 442 284 284 284 284
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Distributions by the elite only)
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Table 1.3: Effects of Targeting Instructions, Public and Monitoring
On the Share of the Non-Poor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Targeted 0.11** 0.11** 0.16** 0.06 -0.02 0.06 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12)
Public 0.19*** 0.25*** 0.14** 0.13
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12)
Monitored 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.10
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12)
Targeted × Public -0.10 0.00
(0.10) (0.17)
Targeted × Monitored 0.15 0.26
(0.12) (0.17)
Public × Monitored 0.13
(0.17)
Targeted × Public × Monitored -0.20
(0.23)
Constant 5.34*** 5.24*** 5.22*** 5.27*** 5.29*** 5.20*** 5.23***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Observations 442 442 442 284 284 284 284
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Distributions by the elite only)
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Table 1.4: Effects of Targeting Instructions, Public & Monitoring
On the Share of the Elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Targeted -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.38*** -0.32** -0.34* -0.32*** -0.08
(0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.12) (0.24)
Public -1.16*** -1.05*** -1.06*** -0.94***
(0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.23)
Monitored -0.26* -0.28 -0.26** -0.28
(0.13) (0.19) (0.12) (0.24)
Targeted × Public -0.21 -0.51
(0.20) (0.33)
Targeted × Monitored 0.04 -0.24
(0.27) (0.34)
Public × Monitored 0.00
(0.33)
Targeted × Public × Monitored 0.57
(0.47)
Constant 5.53*** 6.12*** 6.07*** 5.74*** 5.74*** 6.27*** 6.23***
(0.39) (0.35) (0.35) (0.46) (0.46) (0.41) (0.42)
Observations 442 442 442 284 284 284 284
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Distributions by the elite only)
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Accordingly, the share of the elite decreases by four times this amount in targeted
allocations compared to non-targeted allocations. From a slightly higher baseline
of 5.53 tokens ($2.75), targeting instructions cause a decrease of 0.48 tokens ($.24),
which represents a decrease of almost 9%. This suggests that targeting instructions
prompt a transfer from the elite to both the poor and the non-poor.
Effect of Public Setting
The effect of the public treatment on the amount received by the poor is significant
and almost three times as large as the effect of targeting instructions. In public
settings, each poor receives on average $.20 (0.38 tokens) more than it would have
in a private distribution. The effect of the public treatment is also positive and
significant on what the non-poor gets. The size of the direct effect of the public
treatment is about twice as big as the size of the direct effect of targeting instructions
with an increase of $.10 (0.19 tokens) of the amount received by each non-poor group
member.
In model (3) of Table 1.2, both the direct effect of the public treatment and the
interaction of public and targeting treatments are positive and significant for the
share of the poor. Targeting instructions, when provided in public settings, further
increase the share received by each poor group members by $.10 (0.21 tokens). On
the other hand, looking at the share of the non-poor in Table 1.3, only the direct
effect of public is positive and significant and it is about half the size of the effect
on the share of the poor in model (2) —no interaction— and comparable in size in
model (3) —with interaction. This is consistent with a transfer from the elite to the
rest of the group between private and public distributions, and from the non-poor to
the poor between public non-targeted and public targeted distributions.
The direct effect of targeting instructions drop in significance and in effect size
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when accounting for its interaction with public settings —models (3) and (7). This
suggests that it is actually in public settings that targeting instructions have an effect
on the share of the windfall given to the poor, and that this is what drives the positive
effect of targeting instructions overall.46
As expected, the effect of the public treatment on the share of the windfall that
the elite keeps for themselves reflects all these findings. In public settings, the elite
decides to keep $.60 (1.16 tokens) less than what they would have in private, whether
in a targeted or non-targeted allocation. This represents a decrease of almost 20% of
their share. (See Appendix A.3 for further analysis of the conditional effects of the
public treatment).
Effect of Monitoring
According to Table 1.2, in most specifications the effect of monitoring on the amount
received by the poor is either slightly significant or insignificant. There is no effect of
monitoring at all on the share that the non-poor receives. However, in models (5) and
(7), in which the targeting treatment and the monitoring treatment are interacted,
monitoring has a significant positive direct effect of increasing by $.08 or 0.17 tokens
(resp. $.12 or 0.24 tokens) what the poor receives. Combined with the previous
findings about conditional effect of targeting instructions in public, this suggests that
monitoring has an effect on the share of the windfall received by the poor when the
allocation is made in private, but only then.
In Appendix A.4, I show that changes in the identity of the distributor have no
effect on these main results. When I compare private distributions in which non-poor
group members or poor group members are distributors to private distributions by
46This is consistent the findings presented in Appendix A.3: in Table 1, I find that targeting in-
structions have a positive, significant effect on the share received by the poor in public settings
only.
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the elite in the same groups, the share received by the poor, the non-poor and the elite
respectively are not significantly impacted by targeting instructions or monitoring. If
anything, targeting instructions and monitoring seem to only have an effect on the
allocation when the elites is the distributor. If anything, poor and non-poor respon-
dents tend to display in private more predatory behaviors than their elites. In fact,
the few instances in which a distributor allocated the entire windfall to themselves in
private were for poor or non-poor distributors.
4.3 Heterogeneous treatment effects
In the following section, I present additional findings about the effects of the various
treatments in villages that had received aid from an aid organization in the previous
five years and villages that did not. I also present an analysis of the evolution of the
effects of the various treatments over time by rounds.
Aid and No Aid
In Table 1.5, I show the direct causal effects of each of the three main treatments on
what the poor, the non-poor and the elite receive in private and public distributions
in which the elite is the distributor in the five villages in the sample that had received
assistance from an NGO recently and in the five villages in the sample that had not.
I find that targeting instructions have a slightly significant, positive direct effect
of + $.08 (0.16 tokens) on the amount received by the poor only in villages that
received aid. Conversely, only in villages that received aid does the provision of
targeting instructions cause the elite to keep $.27 (0.53 tokens) less of the windfall
than they would have if the allocation was not targeted to the poor.
By contrast, the effect of the public treatment is positive, large and significant in
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Table 1.5: Comparing the Effects of Targeting in Villages that received Aid or not
Poor Rich Elite
No Aid Aid No Aid Aid No Aid Aid
Targeted 0.01 0.16* 0.06 0.10 -0.17 -0.53***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.19) (0.16)
Public 0.26*** 0.52*** 0.26*** 0.02 -1.04*** -1.08***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.17) (0.16)
Monitored 0.05 0.09 0.16* 0.01 -0.40** -0.21
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.18) (0.17)
Constant 5.15*** 4.97*** 5.21*** 5.22*** 6.23*** 6.66***
(0.29) (0.32) (0.33) (0.28) (0.64) (0.61)
Observations 140 144 140 144 140 144
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Distributions by the elite only)
all contexts. Yet the size of the effect (0.52 tokens or $.26) on the share received by
the poor is twice as big in villages that received aid than in villages that did not (0.26
or $.13). In the meantime, the public treatment also has a significant, positive and
large effect on the amount received by the non-poor, but only in villages that did not
receive assistance recently. Overall, this suggest that, in villages that are not used
to receiving aid, the part of the windfall that the elites distribute to the rest of the
community is split between the non-poor and the poor, whereas it goes mostly to the
poor in villages that are used to receiving assistance by NGOs.
Finally, the results in Table 1.5 suggest that monitoring only has an effect in
villages that are not used to receiving assistance and that this effect mostly benefits
to the non-poor, who receive $.08 more on average when allocations are monitored in
non-aid villages.
These differences between aid and no aid villages are also supported by the survey
data. In terms of influence of the group in public distributions, in villages that are
used to receiving assistance, in 25% of the cases, respondents considered that group
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discussions did not have much influence on the elite’s decision and in 36% of the
cases, they report that the group had a lot of influence whereas in non aid villages,
respondents report that group discussions had not much influence in 21% of the cases
and that they has a lot of influence in 42% of the cases. And the perception of
influence is bigger during non-targeted allocations than during targeted allocations
in non aid villages whereas it doesn’t vary across treatment conditions in aid villages.
On the other hand, only 11% of poor respondents think they have influence in non-aid
contexts (and 22% of the non-poor), while in aid villages, the rates for the poor and
the non-poor are similar and are around 20% as previously reported. Finally, non-
poor group members speak in favor of others significantly more often in aid contexts
(40%) than in non-aid contexts (30%).
Rounds
In Table 1.6, I present the direct causal effect of the three main treatments on what
the non-poor, the poor and the elite receives by round.
The analysis by rounds suggests that the effect of targeting instructions diminishes
over time. While the causal effect of targeting instructions on the share of the poor
(resp. the elite) is positive and significant (resp. negative and significant) in the first
round, both the size and the significance of the effect disappear in subsequent rounds.
By contrast, the direct causal effect of the public treatment on what the elite
gives away and what the poor gets are significant and consistent over rounds. But
the positive, significant effect of the public treatment on the share of the non-poor
observed in the first round (.29), while still significant in the second round is much
smaller (.16) and is smaller and insignificant in the last round (.12). This suggests
that the effect of the public treatment on the share that the non-poor gets disappears
over time, while the effect of the public treatment on the share that the poor receives
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Table 1.6: Comparing the Effects of Targeting in Successive Rounds
Poor Rich Elite
R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3
Targeted 0.21** 0.11 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.10 -0.74*** -0.31* -0.29*
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
Public 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.29*** 0.16* 0.12 -1.35*** -1.07*** -1.03***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17)
Monitored 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.03 -0.40** -0.23
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.18)
Constant 5.04*** 4.97*** 5.27*** 5.36*** 5.35*** 5.14*** 6.23*** 6.39*** 6.08***
(0.35) (0.29) (0.29) (0.38) (0.31) (0.26) (0.68) (0.60) (0.54)
Observations 158 158 126 158 158 126 158 158 126
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Distributions by the elite only)
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can be sustained over time.
Finally, there are only two rounds to compare with the monitoring treatment, but
the fact that it has a negative, significant effect on the share retained by the elite in
the second round and a smaller, negative, non significant effect in the third round
suggests that, as for targeting instructions and contrary to public settings, the effects
of monitoring may also be temporary.
5 Discussion
In this section, I draw some conclusions from the results of the experiment about the
existence of distributor effects, community effects and third-party effects in targeting.
I also discuss more broadly the external validity of these findings, and how they shed
light on our understanding of the targeting of foreign aid resources or of other windfalls
in general.
5.1 General remarks
Generally speaking, the first characteristic of the findings in this study is that the
effects of each treatment when they exist are rather small in size. But they are also
significant, consistent and robust across specifications. The small effect size is not
of much concern: the stakes in the private and public distributions, while sufficient
to motivate the participant to take the simulation seriously, were relatively small.47
In comparison, one can expect aid targeting to yield bigger effects in size and cause
larger, more substantive variations in the shares receives by recipients.
47As mentioned, in each round the participants were allocating the equivalent of the salary for 7
days of work in the fields between five people and that is about what they expected to receive as
compensation at the end of the day.
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5.2 Importance of Community Dynamics
Overall, this study strongly supports the idea that group effects, or more generally
community dynamics, play an important role in making targeting the poor effective.
There is also some support for the idea that the provision of targeting instructions
prompts broader sharing dynamics at the distributor-level. The one consistent effect
of targeting instructions is to induce less capture by the elite. However, the part of
the windfall that is not retained by elites does not necessarily go to the poor. There
is consistent evidence in this study that the non-poor can also receive more as a result
of targeting. Since it benefits both poor and non-poor group members, the nature
of the effect of targeting instructions is consistent with sharing dynamics rather than
with targeting the poor strictly speaking.
In general, there is strong support for community effects in targeting that are
consistent over time and robust across specifications, as well as much larger in size
than the effect of targeting instructions or monitoring. There is also evidence in
support of a positive interaction of community effects (made possible by the public
treatment) and distributor effects (induced by targeting instructions) on targeting
the poor. In the experiment, the instance in which targeting instructions actually
contribute to targeting the poor is during public distributions. Combined together,
these findings could suggest that transparency about targeting criteria, and the in-
volvement of the community at large in the process of targeting can help limit elite
capture. Conditional on elite capture being limited, the role of targeting instructions
is to limit capture by the non-targeted. Getting a better understanding of the com-
munity dynamics at play in aid targeting seems a promising way to further improve
targeted aid programs and their outcomes. In further work based on the same ex-
periment, I investigate whether the community dynamics at play are more consistent
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with peer-pressure or with bargaining dynamics (Strauss-Kahn, 2018e).
Overall, the results of this experiment strongly point to transparency and a better
involvement of the recipient community at large in the targeting process as the most
efficient ways to improve the outcomes of aid programs. Conversely, spending more
money and time trying to increase monitoring capacities or to define more precise
targeting instructions may not be as promising leverages as one could have thought.
5.3 The Role of Outsiders
Aid agencies often think that better monitoring and evaluation systems would be
enough to ensure good targeting outcomes (Transparency International, 2014). In
this experiment, however, there is little consistent evidence that monitoring can have
a sustainable, positive effect in targeting the poor. It could be that the monitoring
treatment in this experiment is not strong enough. Monitoring treatments are par-
ticularly difficult to implement credibly and successfully. However, since monitoring
seems to have an effect in some specific contexts in the study, even though relatively
small in sizes, it may well be that the findings reflect the absence of a strong effect
of monitoring in targeting in general.
Monitoring has a limited effect in private distributions, yet the nature of this effect
seemingly is consistent with sharing dynamics rather than with targeting the poor.
And I have consistently found little to no support for the effects of monitoring by a
third-party in public distributions. These findings are consistent with several recent
papers which suggest that altruistic preferences actually tend to disappear in dictator
games when the anonymity of the process is better enforced, that is when the distrib-
utor is not pressured into being altruistic neither by the knowledge that he is being
observed by a third-party nor by the judgment of the receiver in front of him (Franzen
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& Pointner, 2012, Winking & Mizer, 2013). In other words, monitoring could actu-
ally work in private settings as a substitute for peer-pressure by the community. The
results also suggests that third-party effects when they exist may be superseded by
long-standing community dynamics. This is especially credible in cases where the
interactions of the third-party with the community are limited, which is arguably the
case in most humanitarian contexts. Finally, the effect of monitoring also seems to
diminish over time and with previous exposure to aid programs. This idea that the
effect of monitoring, when it exists, might be temporary is consistent with observa-
tions in the field that recipient communities eventually learn about the inefficiency of
complaint mechanisms and that sanctions eventually loose their credibility.
In line with existing work on the influence of in-group versus out-group enforcers
(Goette et al., 2006, Bernhard et al., 2006), one way to interpret both the findings
about monitoring and the findings about community involvement in this paper would
be that while outsiders can affect the allocation process between a distributor and
a receiver, outsiders that are also part of the group (in this case non-poor, non-elite
group members) are more effective than external observers. In other words, while
this observation warrants additional work on this specific point, it could be that
monitoring and sanctions by an in-group are more effective in aid targeting than
monitoring and sanctions by an outsider.
5.4 Sharing and Conflict Management
Sharing dynamics —in which aid windfalls are shared within the recipient community
at large rather than allocated to the target group only— are often observed in aid
targeting contexts. Yet this possible result of targeted aid programs arguably defeats
the purpose of concentrating resources on those most in need. It is also an outcome
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that is often difficult to interpret. It can either be seen as a positive outcome — a
correction mechanism when targeting criteria or indicators are ill-defined—48 or as
an adverse outcome —the collusion of the elites with the non-poor to the detriment
of the poor. When looking at outcome perceptions by participants in this study, the
results however point to neither of these explanations. Combined with qualitative
information from the baseline surveys, I suggest that this study rather points to the
possibility that sharing, by effectively limiting between-group differences in a public
setting, could be a conflict management mechanism.
In this experiment, there is no evidence that targeting criteria were misunderstood
nor that targeting indicators were inappropriate: group members had no difficulty
identifying poorer members of the group compared to themselves. In cases were tar-
geting instructions were not respected, survey evidence suggests that it is not that
these instructions were not well understood by the distributors or by the community
at large, but rather that they were voluntarily ignored. Yet, there is no evidence
of attempts at specifically marginalizing or excluding the poor from the allocations
either. This all points to the dilution of the windfall among a larger group of benefi-
ciaries than the target group rather than to a possible collusion of the elites and the
non-poor against the poor.
Participants in the experiment seem to agree on not aspiring to stronger target-
ing of the poor, and they declare being satisfied with outcomes in which targeting
criteria were not respected. Overall, 90% of respondents report that the outcome of
their last public distribution did correspond to their personal preference. And when
respondents - both non-poor and poor - had the perception that the allocation out-
48While it could also have pointed to the fact that the study’s understanding and participants’ un-
derstanding of “the poor” may not aligned, this interpretation is largely disproven by the survey
data that shows that participants identified correctly the relative economic situation of their group
members.
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come benefitted mostly to the elite or the non-poor, they were still satisfied with the
outcome more than 80% of the time (70% for the poor).49
The task of targeting the poor was considered fair and acceptable by most. Yet,
survey results also point to the fact that the community in general was resistant to
making differences among village members. As mentioned, in a lot of cases partic-
ipants purely and simply gave the same economic and social ranking to all group
members in comparison with the rest of the village. This is consistent with reports
in the aid literature that recipient communities often try to argue with aid workers
that “everybody is poor”.
According to ethnographic and sociological studies, public behaviors of “indis-
tinction” can act as a mechanism for conflict prevention.50 The weak effect size
of targeting instructions could thus actually result from unexpected, counteracting
community dynamics. Indistinction as a means of conflict management is also an
explanation consistent with multiple reports about targeted aid interventions that
recipient communities were reluctant to targeting specific groups (Maxwell & Burns,
2008). Finally, it is also consistent with the fact that the baseline shares received by
each group members in public distributions were quite similar. In private distribu-
tions, there was much more variance, private distributions by elites were also much
closer to equal sharing than the rest.51
Equal sharing is actually an outcome that happens rather often in community-
49In non-targeted public allocations, 7% of respondents report that the allocation benefited mostly to
the elite (while no respondents report that the allocation benefitted mostly to the non-poor). On the
other hand, in targeted public allocations, 6% of respondents report that the allocation benefited
mostly to the non-poor and powerful (while only 1% of respondents report that it benefited mostly
to the elite).
50On the role of distinction in the organization of human societies, see also Bourdieu (1984) on the
use of distinction by elites see Daloz (2009).
51In public distributions, every member of the group received between 2 and 8 of the 27 tokens to be
allocated with a mean between 5 and 6, and a standard deviation by type of recipient inferior to 1.
On the other hand, in distributions, allocations spanned from 0 to 27 tokens, except for the elite (0
to 14) and standard deviations were at least twice as big.
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based targeted aid programs, even though it is explicitly discouraged since it dilutes
the effect of the windfall in a large pool of recipient. Similarly, although this exper-
iment was specifically designed to avoid the possibility of equal distribution, there
were a few instances in which distributors allocated 5 tokens to each group members
and refused to distribute the two additional tokens and would rather give them back
to the enumerator. This propensity to equal sharing speaks to the existence of strong
collective norms of equality in the allocation of outside windfalls in these villages,
despite large actual inequalities between groups.
For aid organizations, such observations that sharing may be a result that is some-
times strongly preferred by the recipient community to effective targeting may be of
importance. It emphasizes the fact that the objectives of targeted aid programs (eco-
nomic redistribution to the poor) and the objectives of humanitarian and development
assistance at large (do no harm) can sometimes be conflicting. Targeting has indeed
effects both on economic redistribution and social cohesion. If there are contexts in
which the compliance with targeting instructions work against the preservation of
peaceful relationships within the community, there is a choice to make in terms of
which sets of objectives should subsume to the other.
5.5 Pro-poor Preferences and the Role of the Elites
In this experiment, there is little evidence of distributor effects that could play in
favor of targeting the poor. Targeting instructions do not seem to affect distributors’
preferences into being more prosocial and there appears to be no groups in the com-
munity that have significantly more pro-social preferences than the elites such that
they would allocate bigger shares of the windfall to the poor if they were to be in the
position of the distributor.
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Overall, there is not as much heterogeneity between groups as one could have
expected within the sampled communities in terms of prosocial preferences, attitudes
and behaviors. According to the baseline survey, 42% of non-elites and only 26% of
elites originally have pro-poor preferences. And similarly, only 41% of the poor in our
sample have pro-poor preferences: the poor do not have more prosocial preferences
than the rest of the general population.52 And overall, the communities in the sample
do not have strong prosocial norms to begin with: prioritizing the poor in allocations
is not the preference, nor the expectation in usual, non-targeted distributions. De-
spite having more prosocial preferences than their elites, both poor and non-poor
group members do not behave accordingly when they are the distributor in private
allocations: they do not allocate greater shares of the windfall to the poor than the
elite would do. On the contrary, one thing that varies with changes in the identity
of the distributor in private allocations is the range and variance in one’s allocation
to oneself. For both poor and non-poor distributors, there are instances in which
the distributors take all 27 tokens for themselves, which never happens with elite
distributors. By contrast, despite having less pro-poor preferences than the general
population, elites actually behave in a more prosocial manner than the rest of the
population in private distribution.
Not only are baseline preferences across groups within the community not consis-
tent with usual theories about distributor effects, observed changes in those prefer-
ences are not in the expected direction either. If anything, the targeting treatment
seem to further decrease participants’ prosocial proclivities. And while there are
52While counter-intuitive and against their self-interest, this aversion can be explained by the existence
of a stigma in being assisted and speaks to the multi-dimensionality of vulnerability. Poor community
members may be rendered less economically vulnerable by recognizing their status as poor, but they
could become in the same time more socially vulnerable. This is also consistent with the observation
that the poor refused at least as much as the rich if not more to rank other people in the village in
terms of their wealth.
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changes in conceptions of fairness and pro-poor preferences within individual respon-
dents pre- and post-treatment, there is little evidence that these changes are due to
the treatment since they happen in both ways. After the first round, the propor-
tion of non-elite respondents that favor giving more to the poor has decreased from
42% to 36% (pooling both those who received the targeting treatment and those who
did not), while 54% of respondents now prefer giving the same to everyone. But
among elites, it is the contrary: the proportion in favor of giving to the poor has
increased from 26% to 44% after the first round of distributions. Among those who
have changed their preferences after receiving the targeting treatment, 46% changed
in favor of more pro-poor preferences (56% among elites, 40% among the poor, 46%
among the rich), but 54% changed for less pro-poor preferences. After receiving the
non-targeted treatment, 30% of those who changed their preferences were more pro-
poor than in the baseline (41% among elite, 30% among the poor, 25% among the
rich), and 70% were less pro-poor than before.
Overall, these results suggest that changing the identity of the distributor might
not be an effective way to target the poor. In the same time, while elites seem to ulti-
mately behave in a more prosocial way than the rest of the community, this behavior
is not consistent with their own preferences. I suggest that this observed disconnect
between preferences and behaviors can reflect the fact that in this experiment, and
in aid targeting more generally, elites actually have two roles to play. Each of these
roles come with a different set of constraints that are hard to reconcile. As commu-
nity leaders, they have duties toward the community as a whole: this points toward
sharing windfalls among all community members. As an agent the aid organization
intervening in the community, they are temporarily in the position to capture the
windfall according to their self interest, while in the meantime being prompted to
target the poor.
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While it may come as a surprise to some aid workers, in many traditional societies,
it often is not the role of chiefs to redistribute to the poor. For example, only 4%
of respondents in the sample actually think that taking care of the poor is one of
the roles of the chief. Contrarily to representatives in western societies, most of the
time traditional leaders are not elected and they often retain their chiefdom for life.
As a result, there is arguably no natural accountability mechanism that makes elites
cater to poor populations in order to gain votes, which is a common explanation of
preferences for redistribution. On the contrary, according both to the elites and the
general population of the communities in our sample, the primary role of a chief is
to avoid conflict within the village. And this finding most likely applies to many
other aid recipient communities (Strauss-Kahn, 2018c). In other words, this could
explain that chiefs —or their representatives— are expected to allocate resources to
all community members indiscriminately whenever possible.53
Several anthroplogical studies have suggested that capture can also be a way for
a chief to express and to legitimate power (Boehm & Boehm, 2009). In other words,
a chief that doesn’t take what he can where it can may be considered not strong
enough to be chief. If capture is a display of strength, then changing the distributor
to non-elites could actually increase the need to display and legitimate said power and
lead to more capture by the distributor rather than less. In the experiment, non-elite
distributors clearly had less self-control during private allocations, especially during
the first round. Several of them, poor and rich alike, did not hesitate to capture the
entire 27 tokens at their disposal. Conversely, targeted instructions have an effect on
53According to the baseline survey, 87% of respondents think the chief should treat everyone in the
village equally. Among the elites themselves, the perception that the role of the chief is to treat
everyone equally rises to 96%. This contrasts with the fact that 42% of the same populations think
that it would be fairer to give more to the poor in a distribution. In a sense, there seems to be
somewhat of a mismatch between villagers’ expectations about their elites and their own aspirations:
villagers seem to have more pro-poor preferences than their institutions entail.
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elites as distributors in the sense of diminishing capture, but not on any other type
of distributors.
Overall, these findings about the behaviors of alternates to elites as distributors
may be of importance for aid organizations. Aid agencies sometimes attempts to
bypass local power structures by changing the distributor from traditional elites to
women, new elites, or other “gatekeepers”. The expectation is that these alternate
distributors are less likely to capture the aid windfall. While this might be the case
in the short term, several findings of the experiment suggest that it may not be the
case in the long-term. First because these alternate distributors do not have more
distributive preferences than the elites, and they don’t have either preferences for
sharing that would stem from their duties toward the community at large, so there
are no reasons why they would be guided by anything other than their self-interest.
This is already reflected in this experiment in extreme capture behaviors in many
non-monitored private distributions by non-elites.
5.6 Learning Effects
Finally, the findings of the experiment support the existence of learning effects in
targeting both over time and by exposure to the targeting process. For an aid agency,
these learning effects can be either fostering or hindering the implementation of a
successful targeted aid program. On the one hand, while targeting instructions and
monitoring do seem cause actual targeting of the poor, their capacity to do so also
seem to diminish over time. Only the public effect of the targeting process seem to be
stable over time. On the other hand, in places that are used to receiving assistance
and, hence, to aid targeting, there seems to be more actual targeting of the poor and
less sharing of the assistance with non-targeted beneficiaries.
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6 Conclusion
In aid targeting, there are three characteristic elements that always go together: the
targeting instructions, the community involvement and the monitoring. Since there
is always a little bit of all three albeit in various ways, it is difficult to distinguish
what does what in the targeting process. This paper aims at shedding light on the
causal effect of targeting instructions and these two moderators. In doing so, I aim at
contributing to a better understanding of the variation in the outcomes of targeted
aid programs and to foster their improvement in three ways.
First, the results of this paper contribute to debunk some traditional assumptions
in the aid world, by calling into question the effectiveness of monitoring by a third-
party. Second, this paper points to the existence of strong sharing norms in recipient
communities than can run contra the implicit redistributive norms of aid targeting
as well as to possible underlying tensions for elites between their role as a distributor
and their role as community leaders. As such, rather than focusing on the capacity
of the aid agency as a principal to enforce a contract with the recipient community
as a whole, these observations call overall for a better understanding of community
dynamics and the ways in which they can either foster or hinder the effectiveness
of targeting. Finally, the results suggest that rather than targeting instructions by
themselves, it is mostly the public aspect of the targeting process that consistently
contribute to the effective targeting of the poor over time.
In subsequent work, using the same setting, I further unpack the community dy-
namics at play in public distributions in order to gain a finer understanding of the
bargaining dynamics and peer-pressure effects that actually prompt effective targeting
of the poor (Strauss-Kahn, 2018e). While this paper already highlights the poten-
tial role of non-poor non-elites community members in fostering successful targeting,
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additional work will explore the nature of their influence on elites’ decision-making
as well as offer a more detailed theoretical framework that models the interactions
between these various actors within recipient communities (Paler et al., 2018).
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Abstract
The role that communities play in fostering or hindering the targeting of
foreign aid to the poor has been the subject of growing attention. While
the role of the target group itself and the role of elites in the targeting
process is increasingly discussed in the literature, there is little work to
date that considers how the rest of the community can influence whether
the most vulnerable community members actually receive the aid to which
they are entitled. In this paper, I study the role of non-poor, non-elite
community members in influencing how elites choose to allocate resources
to the poor. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment, I look at public distribu-
tions of money within small groups of people from the same rural villages
in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Each group com-
prises one members of the local elite, two poor villagers and two non-poor,
non-elite villagers. I vary whether elites receive instructions to target the
poor or not, whether the non-poor have veto power or not, and whether
the allocation process is actively monitored by a third-party or not. I
find that the non-poor have a significant influence on the allocation, not
by simply keeping the elites in check through peer-pressure, but by ac-
tively bargaining with the elites over whom should receive what. In fact,
when resources are targeted to the poor, and in particular when they have
adversarial relationships with the elites, they can effectively advocate in
favor of allocating a bigger share of the windfall to the poor.
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Targeting the poor is widely considered the most efficient and ethical means of
allocation for humanitarian and development aid assistance when resources are scarce
(NRC, 2013, FAO, 2006). Yet empirical evidence suggests that targeted aid programs
often benefit elites and other non-poor groups in recipient communities, while their
impact on poor, vulnerable populations can be mixed at best (Strauss-Kahn, 2018g).
Ensuring that a windfall reaches those for whom it is intended and bypasses those
for whom it is not is especially challenging since aid agencies rarely have complete
control over the allocation process (Maxwell & Burns, 2008). In low-income or frag-
ile countries, aid agencies frequently face time, capacity, and information constraints
that compel them to rely formally or informally on recipient communities them-
selves to assist with targeting (Galasso & Ravallion, 2005a). Numerous aid programs
now engage in community-based targeting—in which communities themselves select
beneficiaries—in the belief that community leaders or members at large are better
positioned to identify qualified recipients and distribute goods. In other cases, aid
agencies identify beneficiaries through objective or data-driven methods but neverthe-
less still rely on communities or local leaders for assistance with finalizing beneficiary
lists or distributing goods (Alatas et al., 2013a). Overall, the outcomes of targeted
aid programs can vary significantly in terms of whom in recipient communities ends
up benefitting from the aid windfall.
The role that communities play in fostering or hindering the targeting process has
been the subject of growing attention. While community involvement in targeting
can increase the legitimacy of and satisfaction with aid programs (Winters, 2014,
Alatas et al., 2012a), it also raises concerns about undesirable consequences. It is now
widely appreciated that community involvement in aid distributions can increase the
scope for capture of the aid windfall by community members who are not intended
beneficiaries (Jaspars & Shoham, 1999a, Young & Maxwell, 2009). There is also
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evidence that targeting can result in heightened conflict and jealousy within recipient
communities, undermining social cohesion (de Sardan, 2014, de Sardan et al., 2014).
Recent work emphasizes that group dynamics that are established long before the
arrival of an aid program and continue to matter long after an aid program has
ended can be particularly important in understanding specific patterns of capture
(Paler et al., 2018). There are reasons to think that community involvement in the
targeting process can be more efficient in ensuring the respect of targeting instructions
than monitoring or sanctions by the aid agency (Strauss-Kahn, 2018a). Yet, without
knowing exactly what it is about community involvement that makes a difference
about who receives the aid windfall, aid programs can hardly be improved effectively.
Various groups within recipient communities are involved in the targeting pro-
cess. They differ in their roles and in their capacities to influence the aid allocation.
Elites, since they are individuals with formal political authority in the village, are
often in a position to directly influence how aid is allocated and to capture a share
of the aid for themselves (Platteau, 2004a, Alatas et al., 2013a). By contrast, tar-
get groups —those community members that are supposed to receive the aid— are
mostly vulnerable groups within the community (such as the poor, widows, internally
displaced persons, or conflict victims) with little influence in the community in the
first place. Interestingly, there always exists yet another part of the community that
is both likely to have the capacity to influence how aid is allocated, yet usually left out
of aid programs: those community members who do not belong to the target group
but also are not part of the elite. They can be, for example, non-poor community
members in a program targeted at the poor; former militants in a program targeted
at civilians; men in a program targeted at women; members of an ethnic majority in
a program targeted at an ethnic minority; or long-time members of a community in
a program targeted at migrants or internally-displaced persons. Like elites, they are
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not entitled to receive any of the aid; unlike elites they do not have a formal role in
the targeting process; but by contrast with the target group they are not particularly
weak or vulnerable and can be influential members of the community. Whereas the
role of the target group and elites is increasingly discussed in the literature, there is
little work to date that considers how all these other community members —who are
both inside the community and have long-standing relationships with both the target
group and the elites, yet are formally speaking left out of the aid program— can
influence whether the target group actually receives the aid to which it is entitled.
In this paper, I study the role of non-targeted, non-elites group members in in-
fluencing how elites choose to publicly allocate resources to a target group in rural
villages in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In a lab-in-the-field
experiment, I measure behaviors and attitudes of small groups of five villagers —-
among which there is one member of the elite, two poor and two non-poor villagers—
when I ask them to allocate money among themselves in a dictator-game like set-
ting. I randomize whether non-poor group members have veto power over the elites’
decision or not. Using a factorial design, I also randomize whether the distributor
is provided with instructions to target the poor or not, and whether the enumerator
actively monitors the decision-making process or not. As a result, I can identify the
causal effect of an exogenous variation in non-poor group members influence on re-
source allocation separately from the effect of targeting instructions and monitoring
by a third-party.
The Kivus region in eastern DRC, in which I have gathered the empirics for this
study, is currently one of the world’s most complex and long-standing humanitarian
crisis. This allows me to leverage both a relevant context and rich data about real-
life power structures, social roles, and relationships between participants. Since the
villages in the sample are rather small, study participants are likely to interact with
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one another on a regular basis, such that I can use interesting variation in how much
they know, like or trust each other as control measures. In practice, each participant
in the study was first administered a baseline survey. The baseline survey measured
their economic and social situation within the village, as well as included questions
on their perceptions of social norms in the village. Additional survey data was then
gathered before, during and after each public distribution. Since rural villages in
eastern DRC are used to the presence of humanitarian organizations, asking villagers
to allocate resources among themselves while providing them with targeting criteria
was not considered as a surprising nor an artificial exercise by the participants. In
the end, in addition to the behavior of each participant during public distributions,
I can also measure their attitudes toward other group members, their understanding
and perceptions about the outcome of the public distribution, as well as changes in
their perception of social norms post-treatment.
Overall, the results of the experiment strongly suggest the existence of complex
bargaining dynamics among group members during public distributions. More specif-
ically, I find that giving non-poor group members veto power in distributions targeted
to the poor increases both the share allocated to the non-poor and the share allocated
to the poor. While the first part of this finding is generally consistent with the litera-
ture on bargaining, the second is surprising and of substantial interest. This increase
in the share of the windfall that poor group members receive in targeted distributions
with non-poor veto players is strong, robust and consistent across specifications. In
addition, the increase is even significantly larger in effect size when elites and non-
poor group members are at odds with each other, or when poor group members are
close friends with non-poor group members. By comparison, and contrary to expec-
tations, poor group members are for example not necessarily better-off when they are
close friends with the elites. In-depth quantitative and qualitative analysis of group
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discussions during public allocations confirms that in some contexts non-poor group
members actively attempt to influence elites into giving out more of the windfall not
only to themselves but also to poor group members.
In unpacking the nature of the community dynamics at play in aid targeting, this
paper contributes in at least two ways to a better understanding of what makes for
effective distribution of foreign aid, and possibly for effective social transfers to the
poor in general. First, the results of this study specifically highlight the role in making
targeting effective of some members of recipient communities who are otherwise often
purely and simply excluded from aid programs and whose influence on the resource
allocation process is rarely taken into account —in this case non-poor, non-elites
group members—. Since targeting a transfer to one specific group necessarily leads
to excluding another group who is going to be both “inside and out” of the targeted
program, this warrants further work on the role of this excluded group and a better
understanding of the contexts in which it will either foster or hinder the effectiveness
of a social transfer.
Second, the results of this study also suggest that the involvement of the commu-
nity at large in the targeting process influences elites’ behaviors as a result of complex
bargaining dynamics rather than simply through peer-pressure. One way to under-
stand these results is that it is possible that the rest of the community can in some
contexts serve as a counter-balance to the power of the elites and effectively limit their
capacity to capture aid windfall. This in turn suggests that a promising way to im-
prove the effectiveness of aid programs in the future could come from not only higher
but better involvement of recipient communities in targeted programs. In particu-
lar, a more thorough analysis of existing social relationships and potential coalitions
within recipient communities could contribute to balancing elites’ propensity for aid
capture, and ultimately to a better targeting of the poor.
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1 Theory
Targeting resources invariably creates an outgroup: within any group, by selecting
some to benefit from a windfall, one necessarily excludes others (Barrett, 2006). In
this section, I first briefly build on some general empirical observations about the
distribution of foreign aid at the local level to highlight the relevance of this notion of
targeting outgroup in the context of aid targeting. I then consider a vast literature on
group dynamics, including research in social psychology and about non-cooperative
bargaining, and discuss existing arguments that shed light on the influence that such
group that is both inside (the community) and out (of the aid program) —typically
influent in the recipient community, yet in theory not an intended beneficiary of the
windfall— could have on resource allocation. For the sake of clarity, I present these
arguments in terms of whether they fall into one of two families of explanations,
namely peer-pressure and bargaining dynamics.
While aid capture has long been a major concern for foreign aid program, aid
agencies usually assume that the effectiveness of their targeted aid programs de-
pend either on the fairness and acceptability of the targeting criteria, the degree of
transparency of the process within the recipient community, or the quality of their
monitoring (Transparency International, 2014). Recent work points to the possibil-
ity that the provision of instructions to target the poor and vulnerable may actually
not be effective on its own, but rather that targeting can be fostered either through
community involvement or through monitoring (Strauss-Kahn, 2018a).54 Involving
recipient communities in the targeting process through community-driven programs
may seem much more feasible and effective than monitoring in many contexts. Yet
54In work most similar to this paper, I compare resource allocations by elites in private and public
settings and I find significant differences in their allocations to the poor. In this paper, I build on
these results and try to unpack the dynamics at play during public allocations specifically.
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there is also ample evidence that community dynamics can in fact either foster or
hinder the targeting of the poor in aid distributions (Maxwell & Burns, 2008, Jaspars
& Maxwell, 2008, Young & Maxwell, 2009).
Aid agencies face time, cost and operational constraints that highly limit their
actual influence in the allocation process at the local level. Most commonly, an
implementing NGO will come to a village and inform the members of the community
that an aid windfall is intended for the most vulnerable among them. It will then rely
to some extent on some influential community, non-targeted members to make the
actual allocation, and will monitor the distribution of goods to the best of its ability
before leaving the village. In practice, traditional elites seem to invariably end up
acting as a distributor when an aid program is implemented in their village, whether
the aid agency in charge actually wants it or not. And most of the time, aid agencies
have little to no abilities to effectively monitor these distributions, let alone credibly
sanction contraveners whenever targeting instructions are not respected. In the end,
aid distributions are arguably very similar to a dictator-game in which a distributor
—the elites— have to allocate resources to a receiver —the target group. Hence in a
way, since the target group comprises almost by definition weaker, more vulnerable
community members, aid targeting puts elites de facto in a position to capture a share
of the aid windfall for themselves.
Existing work on the role of recipient communities in targeting usually focuses
either on target groups or on elites as the only two relevant actors to consider: for
instance recent studies of aid capture distinguish between the poor and non-poor
(Galasso & Ravallion, 2005a, Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006a) or between elites and
non-elites (Alatas et al., 2013a).55 Yet, there is numerous anecdotal evidence that
55Alatas et al. (2013a) distinguish between formal and informal elites but do not theorize how the role
of informal elites differs from the role of traditional elites nor the interaction between these actors.
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non-beneficiaries other than elites can either help a lot in securing favorable outcomes
to aid programs (Maxwell & Burns, 2008, Harragin & Chol, 1998) or can intervene in
the aid allocation process to try to expropriate a share of the resources for themselves
(de Sardan, 2014). By pooling non-beneficiaries other than elites with other groups
in the community, these studies overlook the possibility that elites, target groups
and the rest of the community can have different objectives and that this can have
important implications for distributional outcomes.
Research in social psychology has long shown that distributors can be significantly
influenced in their decision-making by other group members (Messick & Sentis, 1983,
Robert & Carnevale, 1997, Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998). One could think that in aid
targeting contexts, elites are unlikely to be influenced by anything other then their
self-interest since they are from the start in a two-fold position of power: first they
are individuals with high influence in the community because of their social role,
and second they have decision power on the allocation of resources because of their
position as a distributor. But insofar as their decision-making is to some extent
transparent and public, it stands to reason that elites could also have to take various
other elements into consideration: they have long-standing relationships with other
community members and they will have to stand by their decisions long after the aid
agency has left. The question is thus not so much whether but rather whom in the
community has the most capacity to influence the elites’ decisions and in what ways.
The capacity of group members to affect group decision is generally thought of
as a function of their influence or bargaining power (Caplow, 1956, Gamson, 1961a).
There are reasons to think that target groups have little to no influence in their com-
munity ex ante, and henceforth that they have little influence in the aid allocation
process as well. They are targeted in the first place precisely because they are often
both the most in need and the most at risk of being marginalized from resource al-
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location without special consideration (NRC, 2013, OCHA, 2014, de Sardan et al.,
2015). While it is in theory possible that targeting helps empower recipients to hold
their elites accountable (Winters, 2014), in practice it is often unlikely that target-
ing fundamentally alters enduring power asymmetries within communities Galasso &
Ravallion (2005a), Bardhan & Mookherjee (2006a), Dreze & Sen (1989). By contrast,
the rest of the community is likely comprised by at least some influential individuals,
and it is credible that these influential community members may have an impact on
allocations’ outcomes.
In a public distribution, there are fundamentally two ways to think about how
group members may influence the distributor’s decision, namely through peer-pressure
or through bargaining dynamics. Peer-pressure includes any explanation according
to which it is the mere presence of some given individuals during the decision-making
process that influences the distributor into behaving differently than he would have
otherwise. In the context of aid targeting, peer-pressure could for example foster
targeting the poor if community members’ have more prosocial preferences than the
elites (a.k.a. a direct peer-pressure effect of community involvement), or if targeting
instructions prompted the community to expect more prosocial behavior from their
elites, for example out of considerations about fairness (aka. in which case peer-
pressure would be an indirect effect of community involvement insofar as it interacts
with targeting instructions) (Messick & Sentis, 1983, Kahneman et al., 1986, Brockner
et al., 2001, Van Dijk et al., 2004).56 It could also be that there is some peer-
pressure at play, but that the effect of peer-pressure is not favorable to the poor.
56There is in fact some anecdotal evidence that several competing conceptions of fairness are at
play in aid recipient communities (Young & Maxwell, 2009). And while recipient communities are
not generally poor-oriented societies, practitioners typically assume that specific segments of their
polities —like the poor themselves or women— hold more prosocial preferences than their elites
(Heinz et al., 2012). In such cases, co-opting recipient communities in the targeting process through
awareness campaigns and community-based targeting in general can help a lot in securing favorable
outcomes to aid programs (Maxwell & Burns, 2008, Harragin & Chol, 1998).
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For example, in line with research on the importance of friendships and rivalries in
resource allocation (Rusinowska, 2002, Laengle & Loyola, 2012, 2015), the presence
of community members could pressure elites into favoring their friends rather than
their enemies in distributions. If so, the provision of targeting instructions would
have little to no effect on elites’ decisions while friendship with the elites would be a
strong explaining factor for receiving a share of the windfall.
Group members can also influence the distributor’s decision through bargaining
and coalition formation Komorita & Chertkoff (1973), Komorita & Moore (1976), Ko-
morita & Kravitz (1979), Komorita & Lapworth (1982), Komorita & Miller (1986).
A large literature shows that bargaining outcomes in groups are the result of the for-
mation of a minimum winning coalition that depends on players initial resources and
power (Gamson, 1961b, 1964). Different theories, each with a specific set of assump-
tions about norms and motives, explain the emergence of various types of coalitions
depending on context (Kahan & Rapoport, 2014, Bausch, 2017). One particularly
relevant argument in the case of aid targeting would be minimal group theory (Tajfel
& Turner, 1986, Kelley et al., 1966). Typically, targeting instructions could serve
as a focal point around which the community coordinates its expectations about
the allocation of the aid windfall. Social psychology studies have shown that, when
resources are allocated in groups, even arbitrary and virtually meaningless distinc-
tions can lead to coalition formation around such “minimal groups” (Tajfel, 1982).
The effect of targeting would then be to enforce a specific bargaining environment
that would typically be different from the bargaining environment that would govern
non-targeted allocations.57
Overall, peer-pressure and bargaining explanations differ empirically in several
57Typically, rather than forming a minimum winning coalition with some community members that
they like individually, the elite would have to treat the targeted and the non-targeted as groups - in
this empirical case the poor and the non-poor - with whom it has to bargain as unitary actors.
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ways. First, bargaining dynamics involve active participation of group members, typ-
ically through discussions, while peer-pressure does not. Second, while bargaining
effects will vary with bargaining power, peer-pressure effects will not. With peer-
pressure, it is merely the existence of a common knowledge environment that influ-
ences elites’ behavior: since you are looking at me, even if you don’t say anything, I
know that you know what decision I am making. In other words, as soon as an influ-
ential group member is present, the distributor should start behaving in a certain way.
Bargaining dynamics suggest on the other hand a more active involvement of some
community members in the process, for example through discussions.58 As a result,
traditional bargaining theory would predict that the more bargaining power some
group members have, the more these group members are able to extract resources
for themselves. On the other hand, peer-pressure rather suggests the existence of a
ratchet effect: it either exists or not but it does not vary with bargaining power.
2 Empirics
I have gathered data in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo about how carefully
selected groups of villagers choose to publicly allocate money among themselves in
various situations. In previous work closely related to this paper, I have used a
similar experimental design to study whether the provision of targeting instructions,
the presence of other group members during the decision-making process and the
monitoring by a third-party influence the allocation of resources to the poor (Strauss-
Kahn, 2018a). I have found that public allocations —in which other group members
are present— differ vastly from private ones. In this paper, I focus specifically on
58In a sense, while one can expect the effect of peer-pressure to be binary —either influential group
members are present and there is peer-pressure, or they are not—, the effect of bargaining dynamics
can be thought of as more gradual. The more effort an influential group member puts in bargaining,
the more effect it may have.
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these public distributions to further explore the ways in which the presence of other
group members affect a distributor’s decision.
While the original experimental design as well as the specificities of the context of
DRC are discussed in more details in Strauss-Kahn (2018a), I briefly describe their
main features here. Each group in the sample is composed of five people from the
same village: one is a member of the local elites, two are sampled from the poorer
half of the village, and the other two are sampled from the other half of the village
(the richer half). The elite is in charge of allocating a sum of money among all five
group members while the four other group members are present. Using a 2 × 2 × 2
factorial design, I vary three things about these allocations: whether the distributor
is asked to target poor group members or not (Treatment 1: targeted or non-targeted
distributions), whether the two non-poor group members are veto power over the
elite’s decision or not (Treatment 2: veto or non-veto distributions), and whether
the enumerator is obviously and actively monitoring the distributor’s decision or not
(Treatment 3: monitored or non-monitored distributions). I then compare the share
of the windfall that is allocated to the two poorer group members, to the elite and to
the two non-poor group members in each of the eight treatment conditions.
Comparing veto and non-veto distributions, I can distinguish between peer-pressure
and bargaining explanations. According to traditional veto theory (Tsebelis, 1995),
the veto treatment exogenously varies the bargaining power of the non-poor group
members. While bargaining dynamics should be affected by the introduction of veto
players, the allocation outcome would not change if only peer-pressure is at play (Guth
& Huck, 1997, Rodriguez-Lara, 2016). With this design, I can further sparse into the
effect of community involvement and whether it is affected by targeting instructions
by looking at the interaction of the veto and the targeted treatment. Finally, I can
control for peer-pressure effects induced by a third-party rather than by community
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members by looking at the effect of the monitoring treatment.
2.1 Context
The empirics for this study have been gathered in the regions of North-Kivu and
South-Kivu in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).59 Since 2004, the
Kivus region have become one of the world’s most complex and long-standing human-
itarian crisis as well as one of the largest humanitarian mission currently in operation.
As a result, whether they happen to have directly benefited from assistance or not,
rural villages in DRC have become used to the presence of humanitarian NGOs.
Despite a growing trend toward urbanization, the population is largely rural. Vil-
lages are relatively small — for example, those sampled for this study usually com-
prises from 50 to 150 households. With an average of 5 members per household, one
could that everybody knows more or less argue everybody in these communities. De-
spite the fact that everybody is arguably poor with regard to international standards,
there are also observable differences between poorer and richer households within each
village. For example, in all of the villages in the sample, the poorest respondents re-
ported earnings less than $4/month while a few of the richest respondents declared
earning more than $150/month. Political power is largely concentrated in the hands
of the village chief, who is most of the time male (90%) and whose authority is de-
rived from custom rather than election.60 The chief is assisted in his public duties
by various elites. These elites are called the “eyes of the chief”, and they can act as
representatives of the chief in various instances. In rural eastern DRC as in many
other humanitarian contexts, in aid-recipient villages these elites are usually involved
in the process of distributing the aid windfall, even though they are not intended
59See Strauss-Kahn (2018a) for an in-depth discussion of the benefits of using a relevant context and
rich data about real-life power structures, social roles, and relationships between participants.
60See Strauss-Kahn (2018a) for an extensive discussion of the characteristics of the sample.
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beneficiaries of said aid programs.
2.2 Methodology
A total of 400 respondents from 10 rural villages in five districts of the Kivus were
surveyed for this study. Out of consideration for the external validity of the study and
possible heterogeneous treatment effects, the villages were block sampled by district,
such that in each district one village that had received aid from an NGO in the past
five years and one that had not would be picked.
In each village, I have administered a baseline survey to 8 elites and 32 non-elite
members of the village. The members of the elite were randomly sampled from a
comprehensive list provided by the village chief.61 The non-elite respondents were
a gender-balanced, representative sample of the rest of the village.62 The baseline
survey includes questions about the economic and social situation of each respondent
as well as questions about social norms in the village.
Using this baseline survey, I have sorted the 32 non-elite respondents using a
poverty index into the 16 poorest (hereafter the ‘poor’ half of the sample) and the
16 richest (the ‘non-poor’). All 40 respondents are then randomly dispatched into 8
groups of 5 persons that each included 2 poor, 2 non-poor and 1 elite.63 In each group,
the elite member has to allocate 13.500CF (13.5$US) among all group members while
the other four group members are present. The allocation is done by putting 27 tokens,
each representing (and somewhat resembling) a bill of 500CF into five cardboard
61The chief of the village was asked to provide in advance a list of “the eyes of the chief”, local elites
that could act as his representatives in the distributions.The list included all village members that
had official formal duties related to the governing of the village. In short, they were all more or less
village council members.
62The representative sample of the rest of the village specifically excluded the chief and members of
the elite, but it could include their family members.
63See the Experimental Protocole as well as Strauss-Kahn (2018a) for a more detailed discussion of
the experimental setup.
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ballot boxes on top of which there is a picture of one of the group members.64
Each group is randomly assigned one of the 2×2×2 possible treatment conditions.
First, the elite member is either instructed to target poor group members (“Distribute
this windfall as you want among the members of your group. It is intended for
the poorest people in your group.”) or receives no specific targeting instructions
(“Distribute this windfall as you want among the members of your group.”). Second,
the two non-poor group members are either informed that they will have veto power
over the elites’ final decision (“You have been randomly selected as a veto player.
This means that I will ask you whether you agree with the distributor’s decision or
not before he puts the tokens in the boxes. If you don’t agree, I will take back all the
tokens and no one will receive anything.”) or not. Finally, the enumerator either goes
out of the room and informs the distributor that he will not know anything about his
decision or stays in the room, actively observes the allocation process, takes notes,
asks the distributor to explicitly state how many tokens are put in each box, and
informs the distributor that all these observations will impact the payment received
at the end of the day. All group members know and hear the treatment conditions.65
Treatment assignment is factorial and decided at the group level. From a method-
ological standpoint, the sequential ignorability assumption are likely to be satisfied.
In order to increase sample size, once a round of distribution has been done, the
40 respondents are shuffled into new, different groups. Two people who have been
together in a group in one round can not be in the same group again in subsequent
rounds. In the end, 2 or 3 such rounds of distributions were played in each village.
The final dataset comprises a total of 224 public distributions of which 112 are tar-
64Participants are incentivized to take these distributions seriously since they are informed that the
compensation that they stand to receive at the end of the day for their participation in the surveying
activities will in fact reflect the results of one of the distribution rounds that they have participated
in during the day. See Strauss-Kahn (2018a) for more details on the payment scheme.
65See Strauss-Kahn (2018a) for a more in-depth discussion of the targeting and monitoring treatments.
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geted and 112 are not; 112 have veto players and 112 do not; and 152 are monitored
and 72 are non-monitored.66
2.3 Estimation Strategy
In this paper, I look at the causal effect of having veto players (X) on resource
allocation (Y) while controlling for a moderating factor, namely targeting instructions
(M1), and controlling for monitoring (C) (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In equation form,
the general causal model is very simple and includes a treatment indicator for veto
players (X with a specific level represented by x ∈ {0, 1}), a moderator (M1 ∈
{non-targeted, Targeted}), a dichotomous outcome (Y ) and a control (C ∈ {non-
monitored,Monitored}), where X may affect Y directly and/or X may affect M1,
which then affects Y , is:67
Y = i+ αX + β1M1 + β2C + γ1X ·M1 + 
where α is the direct effect of having veto players on the decision of the distributor ;
β1 is the direct effect of targeting instructions ; β2 is the direct effect of monitoring ;
and γ1 is the effect of the interaction of targeting instructions and veto power.
In terms of potential outcomes:
66Due to concerns about the monitoring treatment and to ensure a clear first round of data, the
monitoring treatment only started at round 2. In other round, at round 1, the only treatment
assigned was for the distribution to be targeted or not targeted.
67There are no theoretical reasons to expect the interaction of monitoring with neither the veto nor
the targeted treatment to be significant, so I don’t include the interaction terms in the general causal
model. See (Strauss-Kahn, 2018a).
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	 NON-VETO	 	 VETO	
	 NON-
MONITORED	
MONITORED	 	 NON-
MONITORED	
MONITORED	
TARGETED	
	
Y(0,T,m)	 Y(0,T,M)	 	 Y(1,T,m)	 Y(1,T,M)	
NON-
TARGETED	
Y(0,t,m)	 Y(0,t,M)	 	 Y(1,t,m)	 Y(1,t,M)		
Table 2.1: Table of Potential Outcomes
α = E{Y (1, t,m)− Y (0, t,m)}
β1 = E{Y (0, T,m)− Y (0, t,m)}
β2 = E{Y (0, t,M)− Y (0, t,m)}
γ1 = E{Y (1, T,m)− Y (1, T,m)}+ E{Y (1, T,M)− Y (1, T,M)}
−E{Y (0, T,m)− Y (0, t,m)} − E{Y (0, T,M)− Y (0, t,M)}
3 Data
Each respondent is first administered a baseline survey. Then, respondents are ad-
ministered additional surveys before, during and after each allocation. The survey
instruments include both behavioral and attitudinal measures. During the public
allocations, enumerators have also collected data about the nature, intensity and
content of discussions within each group. Finally, additional qualitative, village-level
data about is also gathered during focus groups in which all participants have partic-
ipated together. In between two rounds, respondents were encouraged to participate
in various focus groups. The point of the focus groups was both to limit direct, strate-
gic interactions between group members before the public distribution and to gather
more qualitative information about several aspects of the village culture that could
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be relevant in explaining further the results of the surveys. 68
3.1 Outcome measures
Allocations
The main outcome measured in the public distributions is the number of tokens —
among the 27 that are distributed— that each group member receives in a given
allocation.69
Group discussions
Enumerators have also recorded information about who participated in discussions
during public distributions.70 For each public distribution, the enumerators indicate
for each group member both whether they have actively participated in the discussion
and how much. Enumerators also indicate who participated most in their opinion.
Participation measures also include measures of the content of the discussion. For
each individual group member that participated in the discussion, enumerators record
whether they mostly argued in their own favor or in favor of other group members.
Finally, enumerators also record their opinion about whom among individual group
members seemed to influence the elites’ decision.71
68See Field Manual for more information about the data collection process the questionnaires, and the
focus groups.
69Social psychology experiments have shown that the divisibility of the windfall affects the way it
is allocated in group distributions, and specifically which coalitions are formed (van Beest et al.,
2004). I have voluntarily chosen a number of tokens that is not divisible by five in order to force
respondents to choose to favor at least one group member in the allocation. In the 224 distributions
observed, there are 5 instances in which respondents refused to allocate all the tokens and preferred
the equal distribution of 5 tokens to each group members while giving back the 2 extra tokens to
the enumerator.
70All enumerators were extensively trained to record such information during the recruitment process.
And although the process of evaluating the content of a discussion can seem subjective, the pre-tests
done on mock discussions show extraordinary consistency in coding across enumerators.
71The survey records the language in which the discussion occurred. Most discussions were either in
Kiswahili or in Kinyarwanda, both languages in which all enumerators were trained.
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3.2 Other measures
Attitudes toward group members
In each round, respondents were also surveyed on their attitudes toward their group
members. About each other group member, respondents were asked whether they
liked them and whether they considered them a friend. Survey questions about within-
group relationships also included several more specific estimations of the level of
knowledge, friendship and trust each respondent has for each other group member.
The level of knowledge was evaluated with questions about specific informations,
such as asking whether the respondent knew the name, the number of children or the
location of the house in the village of each other group member. Friendship and trust
were assessed using several subjective attitudinal measures as well as questions about
friendly and trusting behaviors that the respondent may or may not have regarding
other group members, such as whether they would be willing to share a meal, lend
them their work tools or let them take care of their kids.
Poverty measures
I distinguish richer from poorer respondents and block randomize groups for distri-
bution surveys based on the baseline surveys. A lot of attention has been given to
developing several appropriate, concurring measures of economic and social status.
The baseline survey includes questions related to assets, revenues, housing and other
objective measures of the economic poverty as well as questions about social relations
and connections in order to provide objective measures of social vulnerability for each
respondent. These measures have served to create a poverty index specific to each
village that was subsequently used to sort the 32 respondents from the general pop-
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ulation into two groups. Economic poverty and social vulnerability are also assessed
subjectively both by the respondents themselves and by the enumerators in charge of
administering the surveys. For these subjective measures, the questions ask whether
a respondent’s situation is worse, the same or better than the rest of the village on
a given dimension. The same type of questions were used to test the capacity of
respondents to assess correctly who were the poorer member(s) in their group.72
Control Measures
All the regressions presented in this article include traditional control measures such
as the gender and age of participants. I also include a measure of the pro-poor pro-
clivity of the distributor as a control in all estimations.73 Heterogeneity in group
composition in terms of economic situation is also controlled for using a measure
of within-group inequality. When appropriate, I also use survey questions about re-
spondent’s perceptions of the role of the village chief as controls for their expectations
about elites’ behaviors as well as questions about their level of involvement in village
activities as controls for their baseline level of participation in group activities and
group discussions. Finally, after public distributions, respondents are debriefed on
their perceptions of the allocation process and its outcome, which allows to assess
compliance.
72The high correlation across the various measures of economic poverty and social vulnerability used
in this experiment (ρ = .65) gives reasonable confidence that the poorer and richer half of the sample
were correctly identified both by the PI and the participants. See Strauss-Kahn (2018a) for a more
detailed discussion of the poverty measures and the poverty index used in this experiment.
73In the baseline survey, respondents also answer questions about their conceptions of fairness in order
to assess their preferences for distributive justice (“Which is more just: (1) giving to all the same;
(2) giving more to the poor; etc.”). I use the answer that it is “More just to give more to the
poor” to this fairness question as an indicator of pro-poor proclivity. Since the same questions are
also included in all post-distribution surveys, it is also possible to assess changes in justice norm
perceptions pre- and post-treatment within individual respondents.
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4 Results
In this section, I present the main results for this experiment. For reference, see
Strauss-Kahn (2018a) for results on the effect of targeting instructions, community
involvement and monitoring on allocation outcomes. For all additional findings, please
refer to Appendix A.2-4.
An in-depth discussion of compliance, treatment checks and some pre-treatment
descriptive characteristics of the sample population is offered in Strauss-Kahn (2018a).
In short, there are no compliance issues in this experiment and the intended main
treatment seems to have been correctly understood by participants (error ≤ 1.8%).
Participants also seem not to have had any problems in identifying the poorer mem-
bers within their group (error ≤ 1.5%). More generally, I have found that more than
the provision of targeting instructions and the monitoring by a third-party, it is the
fact that other group members are present during the decision-making process that
has the most effect on allocation to poor group members. This paper subsequently
focuses more specifically on what happens during such public distributions. Finally,
another important preliminary observation is that in this experiment all group mem-
bers tend to receive relatively similar shares of the windfall.74 The value of the con-
stant in the results presented below strongly suggests that most of the time 5 of the
27 tokens are allocated to each of the five group members and that the distributor’s
decision is really mostly about how to allocate the two “extra” tokens.
74This observation holds for public distributions specifically. There is more variance in private distri-
butions. See Strauss-Kahn (2018a) for more details.
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4.1 Main Results
In this experiment, treatment effects are rather small in size, but they are significant,
consistent and robust across specifications. The small effect size is not of much
concern: the stakes in the distributions, while sufficient to motivate the participant
to take the simulation seriously, were relatively small.75 In comparison, one can
expect aid targeting to yield bigger effects in size and cause larger, more substantive
variations in the shares receives by recipients.
Effect of Veto
In Table 2.2, I present the results for the veto treatment by comparing in public
distributions the allocations where the rich had no veto power to the allocations
where the rich had veto power.
I find that the veto treatment has a strong significant effect on the share of the
windfall allocated to the non-poor that is consistent with traditional bargaining the-
ory. In line with existing theory about veto players, when considering model (2)
without interactions, the direct effect of the veto treatment is an increase in what
each non-poor group member receives by a positive, significant amount of 0.24 to-
kens, which represents $.12 and an increase of almost 5% from their baseline (public
distributions with no veto players). In other words, as theory predicts, the more
bargaining power a receiver has in a dictator game, the more this player can extract
from the distributor. Conversely, the share of the elite decreases significantly by twice
as much ($.24).
When including the interaction of the veto treatment and the targeted treatment
75As mentioned, in each round the participants were allocating the equivalent of the salary for 7
days of work in the fields between five people and that is about what they expected to receive as
compensation at the end of the day.
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Table 2.2: Main Effects of the Veto Treatment
Share of the Poor Share of the Non-Poor Share of the Elite
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Targeted 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.16* -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.49***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16)
Veto 0.01 -0.15* 0.24*** 0.38*** -0.48*** -0.38**
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.16)
Targeted x Veto 0.32*** -0.27** -0.19
(0.12) (0.12) (0.22)
Monitored 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.20 -0.21* -0.21*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Constant 5.63*** 5.62*** 5.74*** 5.30*** 5.13*** 5.03*** 5.23*** 5.57*** 5.50***
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40)
Observations 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224 224
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Public distributions only)
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in model (3), the share of the elite still increases significantly by 0.38 tokens as a direct
effect of the veto treatment. There is a similar, significant decrease in the average
share received by the poor (-.15) with the veto treatment. More surprisingly and
interestingly, the interaction of targeting instructions and the veto treatment has a
significant, large, positive effect on the amount received by the poor, which increases
by $.16 or more than 5.5% compared to their baseline. The share of the non-poor
decreases significantly by a similar amount ($.13).
In other words, when the distribution is targeted to the poor, an increase in the
bargaining power of the non-poor increases not only their own share of the windfall
but also the share that the poor receives to the detriment of the share that is captured
by the elite.
In Table 2.3, I look more closely at the direct effects of the veto treatment on the
average share received by poor group members conditional on the allocation being
targeted to the poor or not. I find that the effect of having non-poor veto players
is positive and significant when distributions are targeted to the poor. The share
receives by the poor increases by 0.17 tokens compared to targeted distributions with
no veto players. Conversely, in distributions that are not targeted to the poor, the
share received by the poor decreases by 0.16 tokens when there are non-poor veto
players compared to when there are no veto players. This suggests that the presence
of non-poor veto players plays in favor of poor recipients only in targeted distributions.
More specifically, in non-targeted distributions, the existence of veto players seems to
prompt a transfer from the elite and the poor in favor of the non-poor. In targeted
distributions, the existence of veto players prompts a transfer from the elites to the
non-poor and an additional transfer from the elites to the poor.
Interestingly, I also find that monitoring has a negative, significant effect (0.21
tokens) on the share that the elites retain for themselves overall. In fact, this effect
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comes from non-targeted, public distributions, in which monitoring has a positive
significant effect on the share that each poor group member receives ($.10) and a
corresponding negative effect on the share that the elites retain ($.23). On the other
hand, monitoring has no significant effect on the allocation when public distributions
are targeted to the poor. These findings possibly point to the role of monitoring as a
substitute at best to the provision of targeting instructions.
Who Participates in the Public Discussions?
Now let us look more closely into what happens during the public discussions. In
this section, I analyze data about the participation of each group members to the
discussion during public allocations. Enumerators have gathered data not only about
who participates in these discussions and how much, but also about the nature of
each players intervention, namely whether they make arguments about receiving more
money themselves or in favor of giving more money to another group member.
In all the tables presented in this section, I control for attendance to village meet-
ings. It is during these public meetings that the village chief makes most decisions
regarding the village, including decisions about the allocation of various resources to
village members. According to the baseline survey, neither poor nor non-poor vil-
lage members are used to attending village meetings regularly: 83% of poor village
members and 85% of non-poor village members never or rarely attend village meet-
ings. On the other hand, 64% of elites report that they often or always attend such
meetings. And during meetings they attend, 74% of elites have the perception that
they participate in discussions more than other village members while poor villagers
conversely have the perception that they tend to participate less than others (44%)
or the same (48%). To the same question, most non-poor village members similarly
respond that they participate as much as others (53% ) or less (31%).
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Table 2.3: Main Effects of Veto Conditional on Targeted
If Not Targeted If Targeted
Poor Non-Poor Elite Poor Non-Poor Elite
Veto -0.16* 0.40*** -0.40** 0.17* 0.11 -0.56***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16)
Monitored 0.19** 0.05 -0.46*** -0.05 0.05 0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17)
Constant 5.94*** 4.96*** 5.27*** 5.59*** 5.27*** 5.30***
(0.30) (0.30) (0.55) (0.31) (0.33) (0.56)
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Public distributions only)
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Table 2.4: Participation in Public Discussions
Poor Non-Poor Elite
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Targeted -0.05 -0.05 -0.11 -0.00 -0.00 -0.12* -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Veto 0.04 -0.02 -0.13*** -0.25*** 0.08 0.10
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
Targeted x Veto 0.12 0.24*** -0.04
(0.10) (0.09) (0.14)
Monitored -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant 0.50*** 0.47** 0.51*** 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.50* 0.44* 0.43
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Public distributions only)
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In table 2.4, I present the propensity of poor, non-poor and elite group members
to actively participate in group discussions depending on whether the distribution
was targeted and whether the non-poor could veto the elites’ decision. The first
observation that can be made is that on average, with a baseline of about .47, the
poor tend to participate a lot in discussions in general, as much as the elites and about
four times more than the non-poor (.12). Looking at the data more closely, at least one
poor group members participated in 78% of discussions, and both of them participated
in over 26% of discussions. In 62% of cases, poor group members were actually the
members of the group who participated the most in the discussions according to the
enumerators. In the meantime, non-poor group members participated in discussions
only 49% of the time and in only 8,5% of cases did both of them participate. Similarly,
even though the elite was actually in charge of making the allocation, they effectively
participated in the discussion only 46% of the time.
Interestingly, when taking into account both the direct effect and the interaction
of the treatments in model (3), the results in table 2.4 show that both the poor and
the non-poor tend to participate significantly less in discussions when the windfall is
either targeted to the poor (a decrease of -.45 and -.32 percentage points respectively)
or when the non-poor have veto power (-.37 and -.53 respectively).76 But on the
other hand, when the windfall is both targeted to the poor and the non-poor have
veto power, then the discussions are most animated with an increase of .57 and .69
percentage point in the propensity of at least one of the two poor or non-poor group
members participating in the discussion respectively.
Insofar as enumerators have also recorded whether the participants were discussing
76The fact that the effect size seems to be bigger for the treatment that favors them (the targeted
treatment for the poor and the veto treatment for the non-poor respectively) could be interpreted
as an indication that these treatments effectively “empower” the group that they relate to, insofar
as they would then have less need to participate in discussions.
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their respective wealth and incomes or not, this experiment also provides some infor-
mation as to the contents of the discussions. The arguments made by participants
were much more often money-related during targeted distributions (93% of the time)
than during non-targeted allocations (76%). By contrast, there is no observable dif-
ference in the contents of discussions between distributions with veto players and
distributions without veto players. Now to get a better sense of what it is specifically
that the non-poor talk more about in targeted, vetoed distributions, let us look more
closely at the type of arguments that poor, non-poor and elite group members make
respectively when they participate in discussions. Table 2.5 shows the propensity of
group members to argue for themselves while table 2.6 presents the propensity of
group members to argue in favor of others.
Interestingly, I find that poor group members tend to speak mostly in favor of oth-
ers rather than themselves, including during targeted distributions (in which typically
they should feel entitled to speak for themselves). Overall, baseline results suggest
when they intervene in public discussions, poor group members almost never argue in
favor of receiving more money for themselves (.0) but rather argue in favor of others
(.47), while by contrast both elites and non-poor group members tend to make their
case selfishly more often than not. More specifically, the elite tend to argue only in
their own advantage (.24) when they choose to intervene and never in favor of others
(.0), while on the other hand the non-poor can intervene both in their own interest
(.32) and in favor of others (.16).
While table 2.5 suggests that the various treatments have no effect on the propen-
sity of group members to advocate selfishly for a share of the windfall, table 2.6 shows
on the other hand that the propensity of non-poor group members to advocate for
others increases significantly by almost 20 percentage points when the windfall is
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Table 2.5: Argue in Favor of Oneself
Poor Non-Poor Elite
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Targeted 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.13
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
Veto 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
Targeted x Veto 0.08 -0.05 0.09
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13)
Monitored 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.37** 0.32** 0.31* 0.27 0.24 0.27
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23)
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 151 151 151
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Public distributions only)
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Table 2.6: Argue in Favor of Another Group Member
Poor Non-Poor Elite
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Targeted -0.09* -0.09** -0.06 0.09** 0.09** 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Veto 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.02 -0.05 -0.16** -0.19**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
Targeted x Veto -0.07 0.13* 0.05
(0.09) (0.08) (0.13)
Monitored 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant 0.58*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.17 0.16 0.20 -0.18 -0.07 -0.05
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Observations 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Public distributions only)
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targeted to the poor.77 More precisely, this effect comes from the interaction of the
veto and the targeted treatment. Looking at model (3), it is during discussions for
a windfall that is both targeted and when they have veto power that non-poor group
members tend to advocate in favor of others the most, with a significant increase of
26 percentage points.
Altogether, these findings paint the following picture: it is not the poor themselves
that voice their entitlement when resources are targeted to them. It is rather the non-
poor that speak up in favor of the poor when the windfall is targeted to the poor, and
especially when they have some power over the elites’ decision. This is also consistent
with the findings from table 2.2 that the poor tends to receive a bigger share of the
windfall in targeted distributions with veto players.
Friends and foes
In this section, I use the rich data collected for each villager about how much each
person knew, liked, and trusted each other to look at various configurations at the
group level in terms of whom is friends (resp. ennemies) with whom. I also use data
from the baseline survey about participants’ social networks in the village to control
for sociability at the respondent’s level.
The villages in our sample are relatively small villages, and the baseline survey
confirms that everyone knows everyone quite well. Most respondents are even able
to correctly answer questions that were quite specific about other villagers and group
members such as their name, the age of their children, etc.78 While there is no
77Even though there is no way to tell from the data that was collected which other group member
benefits from the advocacy when a group member is reported to “speak in favor of another”, there
are good reasons to think, in this instance, that non-poor group members tend to advocate for poor
group members.
78By looking more specifically at who seeks help from whom (and who offers help to whom) in case
of trouble, the baseline survey paints an interesting picture of relationship networks and social
safety nets within the sampled villages. Overall, neither neighbors nor religion are strong sociability
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variation in whether people declare that they “like” each other, there is substantive
variation in whether participants consider other group members as friends or not.79
Interestingly, friendship is not necessarily reciprocal: overall, when a group member
considers another group member a friend, the reverse is also true only less than 70%
of the time. Within each group, I look at whether the poor, the non-poor and the
elite are mutual friends or mutual foes.
In Table 2.7, I find that for the poor being friends with the non-poor has a signif-
icant, positive effect on the share that they receive, while being friends with the elite
does not have much effect. More specifically, when distributions are not targeted to
the poor, the poor benefit from being friends with the non-poor: the share of the
windfall that they receive significantly increases by .52 compared to when they are
not friends. Looking at the share that the non-poor receives and that the elite keeps,
it is clear that the transfer goes from the elite to the poor and not from the non-poor
to the poor. In other words, the effect of friendship between the non-poor and the
poor is that it compels the elite to give more to the poor in addition to what they
already give to the non-poor. Separately, the direct effect of targeting instructions
is still positive and significant (.19): in other words, it has a positive effect on the
share that the poor receive even when the poor and the non-poor are not friends.
On the other hand, the interaction of targeting instructions and friendship seem to
completely cancel out the benefits of friendship, in terms of the extra share of the
networks in those villages. That said, the elite’s sociability seem to differ from the sociability of the
poor and the non-poor. For example, 100% of the elite expect that they’ll always be offered help by
someone in case of trouble while some proportion of the poor (8%) and of the non-poor (6%) declare
that no one in the community would offer them assistance. While the poor and the rich mostly
seek and receive help from their family (78%), the elites’ safety nets depends more on their friends
(85%) than their family (53%). While the rich and the poor do not expect assistance from the chief
(20%) or from elites (7%), the elites rely on those networks much more (58% and 26% respectively).
Finally, while the rest of the village declare they would never seek nor expect to receive assistance
from NGOs (.4%), the elites are much more likely to use such means (8%).
79Arguably, the fact that everyone systematically declares that they “like” other villagers suggest the
existence of a strong social norm that promotes a form of unity in the village.
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Table 2.7: Main Effects of Mutual Friendship on Resource Allocation
Elite x Poor Elite x Non-Poor Non-Poor x Poor
Poor Non-Poor Elite Poor Non-Poor Elite Poor Non-Poor Elite
Targeted 0.19 0.11 -0.56*** 0.27** 0.16 -0.81*** 0.19** 0.14 -0.64***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.21) (0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17)
Veto -0.12 0.30*** -0.25 -0.06 0.30*** -0.39** -0.05 0.31*** -0.44**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17)
Targeted × Veto 0.18 -0.12 -0.25 0.15 -0.21 0.01 0.22* -0.23* -0.06
(0.16) (0.16) (0.28) (0.15) (0.16) (0.28) (0.13) (0.14) (0.25)
Elite x Poor:
Friends 0.04 0.06 -0.16
(0.14) (0.15) (0.26)
Friends × Targeted -0.20 0.10 0.16
(0.19) (0.20) (0.35)
Friends × Veto -0.08 0.04 -0.04
(0.19) (0.19) (0.35)
Friends × Targeted × Veto 0.31 -0.21 -0.06
(0.27) (0.28) (0.49)
Elite x Non-Poor:
Friends 0.23 0.05 -0.51**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.25)
Friends × Targeted -0.45** -0.02 0.91**
(0.19) (0.20) (0.35)
Friends × Veto -0.25 0.01 0.40
(0.18) (0.19) (0.34)
Friends × Targeted × Veto 0.34 0.14 -0.86*
(0.26) (0.27) (0.48)
Non-Poor x Poor:
Friends 0.52*** -0.00 -1.00***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.32)
Friends × Targeted -0.58** 0.06 1.00**
(0.23) (0.24) (0.42)
Friends × Veto -0.66*** 0.12 1.08***
(0.22) (0.23) (0.40)
Friends × Targeted × Veto 0.64** -0.01 -1.25**
(0.30) (0.32) (0.56)
Constant 5.77*** 5.07*** 5.32*** 5.75*** 4.99*** 5.49*** 5.67*** 5.11*** 5.46***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.43) (0.24) (0.25) (0.44) (0.22) (0.23) (0.41)
Observations 221 221 221 218 218 218 220 220 220
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Public distributions only)
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windfall that the poor would have received / that the elite would have given out.
Interestingly, the fact that the non-poor have veto power only positively and
significantly affects the share that the poor receives when the windfall is targeted to
the poor (.22), in which case it has an even bigger effect size if the poor and the
non-poor are friends (.64). But if the windfall is not targeted, even if the poor and
the non-poor are friends, the poor will still not benefit from the non-poor having veto
power (-.66).
In Table 2.8, I find that the poor seem to benefit in general from situations where
some subgroups are enemies with one another, insofar as their baseline share is sys-
tematically higher than in the various configurations of friendship. More specifically,
the poor benefits most from situations where the elite and the non-poor are enemies.
In situations were the elite and the non-poor are mutual ennemies, the poor receive
a significantly bigger share of the windfall when the distribution is either targeted
to them (.60) or when the non-poor have veto power over the elites’ decision (.52).
In other words, in situations in which the elites and the non-poor are enemies, the
windfall doesn’t have to be specifically targeted to the poor for the poor to benefit
from the fact that the non-poor have veto power.80
5 Discussion
In this section, I discuss the conclusions that can be drawn from these results about
the nature of the involvement of the non-poor in public distributions and the ways
in which they can contribute to effective targeting the poor or not. I also offer a
discussion of the external validity of these findings and of how they can shed light
80I have run additional analysis for various other specifications of friendships and enmities between
subgroups. I find that no other specifications yield significant, robust results, which in turn suggests
that the story is really about coalition formation and subgroups being allies or not with one another.
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Table 2.8: Main Effects of Mutual Enmities on Resource Allocation
Elite vs Poor Elite vs Non-Poor Non-Poor vs Poor
Poor Non-Poor Elite Poor Non-Poor Elite Poor Non-Poor Elite
Targeted -0.03 0.25** -0.39* -0.16 0.27** -0.21 -0.02 0.19 -0.25
(0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.13) (0.23)
Veto -0.15 0.29*** -0.23 -0.30*** 0.37*** -0.12 -0.20* 0.29** -0.07
(0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22)
Targeted × Veto 0.42*** -0.15 -0.64** 0.52*** -0.16 -0.74** 0.37** -0.13 -0.59*
(0.16) (0.16) (0.28) (0.16) (0.17) (0.30) (0.17) (0.17) (0.31)
Elite x Poor:
Foes -0.05 -0.01 0.17
(0.13) (0.13) (0.24)
Foes × Targeted 0.35* -0.25 -0.27
(0.19) (0.19) (0.34)
Foes × Veto -0.01 0.15 -0.22
(0.19) (0.19) (0.35)
Foes × Targeted × Veto -0.30 -0.15 0.89*
(0.26) (0.27) (0.47)
Elite x Non-Poor:
Foes -0.26** 0.03 0.39*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.24)
Foes × Targeted 0.60*** -0.27 -0.61*
(0.18) (0.19) (0.34)
Foes × Veto 0.35* -0.15 -0.29
(0.18) (0.19) (0.34)
Foes × Targeted × Veto -0.58** 0.06 0.90*
(0.26) (0.26) (0.47)
Non-Poor x Poor:
Foes -0.13 -0.05 0.46**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.23)
Targeted × Foes 0.20 -0.04 -0.43
(0.18) (0.19) (0.33)
Foes × Veto 0.10 0.07 -0.39
(0.18) (0.19) (0.33)
Foes × Targeted × Veto -0.10 -0.17 0.57
(0.26) (0.26) (0.46)
Constant 5.80*** 5.06*** 5.32*** 5.81*** 5.10*** 5.23*** 5.85*** 5.09*** 5.11***
(0.23) (0.24) (0.42) (0.23) (0.23) (0.41) (0.23) (0.24) (0.42)
Observations 222 222 222 221 221 221 222 222 222
With controls. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
(Public distributions only)
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more broadly on our understanding of aid targeting.
5.1 Peer-Pressure, Bargaining & Coalition Formation
In this experiment, all indications point to the idea that bargaining dynamics are at
play during public distributions and not simply peer-pressure. First and foremost,
there are multiple consistent observations that group members did actively discuss
with one another during the distributions. Second, there is a significant and large
difference between distributions with veto players and without veto players. The exis-
tence of veto players should only affect allocation outcomes if bargaining dynamics are
at play. Finally, the absence of strong, significant, or consistent effect of monitoring
suggests that there is no peer-pressure from the enumerator either.
The abundant qualitative and quantitative evidence about the degree and nature
of participation of various group members in discussions further suggests that the
bargaining dynamics at play are complex. More specifically, some specific patterns of
friendships and enmities across subpopulations within groups have strong, significant
effects on allocation outcomes while others do not. This points to the possibility that
in public settings aid targeting prompts coalition bargaining. Interestingly, the poor
seem to benefit more from conflict configurations —in which some sub-groups within
the recipient community are enemies with one another— than from friendships and
collusions.
Another element that supports the hypothesis that peer-pressure plays little role
in this experiment is the fact that participants’ norms of justice don’t seem to affect
allocation decisions either. The story here does not seem to be either about strong
prosocial norms of justice among non-elite group members nor about expectations
that the elites will respect targeting instructions. In fact, according to the baseline
89
PAPER 2 - THE ROLE OF THE NON-POOR
survey, communities in the sample do not expect their elites to favor the poor in
general. On the contrary, all community members, including the poor themselves,
seem to agree on the fact that it is not the role of the elites to do so. In that sense,
even if there is an effect of peer-pressure, it shouldn’t play in favor of the poor.
Similarly, non-elites are not more prosocial than elites in their preferences. On the
contrary, it is in fact the elites that have more pro-poor preferences than the rest of
the community.81 And if anything, receiving targeting instructions seem to actually
make group members less prone to pro-poor attitudes. 82
Overall, all these observations suggest that it is not sufficient to make the target-
ing process transparent to ensure that elites will be held accountable of their decisions
by their population. Since community involvement doesn’t operate simply by peer-
pressure, not only the degree but also the nature of the involvement of the community
at large in the targeting process is going to be essential to ensuring that aid resources
effectively reach the target group. In particular, since the outcome of an aid program
may depend crucially on the type of coalition that emerges, aid agencies may sig-
nificantly improve the effectiveness of their interventions by taking more closely into
account the existing relationships between the elites, the target group and the rest of
the community.
81As discussed in Strauss-Kahn (2018a), there is not as much heterogeneity in the communities in
the sample in terms of prosocial preferences, attitudes and behaviors as one could have expected.
According to the baseline survey, 42% of non-elites and only 26% of elites originally have pro-poor
preferences. And similarly, only 41% of the poor in our sample have pro-poor preferences.
82This is also consistent with observations from a previous study that targeting instructions by them-
selves seem to benefit both the poor and the non-poor (Strauss-Kahn, 2018a). In other words, the
provision of targeting instructions seem to prompt elite into altruistic dynamics in general, by cap-
turing a lesser share of the windfall for themselves, but not to targeting the poor in particular. It is
something else about the interactions within the group during public discussions that yields benefits
for the poor or not.
90
PAPER 2 - THE ROLE OF THE NON-POOR
5.2 Empowerment of the Poor
One limitation of this study is that the veto treatment is not tested on the poor.
Ideally, one would have wanted to know the effect of poor group members having
veto power over the elites’ decision.83 As a result, the message that comes out of
this study about whether targeting can actually contribute to empower the poor is
somewhat ambiguous.
According to the baseline survey, the poor participate little in village meetings
and discussions, and in any case they participate less that elites or non-poor village
members. In that respect, one remarkable aspect of the experiment presented in this
study is that poor group members participated a lot in the public discussions, even
after controlling for their propensity to participate in village discussions in general. In
that sense, one could argue that the process of targeting seems to provide the target
group with a “voice” that they would otherwise not have within their community.
However, it doesn’t follow that they use this opportunity to participate in decision-
making in a way that effectively benefits them.
According to all actors, including poor group members themselves, while poor
group members participate actively in group discussions their actual influence on the
allocation outcome is limited. Only 10% of poor participants report that they think
they have had influence on the distributor’s decision in their group, and this per-
ception is shared by the enumerator watching over the group in only 5% of cases.
By comparison, 20% of non-poor respondents report think that they personally in-
fluenced the elite’s decision. And according to enumerators’ estimations, in 77% of
the cases it is the non-poor that participated most in the discussions and in 73% it is
83For power considerations considering sample size, I had to choose whether to look at non-poor
veto players or poor veto players. I have eventually chosen to look at non-poor veto partly out of
conviction that the poor have little power in the community in general and so that giving them veto
power would not yield any significant difference in allocations.
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also them that had the most influence on the elite both in targeted and non-targeted
settings. Interestingly, self-perceptions about participation are not correlated with
the enumerators observations. When asked about their own participation in their
group’s discussions, 38% of the poor say that they participated very little in the dis-
cussions (resp. only 28% of the non-poor) while 35% of the non-poor report that they
participated a lot (resp. only 28% of the poor).
Two other striking observations about the behavior of poor group members in this
experiment is that the poor seem to participate less in discussions during targeted
distributions (49%) than during non-targeted distributions (55%), and that when they
participate in discussions in general they seem to advocate in favor of other group
members much more than for themselves.84 This finding can seem counter-intuitive
at first and somewhat hard to interpret. Yet, something similar can be observed
regarding the non-poor: they participate more in discussions when they have veto
power than when they do not. Sociological studies have long established that real
power does not need to be expressed or enforced (Weber, 1965). In this experiment,
it could be the case that when group members have actual influence, their legitimacy
is self-evident and they actually do not have to talk as much to defend their self-
interest. In a sense, this would also be consistent with the fact that elites —who are
in a position of power— are speaking less than all other group members.
5.3 The Role of the Non-Poor
Overall, what this study reveals is that it is non-elite group members that participate
in the discussions actively and efficiently. Survey results further suggest that in doing
so, they try to secure a share of the windfall for themselves, but that in some contexts
84In the same time, elites suggest that they are more susceptible to be influenced by group members
during non-targeted distributions. Elites report that other group members have had a lot of influence
on their decision in 54% non-targeted allocations but only in 40% of targeted ones.
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they can also advocate in favor of poor group members. In both cases, they seem to
have influence in their bargaining with the elite and to affect the allocation outcome.
This suggests that aid agencies should pay more attention to the role of community
members who are usually formally excluded from targeted aid programs, insofar as
they can turn out to be powerful, influential groups in the recipient community long
before and long after the aid distribution has occurred.
There is no existing theoretical explanation in bargaining theory for the increase
in the share of the windfall received by the poor —who have little to no bargaining
power— when the non-poor have veto power. Yet the effect is large, robust and
consistent across specifications. The non-poor seem to advocate in favor of the poor
even though they don’t have particularly prosocial preferences. It could be that
this interaction effect of targeting instructions and the bargaining environment has
something to do with minimal group theory. Targeting instructions, by selecting
some and excluding others as intended recipients of the windfall, would contribute
to crystallizing a specific bargaining environment in which the elite, the poor and
the rich are unitary actors. There is limited evidence in support of this argument in
the fact that targeting instructions and public treatment have a negative, significant
effect on the within-group variance of the share allocated to the rich and to the poor.85
This is also consistent with an interpretation of the results about friends and foes in
terms of collusions, rivalries and coalition-making. In contexts where they are foes
of the elite, or to a lesser extent when they are friends with the poor, the non-poor
contribute to counter-balance the power of the elite and prevent them from capturing
the aid windfall for themselves.
85See additional results as well as Lavergne & Strobel (2004) and Engelmann & Strobel (2006) on
maximin and inequality in group allocations.
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6 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the importance of an actor in targeting that is usually
largely overlooked. Targeting is a double-edged sword (Duffield, 1996): there is always
a group that is not targeted. In this study, it is the non-poor in distributions were
the poor is targeted. This group plays an important role in fostering or hindering
the effective targeting of the poor. . In doing so, I hope to contribute to better
understanding of community-level variation in the outcomes of targeted aid programs
and to foster their improvement.
The results suggest that public dynamics in targeting are bargaining more than
peer-pressure. In particular, in some contexts, the non-poor can actively participate
in discussions to help the poor and this seems to have a decisive effect. This is
particularly true when poor and non-poor are allies or when the non-poor and the
elites are at odds. This suggest a logic of village politics that is akin to balance of
power: the non-poor can balance the power of the elites and limit their ability to
capture aid windfalls.
On the other hand, the results of this paper also contribute to debunk a lot of
traditional assumptions and long-held ideas in the aid world. In particular, I find
little to no support for the role of monitoring in this study. As a conclusion, I intend
in further work, to explore the possibility of offering a theory of targeting based on
these findings.
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Abstract
A central challenge in development involves ensuring that humanitarian
and development aid reaches those in greatest need. Aid agencies typically
try to achieve this by targeting aid to vulnerable individuals or groups.
Despite the prevalence of targeting, we know little about its effects on
distributional outcomes and social cohesion in communities where some
are intended to benefit and others are excluded. We investigate this by
formalizing targeting as a bargaining game with coalition formation in-
volving three players—the target group, the elite, and an excluded group.
We find that whether more aid reaches the target group depends on com-
petition between elites and the excluded group. We provide support for
predictions using a regression discontinuity design and original survey data
from an aid program implemented in Aceh, Indonesia. This paper demon-
strates the importance of understanding the role of community dynamics
in shaping the economic and social outcomes of targeted aid programs.
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One of the central challenges in development involves ensuring that humanitarian
and development aid—whether provided by international or domestic, governmental
or non-governmental actors—reaches those in greatest need. In order to achieve this,
most aid agencies rely on some form of targeting. Targeting is the process of setting
criteria for who should receive aid, identifying eligible beneficiaries, and delivering
resources to them. Vast amounts of assistance are channeled through targeted aid
programs to individuals, households, or groups. More than 85 percent of the aid
intended for individuals now takes the form of targeted distributions of divisible
goods like money and food (Wahlberg, 2008, Barrett, 2006). For instance, the World
Bank has supported approximately 400 cash transfer projects targeting the poor in 94
countries valued at almost $30 billion (Wong, 2012). In recent years, the World Food
Program has targeted 54 percent of 4.4 million metric tons of food aid to vulnerable
populations (World Food Programme, 2011)
Despite the prevalence of aid targeting, its consequences for the economic and
social outcomes at the heart of concerns about aid effectiveness has received relatively
little attention in the literature.86 The main goal of this paper is to examine what
happens after aid reaches a recipient community and, especially, when targeting aid
will succeed in delivering more benefits to those for whom it is intended when some
individuals are eligible to receive assistance and others are not.
In doing so, we argue that understanding the consequences of targeting aid de-
pends on examining dynamics within the communities in which intended beneficiaries
live. Communities play a role in almost all targeted aid programs because successful
86For one review of the aid literature, see (Wright & Winters, 2010). For exceptions to the lack of
literature on individual-level aid targeting, see Winters, 2014, Jablonski, 2014, Alatas et al., 2012b.
Much of the literature on aid targeting has employed cross-national research to explain how aid
is targeted across countries or localities. Micro-level research on aid has tended to focus on the
effectiveness of specific interventions but do not examine the effects of targeting per se (see, for
example, Beath et al., 2013, Fearon et al., 2009).
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targeting is challenging for aid agencies, especially for those operating in low-income
or fragile countries.87 In some cases, aid agencies opt for community-based targeting—
in which community members or leaders select beneficiaries—in the belief that it is
more sensitive to local knowledge and context (Coady et al., 2004). Even in settings
where aid agencies identify beneficiaries through more objective data-driven meth-
ods, they nonetheless often face time, resource, and information constraints that lead
them to turn to communities for assistance at different stages of the targeting process
(Alatas et al., 2013b, Jablonski, 2014).88
While community involvement in targeting can result in greater satisfaction and
other benefits (Winters, 2014, Alatas et al., 2012b), it can also have unwelcome con-
sequences such as elite capture, non-beneficiary capture, and heightened social divi-
sions. One Oxfam program that aimed to help drought victims in three East African
countries helps to illustrate the variation. As Jaspars & Shoham (1999b) detail, in
Tanzania, the program successfully targeted the most drought-affected households
while maintaining a high level of community satisfaction. In Kenya, communities
were also pleased with the program but extensive mis-targeting occurred. Finally, in
South Sudan, there was both extensive elite capture and communal fighting over the
aid, resulting in local tensions that endured long after the program ended.
Existing studies on targeting within communities have limited ability to explain
such variation in effective targeting, capture, and social tensions. For one, they often
study either elite capture (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006b, Alatas et al., 2013b) or
non-beneficiary capture (Galasso & Ravallion, 2005b) but rarely study both together.
In doing so, they overlook the fact that elites and non-beneficiaries can be independent
87A targeted aid program is typically considered successful when the number of eligible households
that did not receive benefits (exclusion error) and ineligible households that did receive benefits
(inclusion error) is small (Coady et al., 2004).
88For a review of different approaches to targeting, see Coady et al. (2004).
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actors who have their own strategic interests and who might each seek to appropriate
a share of the aid windfall. Second, existing studies on aid targeting often focus on
either its economic or social consequences but rarely consider how these relate at the
local level. For instance, research on targeting within communities in non-conflict
settings has primarily focused on economic outcomes, with little attention to its
affects on social cohesion within those communities (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006b,
Galasso & Ravallion, 2005b, Alatas et al., 2013b). Alternatively, there is a growing
literature concerned with the effects of targeting aid at vulnerable populations on
rebel or government-initiated violence (Wood & Sullivan, 2015, Zurcher, 2017). Yet,
these studies have generally not yet addressed the question of when target populations
are more likely to benefit or how conflict outcomes vary by local context.
In our model, the elites offer a division of the aid to the target group and to non-
beneficiaries (hereafter the excluded group), which in turn decide whether to accept
the offer or contest it. If contestation occurs, groups may form coalitions. Equilibrium
strategies depend on three parameters: the amount of aid (which determines the
stakes of the game); the relative influence of the groups (which determines bargaining
power); and the quality of group relations (which determine the costs of contestation).
The model shows that, when windfall size is small, the benefits of contestation to
the excluded group do not exceed the costs, resulting in elite capture. As windfall
size increases, however, the excluded group becomes more likely to contest but will
only do so under certain conditions, namely when it is both influential (meaning
it has more bargaining power) and has bad relations with other groups (reflecting
lower costs to contestation). It is in precisely those communities with a high threat
of excluded group contestation (hereafter ‘high threat’ communities) that elites offer
the target group more in order to buy their support and prevent excluded group
contestation. In this way, our model shows how successful targeting depends not on
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the bargaining power of the target group but rather on competition between two more
powerful players in the community. It also underscores the sobering fact that it is
hard to improve targeting without also increasing mis-targeting: bargaining among
the excluded group and elites results in greater allocations not only to the target
group but to the excluded group as well.
An additional implication of the model is that better aid targeting can come at
the expense of social cohesion. While bigger aid windfalls result in better targeting
in high threat communities, they also increase the likelihood of contestation every-
where. Since we model the costs of contestation as the deterioration of group relations,
this means that increasing distributions to the target group might invariably result
in worsened social outcomes.89 We note, however, that actual contestation is not
necessary to drive the predicted distributive outcomes; the threat of contestation is
sufficient. Nevertheless, it is important to investigate the effects of targeting bigger
windfalls on social cohesion since aid agencies—which typically operate under a ‘do
no harm’ principle—hope that their programs to improve economic well-being will
not do so at the expense of social welfare.
The model developed here is relatively general and could be tested in a wide variety
of targeted aid programs in both conflict and non-conflict settings. We provide a test
of the predictions in the context of one post-conflict community-driven development
(CDD) project implemented in the Indonesian province of Aceh. The BRA-KDP
program studied here aimed to promote both economic welfare and social cohesion
following 30 years of separatist conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) and the central government of Indonesia. Two features
of BRA-KDP make it well-suited to an empirical test of the theory. First, BRA-
89Modeling contestation as worsened relations accords with anecdotal reports of heightened social
divisions. For instance, de Sardan (2014) notes with respect to a program in Niger: “Cash transfers
are not the devil...They are sharpening conflicts that are already there.”
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KDP targeted civilian conflict victims, which enables us to examine how community
dynamics among victims, an excluded group of former GAM combatants, and village
elites shaped distributive outcomes and social relations. Second, BRA-KDP used an
arbitrary cutoff in village population to determine windfall size, which allows us to
use a regression discontinuity design to gain causal leverage over a key parameter in
the model. We draw on original survey data from 504 civilians, former combatants
and village heads to estimate how windfall size and the threat of excluded group
contestation interact in driving distributive and social outcomes in 75 BRA-KDP
villages.
Consistent with the main predictions of the model, we find that bigger aid wind-
falls resulted in the target group receiving a greater share in communities with a high
threat of excluded group contestation. Conversely, targeting more aid resulted in a
smaller share going to the target group in lower threat communities. We also show
that bigger aid windfalls resulted in the excluded group getting more, and elites less,
in high threat relative to lower threat communities. While our findings on social
cohesion are more suggestive, our results indicate that bigger windfalls reduced ac-
ceptance of former GAM combatants overall but improved conflict resolution in high
threat villages with bigger windfalls. This pattern is consistent with a story in which
distributive outcomes in high threat villages are due to the greater threat of excluded
group contestation rather than outright contestation, and that avoiding contestation
might have actually yielded social benefits.
This paper makes several contributions to research on aid effectiveness in conflict
and non-conflict settings. First, it sheds important light on the conditions under which
aid targeting is more likely to be effective, emphasizing the importance of windfall
size and the presence of an excluded group that is willing and able to challenge
elite authority. Second, by distinguishing between three groups in a community, it
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helps to clarify when elites or non-beneficiaries are more likely to appropriate aid,
which is essential to obtaining a clear picture of the nature and extent of capture.
Third, it clarifies when effective targeting might come at the cost of social cohesion,
with important implications for the design of targeted aid programs. And, finally,
by considering how windfall size interacts with community characteristics, it adds
nuance to a large literature on the ‘aid curse’ by showing how bigger windfalls can be
helpful or harmful depending on local conditions. We return to these contributions
in the conclusion.
1 Theory
We begin by developing a simple formal model to shed light on how community
dynamics shape distributional outcomes from a targeted aid program. We make four
assumptions that we build into the model: (1) communities can in fact influence
distributional outcomes; (2) there is a target group that is vulnerable; (3) elites have
some authority over distributions and can also try to capture aid for themselves; and
(4) there are other community members who are ineligible to receive benefits but who
can also try to capture a share of the aid. Recognizing that targeted aid programs
create three players—the target group, the elites, and the excluded group—that can
influence distributional outcomes is the main innovation of our approach. Before
turning to the details of the model we explain these assumptions and characterize the
players.
First, we assume that communities can influence the distributional outcomes of
targeted aid programs. In some cases, aid agencies opt for community-based targeting
approaches, knowingly relinquishing some control in exchange for a process that is
more sensitive to local context and information (Coady et al., 2004). In other cases,
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aid agencies face logistical constraints that lead them to rely (at least to some extent)
on community assistance, for instance by confirming lists of beneficiaries or managing
distributions. Even when aid agencies seek to control the targeting process, the same
constraints can limit their monitoring and enforcement abilities, which again creates
scope for community dynamics to influence targeting outcomes.90 While aid agencies
take steps to mitigate capture and mis-targeting, they are difficult to eliminate. We
thus follow on Galasso & Ravallion (2005b) in assuming that the aid agency has
imperfect control over aid targeting, which shifts our focus to understanding the
importance of community dynamics.
Our second assumption is that there exists a target group that is supposed to
receive the most benefits but that is weak. We note that aid agencies often aim to de-
liver assistance to the most vulnerable elements within a community, such as the poor,
widows, internally displaced persons, or conflict victims (NRC, 2013, OCHA, 2014,
de Sardan et al., 2015). Vulnerable groups are targeted precisely because they are
often the most in need and the most at risk of being marginalized from resource allo-
cation without special consideration. While targeting can help to empower recipients
to hold agencies and elites accountable (Winters, 2014), we follow on existing research
that suggests it is unlikely that targeting can be so empowering as to erase existing
power asymmetries within the community (Galasso & Ravallion, 2005b, Bardhan &
Mookherjee, 2006b, Dreze & Sen, 1989). Indeed, what is unique about targeting—
and what differentiates it from other distributive contexts—is that it makes a weak
group a relevant player despite its lack of formal bargaining strength. We reflect the
weakness of the target group by modeling it as a player that has relatively low levels
of influence within the community.
90The most common way to enforce targeting criteria is to punish violations by making future dis-
tributions of aid conditional on previous performance, but there are also significant challenges to
conditionality (Paul, 2006b).
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Our third assumption is that elites, as individuals with formal political authority
in the village, are often in a position to influence how aid is allocated and to capture a
share of the aid for themselves. When aid agencies involve communities in targeting,
they typically turn first to community leaders to assist with identifying beneficiaries
or delivering assistance. While this can help to ensure that targeting incorporates
local knowledge, it also invariably creates scope for elite capture (Platteau, 2004b,
Angeles & Neanidis, 2009, Alatas et al., 2013b, Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006b). Dreze
& Sen (1989, 107) summarize concerns about elite capture in targeted aid programs:
The leaders of a village community undoubtedly have a lot of information
relevant for appropriate selection. But in addition to the informational
issue, there is also the question as to whether community leaders have
strong enough motivation—or incentives—to give adequately preferential
treatment to vulnerable groups. Much will undoubtedly depend on the
nature and functioning of political institutions at the local level, and in
particular on the power that the poor and the deprived have in the ru-
ral community. Where the poor are also powerless—as is frequently the
case—the reliance on local institutions to allocate relief is problematic,
and can end up being at best indiscriminate and at worst blatantly iniq-
uitous, as numerous observers have noted in diverse countries.
One important piece of the puzzle of explaining when elites distribute to the tar-
get group—and our fourth assumption—is that there exists yet another group in the
community that can also influence how aid is allocated: the excluded group. Criti-
cally, targeting by definition creates beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, or individuals
who live in the community but who do not meet the eligibility criteria and therefore
should not receive benefits (Duffield, 1996). Who comprises the excluded group de-
pends on the nature of the program, but could be the non-poor in programs targeted
at the poor; men in programs targeted at women; members of an ethnic majority
in programs targeted at an ethnic minority; host community members in a program
targeted at migrants or refugees; rebel groups in programs targeted at vulnerable
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populations; or (as in our empirical case) ex-combatants in a program targeted at
civilians.
Unlike elites, the excluded group does not have a formal role in the targeting
process. There is, however, evidence that non-beneficiaries also often intervene to try
to expropriate a share of the resources for themselves (de Sardan, 2014, Kilic et al.,
2013). For instance, in one cash transfer program in Niger, non-beneficiaries contested
a targeted aid program designed to assist widows, the disabled, migrants, and women
from vulnerable households (de Sardan et al., 2015). In Bangladesh, Galasso & Raval-
lion (2005b) find that non-beneficiaries in a community-based targeting program were
more likely to try to capture aid intended for the poor in villages with high income
inequality (implying that the non-beneficiaries were relatively powerful). Wood &
Sullivan (2015) show that, in conflict settings, rebel groups often aim to appropriate
aid targeted at vulnerable civilian populations. Importantly, while the problem of
non-beneficiary capture is well recognized, much of the literature to date—especially
that on non-conflict settings—has overlooked the strategic role of the excluded group
independent of both the elites and the target group. The main contribution of our
approach is thus to model the excluded group as a third player that is also relatively
influential and that has the option to contest an aid allocation proposed by the elites.
All in all, the numerous accounts cited above suggest that targeting aid wind-
falls can induce competition over resources by different groups within a community,
namely a target group, elites, and an excluded group of non-beneficiaries. We note
that one additional factor—the size of the aid windfall—plays a crucial role in the
competition by determining the stakes of the game. In our model, bigger windfalls
make contestation more attractive to the excluded group, but whether it acts to ap-
propriate that bigger windfall also depends on its pre-existing influence within the
community and on the quality of its relations with other groups. It is the interaction
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of bigger windfalls and these aspects of local context that make excluded group con-
testation more likely, which in turn drives elites to make the target group a better
offer.
1.1 Model
We model aid distribution as a bargaining game between elites L, excluded group X,
and target group T with both bargaining breakdown and coalition formation. The
timing of the game is as follows. Given the size S > 0 of the windfall, the strategic
interaction begins when the elite L proposes a take-it-or-leave-it division of the aid
windfall among the three players α = (αL, αX , αT ).
91 The excluded group X observes
α and decides whether to accept the elite’s offer or not. If X accepts, the game ends
and the windfall is divided according to α. If X rejects, we say there is contestation.92
Contest winners share the aid among themselves while the losers get nothing.
If the excluded group chooses to contest the elite’s proposal, they can try to sway
the target group to their side by making them an offer αˆ. T observes the offers from
both L and X and decides which powerful group to form a coalition with; depending
on the offers, probabilities of winning, and costs of contestation defined below. If it
sides with L, with probability 1−pX they win and the outcome is (1−αT , 0, αT ), and
with probability pX the excluded group wins and gets the whole windfall, (0, 1, 0).
Similarly, if T sides with X, they win with probability pXT and the outcome is
(0, 1 − αˆT , αˆT ), and with probability 1 − pXT the outcome is (1, 0, 0).93 Either way,
91We assume that the size of the aid windfall is exogenous to characteristics of the communities, as in
Galasso & Ravallion (2005b) and our empirical context.
92Conceptually, contestation could take different forms depending on the context, ranging from preda-
tion or extortion in conflict-settings to major disagreement in community meetings in non-conflict
settings.
93We assume that the probability of winning a contest is weakly greater for a coalition than the sum
of the probabilities of each of its constituents, pij ≥ pi + pj for all i, j ∈ {L,X, T}. We deliberately
do not assume a functional form to keep the analysis as general as possible, however in a real world
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the game ends after T ’s choice of coalition and payoffs are realized.
L
X
uL =
∑
i
βiαiS
uX = αXS
uT = αTS
Accept
X
T
(1− pX)(1− αT (1− βT ))S − cLX
pXS − cXL − cXT
(1− pX)αTS − cTX
Join L
(1− pXT )S − cLX − cLT
pXT (1− αˆT )S − cXL
pXT αˆTS − cTL
Join X
αˆ
Reject
α
Figure 1: Extensive form of the game.
Each player derives utility from the amount of the windfall they receive, but they
incur costs from contestation. While these costs and benefits capture X and T ’s
utility functions completely, we assume that the elites care not only about short-run
benefits from the windfall but also their relative power in the long-run. The elites’
utility function therefore also includes weights that they attach to the bargaining
share received by other groups when contestation is avoided. See Figure 1 for an
extensive form of the game.
In writing utilities, we focus on two aspects of community relations that are intu-
itively important to understanding community dynamics but also conceptually dis-
tinct. The first aspect is the quality of relations between the groups. Better relations
bring economic and social benefits, such as trade, information-sharing, intermarriage,
and social insurance. It is often argued that the better relations are, the more any
setting we expect p’s to depend on factors such as group size, wealth, or access to means of coercion.
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one actor has to lose by taking an action that might do long-lasting harm to those
relations and disrupting access to such valuable benefits (Polachek, 1980, Baker et al.,
2002). We follow on this logic to assume that, ceteris paribus, better relations make
contestation less likely. We capture the costs of contestation as a loss of above-
mentioned benefits, supposing that each group i pays a cost cij > 0 for all groups j
they face off against during contestation. Thus, groups that have good relations with
the rest of the community will face higher costs of contestation.
A second feature of community interactions pertains to the influence of different
groups in the community, particularly whether groups are weak or strong. By in-
fluence, we refer to attributes including but not limited to group size or access to
resources that improve a group’s abilities to influence outcomes. To understand how
variation in the influence of groups affects bargaining outcomes, we write the elite’s
reduced form continuation payoff as follows: uL(α) =
∑
i βiαiS where βi refers to the
weight L assigns to the share of group i (Galasso & Ravallion, 2005b). We fix the
weight the elites assign to their own share to one, βL = 1. We assume that elites care
more about their own share of the windfall than others’, βi < 1 for i ∈ {X,T}, and
so would keep the whole windfall for themselves in the absence of a credible threat of
contestation.
These weights allow us to capture two distinct and diametrically opposed incen-
tives for the elite. On one hand, when pressed, the elite can behave generously and
opt to share the windfall with others in the community, for instance because their
legitimacy depends in part on keeping others happy or because they want to be seen
as complying with aid agency requirements. We refer to these as reputation consider-
ations. On the other hand, the elite fear giving resources to other influential groups
that might one day use these resources to challenge their political control. We refer
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to these as rivalry considerations.94 Thus, we assume that weights assigned to the
shares are lower for more influential groups. With respect to the excluded group,
the rivalry considerations dominate the reputation considerations (since the group
is influential and not supposed to receive aid anyways), and we have βX ≤ 0. For
the target group, reputation considerations dominate rivalry considerations (since the
group is weak and is supposed to receive aid), resulting in βT ≥ 0.
Our solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.95 There are three
types of equilibrium outcomes. First, when the windfall is small, contestation never
occurs in equilibrium because the costs of contestation for X exceed the potential
benefits.96 In such cases, elites capture the entire windfall. Second, when the wind-
fall is large and the costs of contestation for the excluded group are very low, there is
always contestation in equilibrium.97 Formally, there is a threshold c∗(βX , S) which
we define in Appendix A such that when cXL + cLX + cXT ≤ c∗(βX , S), there is no
possibility to find a negotiated solution. The intuition behind unavoidable contes-
tation is straightforward: when the excluded group is very influential and has bad
relations with other groups, the elite’s concerns about empowering them overcome
their incentives to maintain good relations. In this case, the elites set αX = 0 and
αT =
pXT−pX
1−pX +
cTX+cXT−cTL
(1−pX)S , the excluded group rejects, and the target group sides
94An interesting extension of this model would be to look at a repeated version of this game where
aid received in previous periods change the influence of groups in later periods. While a complete
analysis of a repeated bargaining game is beyond the scope of this paper, the reduced form payoff
function of the elite captures this intuition.
95To avoid multiplicity of equilibria and open set problems, we assume that each player when indifferent
accepts the most recent offer. Similarly, we assume that when a group is indifferent between offering
zero and a positive amount to another group, they offer zero.
96See Appendix A for the formal statement of this condition.
97This is consistent with work on the possibility of disagreement under complete information. For
instance, Laengle & Loyola (2015) show that bargaining breaks down in equilibrium when one player
derives negative externalities from the share received by another player.We show that introducing
a third player (the target group) reduces the range of bargaining breakdown. When the excluded
group and the elite are rivals, each might not want to let the other capture aid but both can agree
to distribute more to the target group, which presents a threat to neither.
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with the elite.98
Finally, aside from these two more extreme outcomes, there is a third equilibrium
outcome in which S is large enough for contestation to be feasible but relationships are
not bad enough for contestation to be inevitable. We now focus on this intermediate
situation and look at how different parameters affect the target groups share. To
avoid contestation the elite must make sure X is at least as well off accepting the
offer as rejecting. When contestation is feasible but avoidable, there are two possible
cases, one in which L either offers a larger share to X and ignores T (which we refer
to as an Appropriation case and denote αA) and one in which L gives a smaller share
to X and a large enough share to T to make sure they would never side with X in
case of contestation (which we refer to as an Inclusion case and denote αI).
Whether elites offer αA or αI depends on the excluded group’s influence, which is
inversely related to βX (the weight the elite attaches to X’s share). Specifically, there
is a threshold β∗X =
βT−pX
1−pX such that when the excluded group’s influence is relatively
high (βX < β
∗
X), the elite offers α
I , and otherwise offers αA. This is because, when
βX is low (excluded group influence is high), the elite’s incentives to withhold the
windfall from a very influential X become stronger; so much so that they are willing
to take a smaller share themselves.
The intermediate equilibrium outcome is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.
(A) When βX ≥ β∗X , L offers αAX = pXT − cXLS + max{cTX−cTL,0}S and αAT = 0, X and
T accept, windfall is divided accordingly.
(I) When βX < β∗X , L offers αIX = pX − cXL+cXTS and αIT = pXT−pX1−pX +
cTX+cXT−cTL
(1−pX)S ,
98 For sake of convenience, we assume that the target group’s influence is low enough so that the
expected payoff for the elite to buy T ’s support is always greater than letting them side with X;
βT >
cTX+cXT−cTL−cLT
(pXT−pX)S+cTX+cXT−cTL .
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X and T accept, windfall is divided accordingly.
Proof. In Appendix A.
1.2 Predictions
Our central interest is understanding when aid targeting is more effective, meaning
that the target group receives a bigger share of the aid to which it is intended, despite
its lack of influence.99 Putting together the three equilibrium outcomes described
above, we make predictions on how a change in windfall size affects the share received
by T , conditional on excluded group influence and relations. Figure 2 shows our main
comparative statics for αT .
Low influence High influence
Good relations
∂αT
∂S
= 0
∂αT
∂S
< 0
Bad relations
∂αT
∂S
= 0
∂αT
∂S
> 0
Figure 2: Main prediction on allocations to the target group. Change in
the shares of the target group as windfall size increases for different parameter re-
gions. The bottom-right quadrant denotes high threat communities where the ex-
cluded group is both strong and has bad relations with other groups. The remaining
three cells characterize lower threat communities.
Our main prediction is that what the target group receives differs in ‘high threat’
communities —where the excluded group is both influential (βX < β
∗
X) and has bad
relations with other groups—and in ‘lower threat’ communities, where the excluded
group is not influential (βX > β
∗
X) and/or has good relations with the other two
99We note that our predictions focus on shares—and consequently on the distributive outcomes of
aid—rather than simply claiming that different groups get bigger amounts as windfall size increases.
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groups (cXL + cLX + cXT ≥ c∗(βX , S) and cXT + cTX > cTL).100 This yields the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. As the amount of aid increases, the equilibrium share
of the target group increases in ‘high threat’ communities and (weakly)
decreases in ‘lower threat’ communities.
To understand this prediction, it is first important to recall that bigger windfalls
increase the material benefits of contestation for the excluded group relative to the
costs, making contestation more likely in general. But whether the excluded group
actually contests also depends on whether it is both influential (which exacerbates the
elites’ rivalry concerns) and has bad relations with other groups (meaning low costs
to contestation). All in all, because bigger windfalls in high threat communities make
excluded group contestation more likely, elites have a greater incentive to offer the
target group a bigger share of the aid to form a coalition to forestall excluded group
contestation. The bottom right cell in Figure 2 shows how it is the interaction of
these three parameters that drives our main prediction for high threat communities.
In lower threat communities (the remaining three cells of the figure), elites lack such
incentives and the share received by the target group is (weakly) decreasing in those
contexts.101
The model also suggests that as aid windfalls become larger, there will be more ex-
cluded group capture—and less elite capture—in high threat communities.102 Where
100When αT > 0, whether T’s share is increasing or decreasing in windfall size (
∂αT
∂S ) depends on the
sign of cTX+cXT−cTL(1−pX)S , which can be rewritten as cXT + cTX > cTL, namely whether the relations of
the target group with the excluded group are better than its relations with the elite.
101When the equilibrium outcome is Appropriation, T s share is always zero, regardless of the size of
the windfall (left column of Figure 2). When the equilibrium outcome is Inclusion, and T s relations
with L are better than their relations with X (cXT + cTX ≤ cTL), the surplus L must offer T to
keep them from forming a coalition with X shrinks in relative terms (upper right quadrant).
102We focus on the predictions for high threat communities in order to understand the trade-off between
effective targeting and capture. For the full set of predictions for excluded group and elite capture,
see Appendix A.
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the elites want to avoid contestation in equilibrium, bigger windfalls mean that they
must now offer the excluded group a bigger share. Specifically, in an Inclusion equi-
librium, the elites use their first-mover advantage to extract cXL+cXT , the costs that
the excluded group would have to endure if there were contestation. As S increases,
the excluded group’s gains from contestation increase but their costs stay the same,
and so does the amount L can extract and keep for themselves. Hence, the share that
L needs to offer X to avoid contestation grows in windfall size.103
Hypothesis 2. As windfall size increases, the equilibrium share of the
excluded group increases—while the elite’s equilibrium share decreases—in
high threat communities.
It is important to note that the main predictions of the model are driven by
a greater threat of contestation in communities where the excluded group is both
strong and has bad relations; actual bargaining breakdown is not necessary for our
predictions to hold. Nevertheless, by expanding the set of parameter values that
result in contestation, the model predicts that bigger windfalls make contestation—
and hence a deterioration in community relations—more likely in general. Critically,
this means that while bigger windfalls might be necessary to obtain better targeting in
high threat communities, bigger windfalls could bring a general loss in social cohesion.
Given that aid agencies often hope their programs will also enhance—or at least
not undermine—social cohesion, contestation is an unwelcome outcome that merits
investigation.
Hypothesis 3. As windfall size increases, contestation (a deterioration
in community relations) becomes more likely in both high and lower threat
communities.
103We also show in Appendix A that if contestation occurs due to bigger windfalls, the excluded group
also gets a bigger share of the windfall in expectation.
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1.3 Discussion of the Model
Showing that competition between two stronger players can have distributive bene-
fits for a weak player is counter-intuitive from the perspective of canonical bargaining
models, which predict that bargaining situations with both weak and strong players
will result in the latter getting almost all of the benefits (Rubinstein, 1982, Baron
& Ferejohn, 1989). Our approach introduces insights from other models of non-
cooperative bargaining with coalition formation to demonstrate how allowing a weak
player to form a coalition with a stronger player can alter these bargaining dynam-
ics.104 Our approach also differs from canonical models of group rent-seeking contests,
which show that the beneficial effects of bigger windfalls dissipate due to competition
among multiple powerful groups (Svensson, 2000b). While we have a similar interest
in the effect of windfall size, our approach differs in its focus on bargaining rather
than rent-seeking and in our central concern for the consequences of aid windfalls for
a weak group.
One potential concern with the model might stem from our decision to allow the
target group to influence distributive outcomes through forming a coalition with one
of the stronger players. In other words, if the target group is weak, can it overcome
the collective action dilemma and act as a group? Critically, one way to think about
targeting is that it helps to overcome the collective action dilemma by designating a
group that did not exist as such previously. This is consistent with the notion that
targeting can have an empowering effect (Winters, 2014). A related concern might be
that, by allowing T to join a coalition, we are in fact imbuing a weak group with out-
sized power. We view the possibility of coalition formation as consistent with a large
104Our model is closest in setup to Dal Bo´ & Powell (2009), who show that government can co-opt an
opposition by offering a share of a resource windfall. While the distributive outcomes in their model
rely on information asymmetries, however, we show that it is possible to get similar outcomes under
perfect information (see more below).
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literature that suggests that weak groups can in fact exercise influence—for instance
by having power in numbers (DeNardo, 1985), by being pivotal in their support for
one party over another (Smith & De Mesquita, 2012), or by influencing outcomes
by opting not to join a coalition (Maschler, 1963)—but rarely do so through direct
challenges to elites.105
Another possible question pertains to our assumption that all actors have full
information on windfall size. Practically-speaking, it is common in targeted aid pro-
grams for donors to publicize the aid amount, which makes incomplete information
over windfall size (or targeting criteria) less of a concern (World Food Programme,
2005, United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), 2005). More importantly, a key
contribution of our model is to show how community dynamics impact effective tar-
geting and capture even in situations of complete information. While we could get
similar predictions from a model using information asymmetries, a main advantage
of our approach is that we show that the dynamics described do not depend on un-
certainty or information advantages among players and as such that they would not
be solved simply by increasing transparency in the targeting process.
Finally, we emphasize that the model is relatively general in that it could be
tested in any targeted aid program in which aid agencies have imperfect control,
elites play some formal or informal role in distributing aid, and the target group
is vulnerable. These are scope conditions that are met in many different types of
aid programs—including community-driven development, conditional cash transfer,
and humanitarian aid programs—in both conflict and non-conflict settings. In what
follows, we provide empirical support for the model’s predictions based on evidence
105In Appendix A we study a more general version where T can make a counter-offer or contest both
powerful groups at once. We show that in our setting the general version of the model is functionally
the same as the simplified version presented here and yields the same results.
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from one case. In Section 5 we return to a discussion of the relevance of our approach
to targeted aid programs more broadly.
2 The Aceh Context
We test our predictions in the context of an aid program implemented in Aceh,
Indonesia. For nearly 30 years, GAM waged a separatist struggle in Aceh against the
central government. While the conflict evolved in several stages, civilians frequently
suffered from violence committed by GAM forces, the Indonesian military, or both.
The conflict resulted in approximately 30,000 deaths as well as widespread instances
of murder, torture, rape, internal displacement, and property destruction.
The 2005 peace agreement contained provisions to reintegrate GAM combatants
and to provide assistance to civilian conflict victims. The Aceh Peace Reintegra-
tion Agency (Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh, or BRA) was established to manage
this process and partnered with the World Bank-supported Kecamatan Development
Program (KDP) to reach conflict-affected communities. The resultant BRA-KDP
program aimed to disburse aid windfalls ranging in size from 60 to 170 million rupiah
(about USD $6,000-$17,000) to more than 1,700 villages. The program also sought
to target those funds to civilian conflict victims, which had the effect of creating an
excluded group of former combatants as elaborated below.
In order to identify civilian conflict victims, BRA-KDP opted for a community-
based targeting approach. Each village organized a series of meetings to select the
criteria for identifying conflict-affected households. Civilian conflict victims were
targeted precisely because they were viewed as among the most vulnerable members
of the community. As one conflict victim stated: “Conflict victims have less education
and are a minority in this village. We don’t have leverage in the community. If we
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rely on the community to determine who qualifies for assistance, we won’t get the
benefits we deserve” (Morel et al., 2009, 19). Following the determination of eligible
beneficiaries, villagers developed proposals that were then voted on at community
meeting. Communities had discretion over how to allocate funds but were instructed
to prioritize proposals submitted by the most conflict-affected.
Elites also played a distributional role in BRA-KDP, despite BRA-KDP efforts to
minimize the possibility of elite capture by using external facilitators to implement
the program within villages. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that village
elites still managed to influence the decision-making process. As one villager stated
with respect to BRA-KDP community meetings: “Meetings are normally attended
only by village authorities. Hamlet heads, religious figures, community leaders and
village government officials attend.” And, according to another: “It is always a group
of people who are close to the village authorities that monopolize the benefits” (Morel
et al., 2009, 27).
Moreover, by targeting civilian conflict victims, BRA-KDP invariably created an
excluded group consisting of former GAM combatants. While ex-combatants were
not supposed to benefit directly from the program, in many villages they felt enti-
tled to receive some of the aid. In the words of one former commander: “Everyone
should understand that returning GAM are heroes. We should receive money. There
are 1,000 combatants here...and there’s potential for them to conduct criminal acts
if BRA-KDP doesn’t target them. GAM are conflict-affected people as well and
therefore we should also get money” (Morel et al., 2009, 28).
BRA-KDP personnel documented numerous instances in which GAM took—or
threatened to take—actions to try to appropriate a share of the funds and that could
be construed as contestation. These actions included extortion, theft of funds, protest,
threats and demands, and, in rare instances, physical intimidation (Morel et al., 2009,
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27-33). These methods are consistent with how, during the conflict, GAM often
demanded that villages pay ‘taxes’ to finance its operations (Aspinall, 2009). As
stated by one villager: “There is a rumor here that GAM have requested 20 percent
of the [BRA-KDP] project funds. I think the money should go to them first, not the
community. Because once they have received something, the process will go more
smoothly” (Morel et al., 2009, 30). BRA-KDP reports suggest that such actions by
GAM generated tensions and community resentment (Morel et al., 2009).
While these dynamics were well-documented, they still call for a more systematic
explanation as to why targeting was more effective in some BRA-KDP communities
than others. Crucial for our analysis, the conflict produced substantial and endur-
ing village-level variation in both GAM influence and relations, which allows us to
examine how the effects of bigger aid windfalls vary depending on local conditions.
Indeed, villages varied in the extent to which they supported GAM during the
conflict, with implications for the quality of relations post-conflict. For much of the
conflict, GAM enjoyed relatively high levels of community support in the eastern
part of Aceh due to a shared ethno-nationalist ideology. In other parts of Aceh,
however, support for GAM was more variable and many villages—especially those
with significant non-Acehnese populations—supported Indonesian military forces (or
neither side). As GAM moved into such areas in the later stages of conflict, it often
used coercion, violence, and intimidation to control local communities, damaging
local support (Schulze, 2004). Importantly, there is also evidence that community
sympathy or antipathy for GAM endured following the conflict, shaping relations
and reintegration prospects (Tajima, 2018).106
Similarly, GAM’s influence varied at the village-level both during and after the
106Our fixed effects regressions, discussed below, allow us to investigate the effects of village-level
variation in support for GAM within districts.
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conflict and did so independently of its popular support. GAM primarily fought a
guerrilla war, which necessitated the creation of local strongholds and bases of oper-
ations and had the effect of enhancing its influence over village affairs. GAM often
established strongholds in or near villages where it had support (Schulze, 2004, As-
pinall, 2009), although even then its influence within the community varied depending
on factors such as the strength of other forms of local authority (Morel et al., 2009).
GAM also established strongholds in areas where it lacked community support but
that were of strategic importance, relying on coercion and intimidation to ensure
popular cooperation (Schulze, 2004). Given that most GAM fought near their home
villages (Aspinall, 2009), the influence over village affairs that GAM established dur-
ing the conflict often extended into the post-conflict period (Morel et al., 2009). In the
next section, we explain how we use our data to capture such village-level variation
in both GAM strength and the quality of its relations with others in the community,
which in turn determine whether GAM posed a high or low threat of contestation to
targeted aid in the post-conflict period.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 The data
Our main data come from original household surveys of a random sample of 504 civil-
ians, former GAM combatants, and village heads from 75 villages that participated in
BRA-KDP. The surveys were implemented in 2008, approximately 12 months after
BRA-KDP ended, and were conducted face-to-face by trained enumerators from a
professional survey firm. Sampling followed a multi-stage cluster sampling approach
in which villages were first sampled within strata and then civilians and ex-combatants
118
PAPER 3 - IS BIGGER ALWAYS BETTER?
were randomly sampled within villages (see Appendix B.2 for details on the sampling
strategy). Question-wording for all survey questions used in the analysis can be found
in Appendix B.3.
Coding threat of contestation. We use data from the village head survey
to code villages as having a high or lower threat of excluded group contestation.
The survey included questions about the strength and nature of relations between
ex-combatants and other community members from 2001 to 2005, which was the
final—and most violent—stage of the conflict. Following on the discussion in Section
2, we proxy for GAM influence using a question about whether a village was a GAM
stronghold (‘basis GAM’) during that period. In doing so, we draw on the qualitative
evidence that ex-combatants remained more influential in communities where they
also had a stronger presence during the conflict (Morel et al., 2009). We proxy for the
nature of community relations with a survey question that inquired into whether the
majority of villagers actually supported GAM during this period or did not (meaning
that they supported the Indonesian military or neither side). We consider relations
between GAM and the community to be better in villages where GAM had at least
majority support (implying high costs to contestation) and worse in places where
the village supported the Indonesian military or neither side (implying lower costs to
contestation).
We combine these two measures to create a binary indicator where ‘high threat’
villages (those in which GAM is influential and has worse relations) are coded 1
and ‘lower threat’ villages (those in which GAM has little influence and/or good
relations) are coded as 0. Our coding is summarized in Table 3.1. We use this binary
coding in the main analysis because it provides the most direct test of the main model
predictions. In Appendix B.9 we show that the empirical results follow the predictions
when we disaggregate this measure into its component parts.
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Village was a GAM
stronghold (2001-2005)
No Yes
j=13 j=17
Majority of Yes i=90 i=129
village supported Lower threat=0 Lower threat=0
GAM
during the j=23 j=22
conflict No i=135 i=150
(2001-2005) Lower threat=0 High threat=1
The table shows the over-lapping measures of GAM influence and relations taken at the
village-level, where j refers to the number of villages in the sample and i to the number of
individuals. Villages in which GAM is both influential and has bad community relations
are considered to have a high threat of contestation, all other villages have a lower threat
of contestation.
Table 3.1: Measure of village-level threat of excluded group contestation
Controls. Importantly, while we have exogenous variation on windfall size (de-
scribed next), the threat of excluded group contestation is not exogenous. There
could in fact be numerous factors that predict both excluded group threat and our
outcomes of interest. To address concerns about omitted variable bias, we employ
a rich set of pre-treatment controls using data from the 2000 PODES survey—an
extensive survey conducted regularly in every Indonesian village. Our controls in-
clude measures of village poverty; terrain and proximity to a forest; remoteness from
services, markets, and population centers; government capacity; security; and the
presence of criminal networks. Descriptive statistics for all PODES variables used in
the analysis can be found in Appendices B.5.
The PODES data also allows us to conduct a rough analysis of the factors that
predict excluded group contestation threat. Appendix B.6 presents a regression of
our binary measure of threat on the control variables. We find a positive association
between threat and village proximity to a forest (consistent with the notion that
GAM often used forests as bases for fighting) as well as between threat and duration
of village head time in office (which could proxy for elite strength). These correlations
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help to confirm the validity of our threat measure. While we do not present regressions
displaying controls in the main text, these results are available in Appendix B.11.
3.2 Exogenous variation in windfall size
One benefit of our empirical context is that we have exogenous variation in windfall
size, which gives us causal leverage over a key parameter in the model that deter-
mines the stakes of the game. This is also an advantage over existing observational
research on aid windfalls, which give rise to concerns that windfall size is endogenous
to unobservable community characteristics.
The World Bank initially selected 67 sub-districts to participate in BRA-KDP,
with all villages in those sub-districts guaranteed some amount of aid (Barron et al.,
2009b). BRA-KDP used two measures to determine aid amounts at the village-level.
First, it used a continuous measure of sub-district conflict intensity and employed
arbitrary cutoffs to categorize sub-districts as low, medium, or high conflict-affected.
Second, it used a continuous measure of village population and imposed exogenous
cutoffs to classify villages as small (0-299 people), medium-sized (300-699 people), or
large (700 or more people). BRA-KDP then crossed these measures to create nine
strata, with each strata receiving a different amount of aid.
While the BRA-KDP assignment process in fact created multiple thresholds, the
analysis in this paper focuses on the one for which we have a sufficiently large sample
near the threshold and which passes the McCrary (2008) density test (discussed be-
low).107 Specifically, we focus our analysis on the cutoff between small and medium-
sized villages in high conflict-affected sub-districts. All villages with 0-299 people
107The fact that the villages included in our analysis are not a representative sample of those that
participated in BRA-KDP does not affect the internal validity of our results given our empirical
strategy. In Appendix B.4 we provide a more detailed description of the assignment process and
explanation as to why we do not estimate effects at other thresholds.
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received an aid windfall in the amount of 120 million rupiah (about $12,000) while
all villages with 300-599 people received an aid windfall of 150 million rupiah (about
$15,000)—an increase of 30 million rupiah (about $3,000) at the cutoff of 300 per-
sons. This is equivalent to an increase in 100,000 rupiah ($10) per capita, or 560,000
rupiah ($56) per household. The top part of Figure 3 shows the distribution of our 75
sampled villages around the population variables (centered at 300 persons) while the
bottom shows the distribution of villages by whether they are high threat or lower
threat.
3.3 Estimation
The fact that windfall size was determined by an arbitrary cutoff in a continuous
measure of village population makes analysis suitable to a regression discontinuity
approach (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). Our main empirical goal is to estimate the
effect of an increase in windfall size on aid allocations in high threat and lower threat
villages. To do this we estimate weighted least squares regressions of the following
form:
Yij = α + τZj + δVj + γZj × Vj + f(Zj, Vj, P˜j) + ωmX ′jm + ij
where Yij refers to the outcome for individual i in village j.
108 Zj is a binary indicator
for treatment assignment that equals one for villages that received a larger windfall
(are above the threshold) and zero otherwise.109 Vj is the binary indicator which
equals one for high threat villages and zero for lower threat villages and P˜j is the
continuous measure of population centered at 300 (P˜j=0 at the threshold). Standard
errors are clustered at the village level and all analysis employs survey weights to
108While the main outcomes in the theoretical model are group shares, our empirical analysis employs
individual-level proxies, as described below.
109This is a ‘sharp’ RD in that by all World Bank accounts the cutoff completely determined assignment.
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Figure 3: Distribution of individual-level observations around the population thresh-
old centered at zero. Top panel shows the full sample; bottom panel shows the
distribution in high threat and lower threat villages.
account for sampling probabilities.
The term f(Zj, Vj, P˜j) refers to variables included in the regression to fit models
flexibly on either side of the threshold. Specifically, we fit linear and quadratic models
separately on either side of the threshold.110 The coefficient γ identifies the effect of
110For our linear spline, f(Zj , Vj , P˜j) = β1P˜j + β2ZjP˜j + β3VjP˜j + β4ZjVjP˜j . Our quadratic spline
includes the additional terms: β5P˜
2
j + β6ZjP˜
2
j + β7XjP˜
2
j + β8ZjVjP˜
2
j .
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a bigger windfall in high threat relative to lower threat villages while τ captures the
effect of targeting a bigger windfall in lower threat communities.111 We also include in
our regressions X
′
jm, the vector of m village-level controls obtained from the PODES
2000 data.
One central concern with regression discontinuity designs is the choice of band-
width. All main analyses presented in this paper employ a bandwidth of ± 150,
which restricts our analysis to 63 villages. In Appendix B.7 we check the robustness
of all results to alternative bandwidths of ± 100 and ± 200. We also check robust-
ness to nonparametric local linear regression using an optimal data-driven bandwidth
(Calonico et al., 2014).
The key identifying assumption of an RDD is the continuity of potential outcomes
at the threshold (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). Following the literature, we check this
assumption by testing for discontinuities in our m pre-treatment village-level controls
and our measures of excluded group threat at the threshold. The results, presented
in Appendix B.7 support the continuity assumption. This assumption would also be
violated if villages had sorted themselves on either side of the threshold, for instance if
they had been able to manipulate strategically their population scores. To check this,
we implement a McCrary density test and find no evidence of sorting (see Appendix
B.7).
111We are interested in estimating effects at the cutoff point where P˜j = 0. The terms in f(·) that are
used to flexibly fit the regression drop out at this point and thus are not included in the calculation
of marginal effects.
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4 Results
4.1 Distributive outcomes
Our main goal is to understand when the target group, as a vulnerable group, gets
a greater share of the benefits to which it is entitled. Descriptive statistics from the
household survey, reported in Appendix B.5, show that about 69 percent of civilian
(victim) households and 58 percent of former combatants received some assistance
from BRA-KDP with the average amount totaling about 630,000 rupiah (about USD
$63) for each group, which suggests that excluded group capture was consequential.
The overwhelming majority of funds were used for private goods, with about 95
percent of all recipients reporting that they primarily received goods in the form of
cash that was then put towards livelihood activities (Barron et al., 2009b, Morel et al.,
2009).
Our first hypothesis is that, as the amount of aid increases, the target group will
obtain a greater share of the benefits in villages with a high threat of excluded group
contestation. To test the prediction, we divide the total amount (in monetary terms)
of goods that a respondent reported receiving by the size of the village’s aid windfall
to obtain a measure of per capita share of the aid windfall.112 Table 3.2 presents the
results for the civilian subsample.113 The columns present results from six different
models in which we fit linear and quadratic regressions separately on either side of
the threshold, both with and without village pre-treatment controls and district fixed
effects, for our preferred bandwidth of ± 150.
112Because we have a representative sample, a bigger share for respondents that belong to the target
group implies a bigger share for other group members.
113We use data from the full civilian subsample here because victim-hood was broadly defined in many
villages; we show in Appendix B.8 that we observe the same pattern of results if we define conflict
victims more narrowly using objective or subjective criteria.
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DV: Per capita windfall share for target group members
Linear spline Quadratic spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
no controls controls controls + no controls controls controls +
district f.e. district f.e.
Bigger windfall * High threat (γ) 0.97*** 1.38*** 1.08*** 1.58*** 1.93*** 1.36**
(0.34) (0.41) (0.39) (0.54) (0.55) (0.52)
0.006 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.010
Bigger windfall (τ) -0.46* -0.50* -0.29* -0.86* -0.98** -0.37
(0.26) (0.25) (0.17) (0.47) (0.47) (0.35)
0.081 0.050 0.091 0.073 0.041 0.292
High threat (δ) -0.57* -0.95*** -0.44 -0.83* -1.20** -0.79*
(0.29) (0.35) (0.31) (0.50) (0.48) (0.43)
0.056 0.008 0.165 0.099 0.015 0.071
Marginal effect of a bigger aid 0.51** 0.88*** 0.80** 0.72*** 0.95** 1.00**
windfall in ‘high threat’ villages (0.22) (0.30) (0.30) (0.25) (0.38) (0.39)
0.023 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.013 0.011
N 317 312 312 317 312 312
Band 150 150 150 150 150 150
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 based on a two-tailed test. All results are from survey weighted least squares
linear and quadratic regressions fitted separately on either side of the threshold. Standard errors are clustered at the
village level.
Table 3.2: Effect of Targeting a Bigger Aid Windfall on Target Group Benefits
0
1
2
3
-150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150
Share Received (Target Group)
Figure 4: Local polynomial regression showing the effect of targeting a bigger aid
windfall on the share received by the target group in high threat (black line) versus
lower threat (gray line) villages.
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The table shows three main findings, also shown in Figure 4. First, looking at the
final row of the table, there is strong evidence that targeting a bigger aid windfall
resulted in the target group receiving a greater share of the benefits in high threat
communities. Across all six main specifications, the coefficients are positive and
significant and suggest that targeting a bigger aid windfall caused a .5-1 percentage
point increase in the share of the windfall for the target group. Second, the coefficients
on Bigger windfall (τ) are negative and at least marginally significant in five out of
the six columns. This is consistent with the prediction that, as the amount of aid
increases, the share received by the target group is (weakly) decreasing in lower threat
communities. Finally, the findings in the first row show that, as windfall size increases,
the target group indeed received a greater share of the benefits in high threat relative
to lower threat communities. These differences are statistically and substantively
significant. Evidence in Appendix B.8 shows that, as windfall size increases, those
in the target group in high threat communities received 1.28 to 2.51 million rupiah
(USD $128-251) more than their counterparts in lower threat communities.114
Our second hypothesis is that the excluded group receive a greater share of the
windfall (and elites a smaller share) within high threat communities. To assess whether
the excluded group and elites benefited from BRA-KDP, we use three measures from
the survey that ask: “When the community has to make a decision about how to
allocate resources in the village, sometimes some groups benefit more than others.
Generally, do you think that [ex-GAM combatants/friends and family of the village
leader/people that are well-connected with local government]” do much or somewhat
better than others (coded 1), about the same as others (coded 0), or much or some-
what worse than others (coded -1). We combine the two measures pertaining to elite
114There is also no evidence from the survey that BRA-KDP goods had been given or taken away one
month after receiving them, allaying concerns about forced redistribution after the initial allocation.
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benefits into an index using inverse covariance weighting.115
DV: Perceived benefits for excluded group
Linear spline Quadratic spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
no controls controls controls + no controls controls controls +
district f.e. district f.e.
Bigger windfall * High threat -0.11 1.01*** 0.87*** 0.27 0.97*** 1.05***
(0.35) (0.31) (0.33) (0.38) (0.36) (0.29)
0.752 0.002 0.010 0.471 0.008 0.000
Bigger windfall -0.20 -0.30 -0.36** -0.15 0.06 -0.30*
(0.25) (0.20) (0.16) (0.27) (0.23) (0.16)
0.430 0.131 0.025 0.583 0.780 0.063
High threat -0.01 -0.50* -0.55** 0.04 -0.32 -0.34
(0.24) (0.26) (0.23) (0.24) (0.29) (0.21)
0.979 0.059 0.019 0.883 0.266 0.116
Marginal effect of a bigger aid -0.31 0.71*** 0.51* 0.13 1.04*** 0.76***
windfall in ‘high threat’ villages (0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.30) (0.22)
0.207 0.007 0.067 0.640 0.001 0.001
N 315 310 310 315 310 310
Band 150 150 150 150 150 150
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 based on a two-tailed test. All results are from survey weighted least squares
linear and quadratic regressions fitted separately on either side of the threshold. Standard errors are clustered at
the village level.
Table 3.3: Effect of Targeting a Bigger Aid Windfall on Perceived Excluded Group Benefits
The main results on perceived ex-combatant benefits are presented in Table 3.3,
where the results in the final row show the marginal effect of targeting a bigger aid
windfall in high threat villages. The coefficients in this row are positive and significant
at least at the 90 percent confidence level in four of the six main specifications, sug-
gesting that former combatants indeed receive more in such contexts. These findings
are consistent with those in Table 3.4, which reports results from the ex-combatant
subsample on what they actually received from BRA-KDP. While the ex-combatant
sample is small (n=117 in the ± 150 bandwidth) and more susceptible to false pos-
itives, the findings nonetheless are consistent with the perceptions results and with
the prediction that a bigger aid windfall causes ex-combatants to capture a greater
share of the windfall in high threat communities.
115While we have data on what ex-combatants actually received from BRA-KDP (see below), we do
not have data on what elites actually received.
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DV: Per capita windfall share for ex-combatants
Linear spline Quadratic spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
no controls controls controls + no controls controls controls +
district f.e. district f.e.
Bigger windfall * High threat 0.78* 1.71*** 0.84 1.28*** 1.59*** 0.99**
(0.41) (0.55) (0.51) (0.48) (0.55) (0.46)
0.059 0.002 0.101 0.009 0.005 0.033
Bigger windfall -0.87*** -0.92*** -0.45* -0.93*** -0.55 0.54*
(0.14) (0.25) (0.24) (0.20) (0.34) (0.28)
0.000 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.108 0.056
High threat -0.62** -2.19*** -1.53*** -0.64 -2.06*** -2.62***
(0.31) (0.48) (0.58) (0.41) (0.50) (0.55)
0.048 0.000 0.010 0.116 0.000 0.000
Marginal effect of a bigger aid -0.09 0.79* 0.39 0.35 1.03** 1.52***
windfall in ‘high threat’ villages (0.39) (0.44) (0.38) (0.44) (0.48) (0.38)
0.824 0.072 0.317 0.425 0.033 0.000
N 117 117 117 117 117 117
Band 150 150 150 150 150 150
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 based on a two-tailed test. All results are from survey weighted least squares
linear and quadratic regressions fitted separately on either side of the threshold. Standard errors are clustered at
the village level.
Table 3.4: Effect of Targeting a Bigger Aid Windfall on Excluded Group Benefits (ex-combatant sample)
The model predicts that the reverse will be true for elites; in other words, as
windfall size increases, there will be less elite capture in high threat communities as
elites are forced to give the target and excluded groups a greater share of the windfall
in order to forestall excluded group contestation. The coefficients in the final row
of Table 3.5 are generally negative and are significant in two of the quadratic spline
specifications. While this is somewhat weaker evidence for the second hypothesis it
nonetheless suggests support for the predictions of the model in light of the findings
already presented.
All in all, the results thus far are generally consistent with the main predictions
of the model in showing that the target group receives a bigger share of the aid in
communities with a high threat of excluded group contestation. These results are
highly robust to alternative specifications, bandwidths, and extended analyses (see
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DV: Perceived benefits for elites
Linear spline Quadratic spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
no controls controls controls + no controls controls controls +
district f.e. district f.e.
Bigger windfall * High threat -0.62 -0.37 -1.09 -1.56*** -1.72** -2.95***
(0.61) (0.80) (0.86) (0.48) (0.73) (0.80)
0.308 0.645 0.209 0.002 0.020 0.000
Bigger windfall 0.26 0.46 0.55* 0.57* 1.18*** 1.24***
(0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.33) (0.37) (0.38)
0.387 0.148 0.074 0.087 0.002 0.001
High threat 0.35 -0.06 0.53 0.31 0.27 1.45**
(0.26) (0.58) (0.68) (0.31) (0.52) (0.60)
0.175 0.917 0.433 0.325 0.608 0.017
Marginal effect of a bigger aid -0.36 0.09 -0.54 -0.99*** -0.54 -1.71**
windfall in ‘higher threat’ villages (0.54) (0.64) (0.69) (0.35) (0.62) (0.66)
0.500 0.887 0.439 0.005 0.382 0.012
N 312 307 307 312 307 307
Band 150 150 150 150 150 150
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 based on a two-tailed test. All results are from survey weighted least squares
linear and quadratic regressions fitted separately on either side of the threshold. Standard errors are clustered at the
village level.
Table 3.5: Effect of Targeting a Bigger Aid Windfall on Perceived Elite Benefits
Appendices B.8, B.7, and B.9). All in all, our findings show that targeting a bigger
aid windfall does lead to more effective aid targeting in communities where the threat
of excluded group contestation is high.
4.2 Contestation and social cohesion
While the evidence so far shows that targeting bigger aid windfalls result in better
targeting in high threat communities, we next investigate whether doing so comes at
the cost of social cohesion. We remind readers that the distributive results presented
above are not dependent on contestation actually occurring, rather the threat of
contestation is sufficient to produce these outcomes. Yet, contestation is a possible
and important mechanism, which motivates our investigation.
We first test our third hypothesis that bigger windfalls—unconditional on local
context—increase the likelihood of contestation and, consequently, a deterioration of
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group relations. To measure relations between the excluded group and target group,
we use inverse covariance weighting to create an index of ‘GAM acceptance’ that
aggregates five survey measures that capture civilian willingness to accept GAM in
various roles, including as members of village associations, as village leaders, and as
close friends. We also employ a more general question from the survey that asked
whether individuals felt that conflict in their village was resolved satisfactorily (coded
1) or tended to endure (coded 0), which less directly proxies for a persistent deteri-
oration in relations. If bigger windfalls resulted in more contestation and worsened
relations, we expect to see a negative coefficient on both measures.
In general, there are high levels of reported acceptance of former GAM (see Ap-
pendix B.5). Yet, the findings in Panel A of Table 3.6 provide weak evidence that
targeting a bigger aid windfall did in fact undermine acceptance of former GAM com-
batants. In five out of six specifications the coefficients are negative and in two of
them the effect is significant at at least the 90 percent confidence level. There is little
indication of any significant effects for our measure of conflict resolution in Panel B.
Additionally, we explore whether bigger windfalls resulted in more contestation
in high versus lower threat villages. While the model does not yield the specific
prediction of a differential effect in high versus lower threat villages, it is possible that
contestation is more likely in high threat villages. This is important to investigate
empirically to shed more precise light on whether greater effective targeting in high
threat villages indeed comes at the expense of less social cohesion in high threat
villages.
The results in Panel A of Table 3.7 suggest that bigger windfalls reduced GAM
acceptance in lower threat villages (as indicated by the negative coefficients on Bigger
windfalls), while the lack of a statistically significant interaction implies similar effects
in high threat villages. Of greater interest are the results in the final row of Panel
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Linear spline Quadratic spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
no controls controls controls + no controls controls controls +
district f.e. district f.e.
Panel A: Index of Ex-combatant Acceptance
Bigger windfall -0.10 -0.38* -0.42** 0.27 -0.19 -0.31
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.31) (0.32) (0.28)
0.578 0.050 0.033 0.386 0.563 0.274
N 317 312 312 317 312 312
Panel B: Conflict resolved satisfactorily
Bigger windfall 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.22 0.16
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.18) (0.14)
0.373 0.534 0.645 0.804 0.233 0.257
N 313 308 308 313 308 308
Band 150 150 150 150 150 150
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
District fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 based on a two-tailed test. All results are from survey weighted
least squares linear and quadratic regressions fitted separately on either side of the threshold. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level.
Table 3.6: Effect of Targeting a Bigger Aid Windfall on Social Cohesion (Unconditional on Threat)
B, which suggest that a bigger aid windfall had a positive effect on perceptions of
conflict resolution in high threat villages.
We interpret this result as consistent with a story in which distributive outcomes
in high threat villages were due to the threat of excluded group contestation rather
than contestation itself. Moreover, the findings suggest that distributions to GAM
might have even helped to serve as a form of conflict resolution. In other words, there
could have been a number of communities that were on the brink of contestation but
that just managed—through their own efforts or with assistance from the program
implementers—to reach a solution that appeased the excluded group, helping to ame-
liorate tensions and create a stronger impression of satisfactory conflict resolution.
This is especially plausible in the BRA-KDP case given that staff actively intervened
to mediate tensions when they arose. Indeed, of known attempts by former combat-
ants to extort funds in eight sub-districts, such intervention led GAM to withdraw
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Linear spline Quadratic spline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
no controls controls controls + no controls controls controls +
district f.e. district f.e.
Panel A: Index of Ex-combatant acceptance
Bigger windfall * High threat 0.41 0.08 0.09 0.65 0.25 0.53
(0.39) (0.71) (0.72) (0.47) (0.77) (0.69)
0.302 0.909 0.902 0.168 0.748 0.446
Bigger windfall -0.17 -0.41* -0.48* 0.01 -0.27 -0.50
(0.21) (0.22) (0.26) (0.27) (0.23) (0.33)
0.420 0.073 0.067 0.967 0.244 0.131
High threat -0.23 0.25 0.46 -0.58 -0.07 -0.29
(0.36) (0.63) (0.60) (0.45) (0.70) (0.58)
0.529 0.697 0.446 0.200 0.917 0.618
Marginal effect of a bigger aid 0.24 -0.32 -0.39 0.67* -0.02 0.02
windfall in ‘high threat’ villages (0.33) (0.61) (0.59) (0.38) (0.71) (0.50)
0.472 0.598 0.517 0.085 0.973 0.962
N 317 312 312 317 312 312
Panel B: Conflict resolved satisfactorily
Bigger windfall * High threat 0.55* 0.63** 0.77*** 0.22 0.36 0.38
(0.28) (0.25) (0.23) (0.36) (0.30) (0.26)
0.052 0.011 0.001 0.548 0.232 0.145
Bigger windfall -0.08 -0.09 -0.14 -0.07 0.08 0.03
(0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
0.283 0.401 0.213 0.514 0.523 0.783
High threat -0.42* -0.82*** -0.85*** -0.25 -0.57** -0.56**
(0.25) (0.22) (0.21) (0.36) (0.29) (0.23)
0.099 0.000 0.000 0.491 0.048 0.018
Marginal effect of a bigger aid 0.48* 0.54*** 0.62*** 0.15 0.44 0.42*
windfall in ‘high threat’ villages (0.27) (0.20) (0.17) (0.34) (0.27) (0.21)
0.083 0.007 0.001 0.668 0.105 0.051
N 313 308 308 313 308 308
Band 150 150 150 150 150 150
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 based on a two-tailed test. All results are from survey weighted least squares
linear and quadratic regressions fitted separately on either side of the threshold. Standard errors are clustered at the
village level.
Table 3.7: Effect of Targeting a Bigger Aid Windfall on Social Cohesion
its demands in all known cases (Morel et al., 2009, 31). This supports the conclu-
sion that actual contestation was rare in BRA-KDP and that its most severe social
consequences might have been avoided.
In sum, there is suggestive evidence that bigger windfalls reduced GAM acceptance
overall but possibly resulted in more enduring conflict resolution in higher threat
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villages that avoided contestation. These findings are broadly consistent with the
third hypothesis but underscore that whether or not bigger windfalls harm social
cohesion in high threat villages could depend on how close those communities are
to bargaining breakdown and how capable they are of avoiding it. Thus, while the
results for our context are reassuring, they do not alter the central insights of the
model that aid targeting can have detrimental social outcomes.
5 Alternative Explanations and External Validity
Our theory and evidence show that targeting is more effective in villages with suffi-
ciently big windfalls and with a high threat of excluded group contestation. Consistent
with the predictions from the model, we find that both the target and excluded group
benefit more in villages with a high threat of excluded group contestation and that
receive bigger aid windfalls. We also find suggestive evidence that bigger windfalls
reduced social cohesion—namely acceptance of former combatants—on average, but
that the distributive arrangements reached in high threat villages might have had the
effect of conflict resolution.
One possible alternative mechanism for the results presented above is that ex-
GAM combatants in high threat villages used their leverage to obtain more benefits
for the target group in order to build social capital. If social capital-building were the
motivation, we might expect to see both greater distributions to the target group and
improved relations in high threat communities, rather than the deteriorated relations
predicted by the model.
We see little evidence for this alternative mechanism, however. First, the results
presented above do not specifically show relations with ex-combatants improved in
high threat communities. Second, if GAM were acting in a purely altruistic way—
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championing the interests of the target group at the expense of its own material
gain—then we would not expect to see evidence of it also taking a bigger share for
itself in high threat communities, which we do. Finally, if GAM were acting in a
more narrowly altruistic way—championing both its interests and those of the target
group—there is no reason to expect that this would succeed in building social capital.
Indeed, there were many BRA-KDP villages in which GAM pushed for an equal
division of aid among all civilian and conflict-affected households, akin to threatening
contestation on behalf of both the target group and itself. While community members
acquiesced to avoid tension, such actions by the excluded group produced lingering
resentment (Morel et al., 2009, 19). This pattern is consistent with evidence from
other contexts that non-beneficiaries often seek to appropriate aid for themselves and
do so at the expense of their community relations (e.g. de Sardan et al., 2015).
Another potential concern with this study might be that the theoretical model
developed here is only relevant to our immediate empirical context of Aceh. As such,
it might be the case that our model is not relevant to understanding outcomes in
other targeted aid programs or that our findings would not extend beyond the case
of Aceh.
We believe that the theory developed here can in fact shed light on targeting
outcomes in a wide variety of settings. We show in Section 1 that the assumptions
under-pinning our model are common features of targeted aid programs. In other
words, it is widely recognized that community dynamics matter; aid is targeted at
vulnerable groups; elites can formally or informally influence distributions, raising
concerns about elite capture; and non-beneficiaries try to obtain a share for themselves
in targeted aid programs (e.g. Rao & Iba´n˜ez, 2005, Barron et al., 2007, Angeles &
Neanidis, 2009, Caeyers & Dercon, 2012, de Sardan et al., 2015, Kilic et al., 2013,
Zurcher, 2017). While our scope conditions rule out some targeted aid programs—
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namely those in which aid organizations distribute benefits directly to the target
group without using local intermediaries—there are still many situations in which we
expect it to be relevant.
To that end, while we investigate bargaining and contestation in the context of
community-driven development, we do not believe our approach is limited to CDD.
While CDD is a common for of aid targeting (Mansuri & Rao, 2004) and thus impor-
tant to understand in its own right, we expect that the dynamics observed here could
play out in any context in which community members have means—whether through
informal or formal, peaceful or violent channels—to challenge elite decision-making.
This builds on the observation that similar dynamics to those modeled here have
also been reported in conditional cash transfer, employment, and humanitarian aid
programs (de Sardan et al., 2015, Zurcher, 2017).
We also do not view our model as limited to conflict settings, insofar as many
non-conflict settings meet our scope conditions and are prone to elite capture, non-
beneficiary capture, and heightened social divisions (de Sardan et al., 2015, Galasso
& Ravallion, 2005b, Kilic et al., 2013). Importantly, one of the benefits of the model
is that it provides a framework for thinking about how our empirical findings in Aceh
might generalize to different empirical contexts. A central feature of the model—
and what makes it broadly relevant to both conflict and non-conflict settings—is
that it crystallizes predictions about the effectiveness of aid targeting for different
types of local contexts. In contexts where the excluded group is strong and has
bad relations—which might be more common in conflict-affected environments—the
model predicts that both the target group and excluded group will receive a bigger
share of the aid on average. Conversely, in communities where the excluded group has
good relations with elites and/or the target group—which might be more common in
non-conflict settings—the model predicts less effective aid targeting and more elite
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and/or excluded group capture.116 All in all, while the explanatory power of our
model can only be uncovered through more empirical testing in different contexts,
we hope that the theory and evidence presented here will motivate future research in
conflict and non-conflict contexts alike.
Finally, we note that another possible concern is that there are sometimes multiple
aid programs implemented in the same communities, either sequentially or simulta-
neously. We believe that there is good reason to view dynamics in each targeted
aid program as independent rather than interrelated, especially in contexts where
resources are scarce and aid programs are sufficiently separated in time. That does,
in fact, describe the context in which BRA-KDP was implemented (Morel et al.,
2009). While theorizing and testing the interdependence of dynamics from multiple
aid programs is beyond the scope of this paper, this is an important avenue for future
research and we believe that the model presented here lays the foundation for such
an investigation.
6 Conclusion
It is widely appreciated that while targeted aid programs hold the promise of better
economic welfare for populations in need they can also have adverse effects in the
form of elite capture, mis-targeting or non-beneficiary capture, or heightened social
divisions. Thus, a central challenge of targeting aid involves ensuring that assistance
reaches those for whom it is intended without harming social cohesion within recip-
ient communities. This paper investigates how the economic and social outcomes
116Interestingly, our predictions for lower threat communities are consistent with the findings in Alatas
et al. (2013b), who show that formal elites are more likely to capture aid targeted at the poor than
informal elites, which they attribute to greater reputational costs for the latter. While the authors
do not theorize the strategic interaction, their results are consistent with ours insofar as informal
elites constitute an excluded group that value on maintaining good relations.
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of targeted aid programs depend on the interaction of windfall size and community
dynamics. Our central finding is that targeting will be more effective at reaching
vulnerable populations when non-beneficiaries are willing and able to challenge elite
authority to try to appropriate a share of the aid for themselves. It is this competition
over resources between two more powerful actors—elites and non-beneficiaries—that
can have surprising distributive benefits for the target population.
This finding contributes to research on aid targeting by offering a novel explanation
for a central dilemma at the heart of aid targeting: When is the target group—
as a weak group—ever going to get more of the benefits to which it is entitled in
the presence of more powerful actors who might seek to appropriate benefits for
themselves? Existing answers to this question tend to focus on norms of generosity
(Harragin & Chol, 1998); the monitoring and enforcement abilities of aid agencies
(Paul, 2006b, Dietrich, 2013); or the notion that aid empowers the target group and
enables it to hold elites or aid agencies accountable (Winters, 2014). While important,
these explanations rest on sometimes questionable assumptions—that norms prevail
over material-self-interest, that aid agencies have perfect control over targeting, and
that vulnerable groups can effectively hold more powerful actors accountable. We
provide an explanation for when targeting is more likely to be effective that allows
for self-interested actors, imperfect agencies, and a weak target group, which are
ubiquitous features of targeted aid programs.
Another contribution of this paper is to highlight that bigger windfalls can im-
prove targeting in some communities but at the cost of social cohesion. This finding
is relevant to a growing literature on aid and conflict interested in how targeted aid
windfalls affect interactions among vulnerable populations, rebel groups, and the gov-
ernment (Wood & Sullivan, 2015, Zurcher, 2017) but that has not yet fully theorized
the strategic dynamics. As Zurcher (2017, 519) notes in a recent review article, one
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of the most important avenues for future research on this subject is studying sys-
tematically which local environments are more or less conducive to benefiting from
aid. Our paper presents one of the first attempts to crystallize these conditions by
focusing on the relationship between windfall size and community dynamics.
The findings presented here also have implications for understanding the con-
sequences of targeted aid programs in non-conflict settings. Much of the existing
literature on elite or non-beneficiary capture in non-conflict environments produces
mixed results (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006b, Niehaus et al., 2013, Alatas et al.,
2013b). This paper shows that accounting for three relevant groups within a commu-
nity can provide a deeper understanding of when aid capture is likely to occur, how
severe it is likely to be, and who—whether elites or non-beneficiaries—will capture
more. It also highlights the need to consider the social consequences of targeted aid
programs in non-conflict settings as it is still possible for relations to deteriorate in
the face of competition over aid.
Finally, this paper sheds light on how windfall size affects economic and social
outcomes within communities. While we might expect bigger aid windfalls to yield
more benefits in poor communities, a large literature on the resource and aid curses
suggests that introducing free commodities into resource-poor environments can in-
crease corruption, rent-seeking, and conflict (Svensson, 2000b, Wright & Winters,
2010, Ross, 2013, Zurcher, 2017). We add nuance to this literature by showing how
bigger windfalls can have contradictory effects, resulting in better economic welfare
for the target group in some communities while at the same time increasing the
risk of social conflict more broadly. All in all, the theory and evidence presented
here underscore the importance of appreciating that targeted aid windfalls can in-
duce distributional conflict among different groups within a community and that it
is ultimately the nature of group dynamics that drives the outcome of that process.
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